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THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD 



ITS RELATION TO THE THEORY 
OF KNOWLEDGE IN ST. THOMAS 



DISSERTATION 



SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE 

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PART 

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR 

OF PHILOSOPHY 



BY 



MATTHEW SCHUMACHER, C. S. C. 

(A. B., S. T, B.) 



NOTRE DAME, INDIANA 

UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1905. 



.S3 



Gift 

5 oe 



Go tbe fl&emorg 

of 

IRev. peter Jobannes, a. 5. a. 



CONTENTS. 



Introduction - 1 

Historical 10 

CHAPTER I. 

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

General Principles of Knowledge 33 

a. Union of Subject and Object 36 

b. Object Known according to the Nature of the 

Subject .= 41 

c. Immateriality and Actuality of Subject and Object 46 

section n. 

Theory of Intellectual Knowledge 54 

a. Prime and Connatural Object of the Intellect 54 

b. Active and Passive Intellects 58 

c. Intelligible Species, Completion of the Act of 

Knowledge 64 

section m. 
Validity of Knowledge 65 

a. Sensible and Intellectual 67 

b. Adaequatio Rei et Intellectus 73 

c. Relativity of Knowledge 79 

SECTION IV. 

Causality and Knowledge 83 



CHAPTER II. 
THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD. 

SECTION I. 

Existence of God 95 

a. Relation between Chapters I. and II 96 

b. Existence and Conception, Relation of. 98 

c. Existence of God— How Known ? 99 

1. Ontological Argument, not by 101 

2. Demonstration, by 106 

3. Innatism of Aquinas 109 

4. Arguments to Prove Existence of God 116 

SECTION II. 

The First Cause 119 

section ni. 
Nature of God 130 

a. Infinitely Knowable in Itself. 132 

b. Ontologism Rejected 136 

c. Position of Aquinas— God Known by His Mani- 

festations 141 

1. Primum Ens 142 

2. Remotion, Eminence, Causality 143 

3. Analogy, Similarity, Relation 148 

4. Anthropomorphism 161 

SECTION IV. 

xApplication of Principles to : 

1. Infinity 165 

2. Omniscience: 169 

3. Omnipotence. 173 

4. Personality 175 

5. The Rounded Concept, Qui est 179 

Epilogue 183 

Bibliography 187 



ABBREVIATIONS. 



C. G. for Contra Gentes. C. G., 1. i, c. 10 means, 
Contra Gentes, book i, chapter 10. 

Sum. Theol. for Summa Theologica. Sum. Theol., 
I, q. 10., a. i ad 2 means, Summa Theologica, 
first part, question 10, article i, second objection. 

De Veri. for De Veritate. De Veri., q. i, a. 2 means 
De Veritate, question 1, article 2. 

Com. on L,omb. I, Dis. 5, q. 1. a. 3 means, Commen- 
tary on the Lombard, first book, distinction 5, 
question 1, article 3. 

Others can be understood from these. 



INTRODUCTION. 



If truth is God's handwriting, the ink is indel- 
ible and the page indestructible. If the world is 
God's, it cannot deny its allegiance. The Con- 
ception of God as found in the works of St. 
Thomas is the expression of the power of the 
Creator as witnessed to by the work of His 
hands. The question of God has never been a 
problem of the past; in some phase it has 
always demanded the best thought of the best 
thinkers of all epochs. There are times, however, 
when it seems to arouse especial attention — 
when its full import for all thought is pressed 
home. We are now in such a time, for we have 
gone to the very root of the problem — we are 
now concerned with the Idea of God. Not so 
much the existence of God, nor a discussion of 
His Attributes specifically, but the quest is for 
a Conception of God that will quell our uneasi- 
ness in presence of many apparent confusions, and 
satisfy our demand for an adequate explanation. 
Many have been and are to-day seeking this 
Concept, but it is an idle attempt unless the path 
that leads to it has been shown to be sure and 
consistent, for this Idea is not the product of 
bare thought. In other words, our Concept can 



only have the validity of the methods that have 
been employed in reaching it. 

Prof. Ladd has pointed out what he considers 
preliminary to the formation of the Concept of 
God. We must know the development of man's 
religious life, w r e must know human nature in its 
totality, and, finally, we must have " points of 
view for regarding the sum-total of human ex- 
perience which will bear the test of the severest 
critical and reflective thinking.' ' l This last point 
as stated in another place — " A tenable and con- 
sistent theory of knowledge is then, an indis- 
pensable part of the prolegomena to an argument 
for the being of God," 2 is what we wish to show 
in the present paper. Our aim— and this is the 
implicit burden of all Scholastic treatments of 
this subject — is to show the intimate connection 
between the Theory of Knowledge set forth by 
St. Thomas and his handling of the Knowable- 
ness of God. The principles he uses in arriving 
at a knowledge of any subject are unchanged 
when he comes to discuss the question of our 
knowledge of God. Ladd also notes that we must 
have some theory of reality — we shall state like- 
wise the theory of reality held by our author and 
follow it throughout. "In general the cause of 

1 G. T. Ladd, Prolegomena to an Argument for the Being of 
God. Phil. Rev., v. 12, pp. 130-137. 

2 hoc. cit., p. 136. 



— 3 — 

Theodicy is bound up with that of Metaphysics. 
The science of God is a part of the science of 
being." 3 The relation of the knowableness of 
God to the theory of knowledge is so close in 
Aquinas that a presentation of the two together 
may give a more satisfying view of the position 
he held, and which Christian Philosophy also 
holds, than those unacquainted with his works 
and not in sympathy with his thoughts are 
accustomed to have. With this purpose we have 
written what cannot be new to students of 
Scholastic Philosophy, but what may serve to 
awaken in others a friendly regard for a Concep- 
tion of God arrived at by ways so unlike the 
ones they are wont to use. 

There are a few points in the method of St. 
Thomas that are worth noting at the outset. He 
begins with a vague sort of a Conception of God 
that he considers common to all men. By induc- 
tion he arrives at a concept more specific yet not 
complete; this concept he treats by deduction 
and evolves its implications. The development 
of this concept by deduction is done according to 
carefully formulated tests ; its necessity is due to 
the nature of our mind, for God is truly one, all 
attributes are identical in Him, but we can only 
know Him by considering them separately. As 



3 Janet et S£ailles, Histoire de la Philosophic, p. 888. 



a result we have a full and many-sided concept, 
and no one attribute in particular is made to 
bear the burden of the whole. 

One of the most striking differences between 
the attitude of Aquinas and that of Moderns 
who have no specific interest in the Conception 
of God they reach, provided it harmonizes in some 
way with the general trend of the philosophical 
systems they are following or framing unto 
themselves, is the directness and consistency with 
which he meets the problem in all its develop- 
ments. "Even when we recognize that the 
modern spirit is less trammeled in its researches, 
we shall be forced to admit that it is to some 
extent hampered by the restrictions which arise 
from the cultivations of 'systems* and from loyalty 
to the traditions of the 'schools.' " 4 St. Thomas 
sees his way clearly and he utilizes his light to 
the fullest measure — there is no hesitation when 
it is asked is such an attribute to be found in 
God. At once the answer is given — and this is so 
because his principles are plainly before him and 
they are the test of his Concept. This fact is 
highly commendable whether we agree with his 
principles or not. There are few Conceptions of 
God given us at present — outside of Christian 



4 Prof. W. Turner, Recent Literature on Scholastic Philoso- 
phy. The Journal of Phil., Psychol., and Scienti£c Methods, 
April 14, 1904, p. 201. , 



— 5 — 

Philosophy — where the position is ever essen- 
tially the same, that cannot be criticised on the 
score of unwarranted assumption, inconsistent 
development, incomplete presentation, — some of- 
fend against all three. 

If we contrast a thought taken from Spencer 
and one from Paulsen with the position of 
Aquinas this will be evident. It will show how- 
he admitted the truth in each of their doctrines 
and yet did not stop where they did. With 
Spencer from a consideration of Causation in the 
world he comes to a First Cause; but Spencer 
says, if we reason on the nature of this Cause we 
land in contradiction — "the conception of the 
Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we 
view it, appears encompassed w4th contradic- 
tions", 5 and hence is practically unknowable. 
Paulsen, speaking of the God of Pantheists, re- 
marks : " We cannot presume to give an exhaus- 
tive definition of the inner life of the all-real God. 
. . . The difference between human and divine 
inner life must indeed be great and thorough- 
going, so great that there can be no homogeneity 
at any point." 6 With this statement St. Thomas 
holds that we cannot have an exhaustive defini- 
tion of God; his fundamental thesis — we can 
know God from creation as a likeness of Him — 



5 First Principles, p. 42. 

6 Introd. to Phil., p. 252, trans. 



— 6 — 

is opposed to the second half of Paulsen's view. 
"From sensible things", Aquinas says, "our 
intellect cannot attain to a view of God's essence 
( inner life ) because creatures are effects of God 
not equalling the power of the Cause. . . They 
lead us, how r ever, to a knowledge of God's exist- 
ence and from them we learn what we must 
ascribe to God." 7 Agnosticism wishes to know 
too much, Pantheism is too modest, as usual the 
mean is more satisfying. What Caldecott says 
of the Idea of God found in Bradley's "Appear- 
ance and Reality," w r e quote in a more general 
sense as applicable, in our opinion, to the short- 
comings of much writing on this question. "Is 
it an impertinence to suggest to an original 
thinker that a consideration of the canon of i ap- 
plication of terms of human thought to the 
Deity' formulated by Aquinas, and never sur- 
passed in penetrative and judicious subtlety, 
might relieve the vacillation and inconsistency, 
which is the great defect of Mr. Bradley's work 
as it stands." 8 This, to our mind, is also the 
defect of Prof. Royce's "Conception", as we 
shall point out in the text ; Prof. Royce uses the 
same terms as Mr. Bradley. 9 
There is no need of presenting the views of the 

7 Sum. TheoL, q. 12, a. 12. 

8 The Philosophy of Religion, p. 396. 

9 The Conception of God, pp. 44, 45. 



thinkers of all times on our question. At most 
we might show how their Idea of God w r as 
an outcome of their Theory of Knowledge and 
Reality. We shall be content to bring to light 
again the view of Aquinas, for we are apt to 
overlook what has been done when all energies 
are bent on doing something new. As far as 
we know, the question has not been handled 
explicitly in the way we are presenting it, at 
least in English. 10 It seemed more satisfactory 
to give the Theory of Knowedge of Aquinas as 
a basis for his Conception of God, rather than 
start with the Conception itself and be con- 
stantly referring to a set of principles that are 
now T here given together, and yet are closely 
connected with the subject itself. 

It is but fair to admit that Aquinas had 
advantages in the construction and development 
of his Idea of God that are not at hand for 
many to-day who are busy with this problem. He 
saw guiding -posts on all sides and he was 
presented with a set of ideas the value of which 
he did not question. The teaching of the 
Fathers, especially St. Augustine, the attitude 
of his age toward the Scriptures, the doctrine 



10 A Commentator on St. Thomas, Capreolus, handles the 
question practically in this way. He discusses the basic 
principles of knowledge, and then applies them to God. 
Cfir. Revue Thomiste, v. 8, Pegues. 



and influence of the Church in her varied 
activities, were all helps to one who gave his 
attention to the Supreme Thought of all these 
factors. Yet withal, Aquinas saw clearly the 
work of reason in the question of God and set 
himself to know what the powers of man could 
do to solve its meaning. His works bear 
testimony to the careful and detailed method 
he brought to bear on this question. We are 
told, however, by Dr. Carus, "the God of 
mediaeval theologians is a mere makeshift." 
"The more I think about the God-problem, the 
surer grows my conviction that the God of 
science is the true God, and the God of mediaeval 
theologians is a mere makeshift, a substitution 
for the true God, a temporary surrogate of God, 
a surrogate which at the time was good enough 
for immature minds, but too often only lead 
people astray." 11 

Dr. Carus tells us that our conception of God 
will be true "if only we agree to be serious in 
the purification of the God idea, if only we think 
of God as a truly divine being, if only we are 
serious in looking upon Him as truly eternal, 
omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, etc." He 
adds the astounding sentence : " The theologians 
of the past have never been serious in thinking 



11 "The God of Science," The Monist, April, 1904. 



— 9 — 

out these qualities of God to their very last 
conclusions.' ' Without speculating on what led 
to this statement, or inquiring into the author's 
acquaintance with the writings of mediaeval 
theologians, I will simply remark that had he 
sat in the lecture -hall of Aquinas and was 
determined to swear by his word, he could not 
have followed more faithfully, in essence, the 
method of Aquinas than he gives signs of in 
the present article, especially in the paragraph 
beginning, "God's thoughts are not transient 
successive representations." The method of 
Aquinas in this problem is golden, and its main 
import is to be ' serious in the purification of 
the God idea'. As Dr. Carus acknowledges no 
allegiance to the formulator of this method, it 
may be advantageous to consider that when 
the human mind is serious, no matter at what 
age it lives, it will be true to itself, and its 
methods will be commendable though the result 
reached may vary. Dr. Carus violates his own 
dictum in dealing with the mediaeval theo- 
logians; he says, "in my opinion it is the duty 
of the philosopher to judge every religion 
according to the best interpretation that its 
best representatives have given it." His attitude 
is sufficient warrant for our recalling the Con- 
ception of God according to Aquinas, for it is 
certainly a Conception of a w^orthy represen- 
tative of the mediaeval theologians. 



io — 



HISTORICAL. 



Before we take tip the problem directly, we 
shall say a few words on the principal works 
of St. Thomas in which he treats this question, 
and also point out briefly the position of this 
subject in his writings, as well as the influence 
that affected his view and presentation. The 
works that we shall outline are : Summa Theo- 
logica, Summa Contra Gentes, Commentary on 
the Lombard, Quaestiones Disputatae, Com- 
pendium Theologiae. 

"The Summa Theologica is the first system of 
Theology scientifically carried out. The theo- 
logical and speculative works of his predecessors 
and elder contemporaries as well as his own 
numerous works of many sorts are but a great 
and massive preparation for this work." 1 The 
development of theological science from the days 
of Anselm to those of Aquinas here finds com- 
prehensive and systematic expression. We find 
the purpose of the work stated in its prologue : 
"Our intention in this work is to present the 
teaching of the Christian Religion in a way 
suited for the instruction of beginners. " He, 



1 Werner, Der heilige Thomas von Aquino, v. 1, p. 801. 



II 



therefore, proposes to avoid questions and 
distinctions that confuse the beginner, and to 
give a connected view of the whole field of 
sacred knowledge. There are three parts to 
the work; the first treats of God in Himself, 
the second of man in his relation to God, the 
third of Christ as the way that leads to God. 
The parts are made up of questions; each 
question is divided into a number of articles, 
and each article opens with a few objections 
against the special point to be discussed; then 
there is a positive statement of doctrine with 
accompanying arguments; and finally, the 
previously proposed objections are answered. 
The first part is the one that interests us 
especially and only that portion which tells us 
what the human reason can know of God. 
This portion is well set forth in the following 
diagram taken from Werner. 2 



a) num sit; 



b) quomodo 



DE ESSENTIA DIYIXA. 

a. sit vel potius non sit: 

1. simplicitas, 

2. perfectio (bonitas) remota omni 

imperfectione creaturarum, 

3. infinitas, 

4. immutabilitas, 

5. aeternitas, 

6. unitas; 



/3. a nobis cognoscatur, 
W- a nobis nominetur; 



2 Loc. cit. f p. 803. 



12 



ad intra: 



(1. de scientia Dei, 
a. cognos- ) 2. de ideis, 

cendo "] 3. de vero et falso, 
[4. de vita Dei; 

1. de voluntate divina, 

2. de iis,quae absolute ad 
voluntatem pertinent: 

act. amor 

pp. justitia et miser- 
c) quomodo ^p. volendo < icordia, 

operetun 3. de iis, quae simul ad 

intellectum pertinent: 
aa. providentia. 
pp. praedestinatio 
(liber vitae) ; 
ad extra: de potentia Dei. 

This diagram comprises questions 2-26 of the 
Summa Theologica. It is completed for our 
purpose by adding questions 44-49, relating 
specifically to the First Cause of all things, 
duration and distinction of created things, evil 
and its cause. 

The Summa Contra Gentes is an Apology for 
the Christian Religion. The title given it by 
St. Thomas himself shows this: Summa de 
Veritate Fidei Catholicae. It was written at 
the request of St. Raymond of Pennafort, who 
wished to have a systematic presentation of the 
doctrine of the Church as a defence against the 
Moors in Spain. The work is divided into four 
books and each book is made up of chapters. 
The first three deal w r ith doctrine in the light of 
reason, the fourth is concerned with the data of 
revelation as beyond reason. The question of 



— 13 — 

God is paramount in these pages: God in Him- 
self, His essence and attributes, are treated of in 
the first book, God as the efficient and final 
cause of all things make up the second and 
third, as named. 

"It is the first work in which he (Aquinas) 
presented his system as a coherent whole", 3 
though not entirely complete, for the final 
expression of his thought is found in the Summa 
Theologica. These two works have much in 
common, yet differ in scope and method. The 
former is practically philosophical throughout, 4 
the latter is principally theological, though in 
each there are philosophical and theological 
discussions according to the topic treated. In 
method, the former is almost entirely positive in 
in its treatment, at least objections are seldom 
formally presented and answered, in the latter 
each article begins with a number of objections ; 
again, in the former there are a number of 
arguments advanced to support each question, 
in the latter there is usually but one. This is 
due to the fact, no doubt, that St. Thomas 
wished to make the Summa Theologica as clear 
and as easy as possible, since, in his own words, 
he wrote it for beginners. In the Summa Contra 
Gentes, "It is much more a question of basis 

3 Werner, loc. cit., p. 403. 

4 Hence often cited as Summa Philosophica. 



— i 4 — 

for the points raised than a development of 
them, hence the desire to vindicate in severe brief 
presentation the right value and necessarily 
concise acknowledgment of the truth contained 
in the question by means of as large a number 
of reasons as possible." 5 We shall shortly recur 
to the position of God in these works. 

In his Commentary on the Lombard, St. 
Thomas followed the division of the work of 
the author. There are four books containing 
in a systematic form the theology of the Church- 
God, Angels, man, creation, the saints, and like 
questions are discussed. Each book is made up 
of a number of distinctions, and these again are 
divided into questions and articles. The text of 
the Lombard served as a basis for the Com- 
mentators to give their own solution to the 
subject under consideration. These commen- 
taries are rather works on the Lombard than 
simple expositions of his meaning. This is 
sufficiently evidenced for by the diversity of 
opinion of the various commentators. This was 
the first comprehensive work of St. Thomas, and 
it " formed a mighty foundation for the further 
extension of theological efforts. The Commen- 
tary on the Lombard contains his w^hole 
teaching . . . though not in the thoroughly 



6 Werner, loc. cit. y p. 404. 



— 15 — 

constructed form of an independent system 6 ." 
The Quaestiones Disputatae comprise the 
lectures delivered by St. Thomas in theUniversity 
of Paris after he had finished his Commentary 
on the Lombard. " These are concerned with 
the most important and the most excellent ob- 
jects of theological speculation, namely, with 
those matters which are treated of in the first 
and second parts of the Summa TheologicaV 
They contain in rounded form the treatment of 
certain questions that a commentary, following 
a given plan, forbids one attempting. There are 
sixty-three questions in all with four hundred 
articles ; all these are given under a few general 
heads: De Potentia, De Alalo, De Spiritualibus 
Creaturis, De Anima, De Unione Yerbi, De Virtu- 
tibus, De Yeritate. The articles are preceded by 
numerous objections, sometimes as many as 
thirty, under the form quod videtur non. St. 
Thomas gave his "best and most active atten- 
tion to their elaboration. . . It has been remarked 
that Thomas wished to bring the art of the 
Scholastic Dialectic to its highest perfection in 
these Quaestiones Disputatae." 8 They were writ- 
ten rather for the trained philosopher than for 

6 Ibid., pp. 358-359. 

7 Ibid., p. 360. 

8 Werner, loc. cit., pp. 360-1. 



— i6 — 

the beginner. 9 Under the heading De Veritate, 
the question of knowledge and of God are 
handled in detail. 

The Compendium Theologiae was written for 
his dear companion, Bro. Reginald. Its original 
plan was to embrace briefly all theology, in three 
books, based on the virtues, faith, hope, and 
charity. The first book alone, containing two 
hundred and forty-six chapters, was completed. 
The chapters are short and concise. " The whole 
work is an intelligible and succinct summary 
view of the system of St. Thomas. " 10 This is 
strikingly true on the points of God, man's 
nature, and man's relation to the First Cause. 
"The doctrine of one God and the necessity of 
thinking of the condition of His existence, is de- 
rived in a strong and continuous series from the 
proof of a first highest mover of the world/ ' " 

The problem of God occupies the first place in 
all the works of Aquinas. " There is not a single 
one of St. Thomas's works that does not begin 
with the discussion of the existence and at- 
tributes of God." 12 This statement shows the 

9 A. Portmann, Die Systematik in den Quaestiones Disputa- 
tae des hi. Thomas von Aquino, Jahr. f. Phil u. Spek Theol., 
1892, pp. 127-150. 

10 Werner, loc. tit., p , 389. 

11 Ibid., loc. cit., p., 388. 

12 Jourdain, La Philosophic de St. Thomas d'Aquin, v. 1, 
p. 184. 



— i7 — 

importance attached to the question of God in 
our author's system ; a glance at any of his 
greater writings will suffice to make this evident. 
God, for him, is the creative and sustaining 
Power of all things, and He is also their last end. 
Creation in all its forms gets meaning only when 
viewed in relation to Him. In the development 
of our subject we shall see how all comes from 
the hand of God, how everything bears some 
trace of His operation, and how He is the 
unifying element in the variety about us. A 
knowledge of Him, no matter how meagre, is 
worth more than a thorough knowledge of all 
that is less than Him, for He is the greatest 
object that the human intelligence can consider 
and seek to know. " Among all the perfections 
found in created things, the greatest is to know 
God." 13 In a proem to the second question 
of the Summa Theologica, part I, St. Thomas 
gives his attitude on this question: " Since the 
principal intention is to give a knowledge of 
God, and not only as He is in Himself, but also 
as He is the Source and End of things, especially 
of rational creatures, we shall first treat of God, 
secondly, of the tendency of the rational creature 
toward God, and thirdly, of Christ who is our 
way in tending toward God. M Here we have his 

13 C. ft, 1 1, c. 47. 



— 18 — 

principal work outlined, and its basic thought 
is God. 

In both Summae, God is the all-embracing, all- 
important problem. The Idea of God is the 
pivotal idea in these works. The subsequent 
developments and deductions are so intimately 
bound up with it that all stands or falls 
together with it. This is seen very strikingly 
in the fact that St. Thomas considers God as 
the cause of all things and likewise as their last 
end — thus comprising the whole realm of the 
actual and the possible under all aspects. It is 
not an arbitrary measure on the part of Aquinas 
to give this prominence and preeminence to the 
God-question, for it arises from the very nature 
of the subject itself, from the very content of the 
Idea of God. The introductory remarks to the 
main divisions of the questions in the first part 
of the Summa Theologica show this clearly ; the 
same is evident in the other Summa where he 
devotes a chapter (1. 1, c. 9) to outlining his 
order and method, saying, he will first treat of 
God in Himself, then of God as Creator, and fin- 
ally of the relation of creation to God as an end. 

It is natural to ask in view of the detailed 
presentation of this problem in St. Thomas, how 
much of this delicate net -work is due to his 
workmanship. Is he responsible for all, or is 
he only a systematizer ? Neither, exactly. He 



— 19 — 

inherited an Idea of God that showed signs of 
the thoughts of some great minds, and which 
had been growing and becoming richer under 
the guidance of a solicitous tradition; but this 
Idea was fully grasped by him and set forth in 
a way that combined all previous thought, and 
yet evidenced a selection that proclaims the 
master mind and gives title to originality. A 
cursory view of the principal authors he drew 
from, and the condition of philosophy at his 
time, will give his position more accurately. 

Among the Greeks, the influence of Aristotle 
and Plato is unmistakable. His proofs for the 
existence of God are taken from them. God as 
Prime Mover and Intelligence are found in 
Aristotle, and " Thomas derived the most 
incisive proofs for the existence of God and 
for many of the divine perfections from 
Plato. ,,u That Aquinas went beyond the 
Conception of God arrived at by these two 
philosophers is no matter for surprise, for their 
Conception had been enriched by modification 
and addition long before the days of our 
author. In the Christian era, St. Augustine, 
and Dionysius the Areopagite, and Boethius are 
largely utilized. They are quoted frequently, 
and some of their statements are taken as a 



14 Schneider, Jahr. £ Phil. a. Spek. Theol., 1893, p. 470. 



— 20 — 

basis for the development of the particular 
aspect of God he is considering. It is true, St. 
Thomas quotes from other writers both before 
and after Christ, yet there is not the same 
practical intimacy betrayed as in the case of 
the writers just mentioned. He considered of 
sufficient importance the De Divinis Nominibus 
of Dionysius and the De Trinitate of Boethius 
to write a commentary on them. His presen- 
tation however, is rather the outcome of his 
assimilating the various elements that attended 
the grow r th of the Conception of God than a 
conscious borrowing from different sources; he 
brought his synthetic and selective mind to bear 
on the materials the past had gathered, and 
threw these into the form that Christian 
Philosophy has recognized as its own since his 
time. The synthesis is partly due to the stimu- 
lation of his age, and partly to the actuality 
of certain problems at that epoch. Werner 
points out that the fundamental thoughts or 
axioms in the questions 2-26 of the Summa 
Theologica are derived from some philosopher, 
some philosophical writing, or Father of the 
Church, and thus concludes the acquaintance of 
Aquinas with the learning of the past and his 
leaning toward tradition; we might add, it is 
a characteristic of the work of St. Thomas 
to assimilate all the good he knew of in the 



21 



efforts of others, no matter who they were. 
The question of God was given especial con- 
sideration in the generations immediately 
preceding Aquinas. The attitude of St. Anselm, 
who thought about the subject, with a view 
of giving it a simple yet comprehensive basis, 
until he was weary and about to desist from 
his inquiries, is a worthy introduction 
to the attention it received at the hands 
of Scholasticism during its growing days. 
" Theodicy was always regarded by the Scho- 
lastics as one of the most important chapters in 
philosophy . . . Theodicy (and it alone) remained 
faithful to the proper genus of Scholasticism/ M5 
The close connection between Theodicy and 
Religion in those days made this a practical 
necessity. Before St. Thomas took up the 
question, the Schools had witnessed the Con- 
troversy about the Universals ; Eclecticism, 
Mysticism, Pantheism, in turn passed by; the 
Arabian and Jewish Thinkers had given their 
version of Greek Philosophy that called for 
attention; his contemporaries or immediate 
predecessors, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, 
Albert the Great, wrote and influenced thought. 
There was certainly activity from the Pantheism 
of Scotus Erigena to the Angel of the Schools. 



16 DeWulf, Histoire de la Philosophic Medieval, p. 155. 



■22- 



The merit of Aquinas consists in the fact that 
he was not bewildered by the divergent views 
of previous thinkers, and that he did not branch 
off into a particular view of his own but 
accepted the truth contained in each, refuted 
fearlessly what he considered error, and out 
of it all gave us a conception that justly 
appreciates the careful efforts of many minds 
and ages. 

If we specify in greater detail the condition of 
thought at the time of St. Thomas, we shall be 
in a better position to judge the value of the 
statement so frequently made that Aquinas was 
little else than an imitator. Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages was not a unit; there was much 
diversity in the opinions held and defended. 
Scholasticism was but one form of philosophic 
thought, and thus does not stand for Mediaeval 
Philosophy as a whole, as DeWulf and Lindsay 
very well point out. "The philosophy of scho- 
lasticism should be understood as really not the 
same thing as mediaeval philosophy." 16 This 
distinction is important in the sense that it re- 
calls the fact — too often overlooked — that there 
was great mental activity in those times, with 
the consequence that a thinker had to choose 
one view among many. Aquinas chose pure 

16 Dr. Lindsay, Scholastic and Mediaeval Philosophy, 
Archivf. Gesch. der Phil,, v. 15, p. 42. 



— 23 — 

Aristotelianism, and gave form to the system 
that honors him as its chief exponent. 

This choice implied a discrimination and an in- 
dependence of thought that modifies to a large 
extent the imputation of a mere follower. His 
attitude toward the Pantheism of his time and 
the Arabian Philosophy are instances to the 
point. The statement of W. T. Harris — "Panthe- 
ism versus Christian Theism was on trial" in the 
days of Aquinas, is true. None the less true is 
his tribute to the way St. Thomas met the 
issue of his day regarding the problem of God. 
Aquinas "stated the Christian Idea so clearly in 
the language of the Intellect that the develop- 
ment of six hundred years has not superseded his 
philosophical forms. In fact, his comprehension 
is confirmed by the profoundest thought of our 
own time. The necessity of a philosophical sys- 
tem that shall make personality its central prin- 
ciple, and exhibit the true difference between the 
beings of nature and human souls should revive 
in our theological seminaries the study of 
Aquinas." 17 It is noteworthy that the discussion 
of the question of God during the last century 
was carried on along the same lines as were 
prominent in the Middle Ages, according to the 
view of Janet and Seailles. " The progress made 



17 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, v. 9, p. 327. 



— 2 4 — 

in our century consisted in sifting more precisely 
than ever the problem of God, in putting in 
presence of each other, for the first time, in an al- 
together direct manner, Theism and Pantheism. 
To limit this problem, to measure with accuracy 
the merits and defects of the personal and imper- 
sonal theory as such, has been the work of our 
century." 18 St. Thomas had to meet the Panthe- 
ism of Erigena, that of Bernard of Tours, 
Amaury of Bene, and David of Dinant. The 
last named identified God with first matter 
and provoked the only severe condemnation 
uttered by the ever mild and calm Angel of the 
Schools. 

Pantheism was also taught by the Arabians. 
Creation out of nothing was unknown to them, 
matter was eternal. Their dualism, however, 
admitted of emanation, and was thus Panthe- 
istic. They did not wish to separate God and 
matter absolutely, so they held that God created 
a first intelligence and from it all else proceeded. 
The source of this emanation was the thought of 
God, not His will. They taught the unity of 
the divine nature; finally, they denied to God 
a knowledge of individual and contingent 
things. 19 Ueberweg says of their philosophy: 

18 Histoire de la Philosophic, p. 288. 

19 Stockl, Gesch. der Phil des Mittelalters, v. 2-1, pp. 124- 
130. 



— 25 — 

"The whole philosophy of the Arabians was 
only a form of Aristotelianism, tempered more 
or less with Platonic conceptions. ,,2 ° And this 
characterization is common with the historians 
of philosophy; to quote another. "In their 
method however, in their principles by which 
they apprehend the universe, and in their entire 
system of philosophical conceptions they stand, 
so far as our information on the subject reaches, 
entirely under the combined influence of Aristot- 
elianism and Neo-Platonism ; and the same is 
true of the Jews*" 21 Aquinas has these philoso- 
phers in mind throughout his work, and refutes 
them as occasion offers, and he is also careful to 
show by explicit argument that his own position 
is not open to a Pantheistic interpretation. 

Perhaps the question of God is the portion of 
the doctrine of St. Thomas that shows best that 
his undoubted admiration for Aristotle did not 
prevent him from being an independent thinker. 
No one that has contrasted his theodicy with 
that of the Stagyrite can fail to note the larger 
and more thorough treatment of Aquinas, and 
the presence of ideas wholly absent from the 
work of the Philosopher. These additions are 
due to the development of the Divine Idea in 
Christianity, but their full comprehension and 

20 Hist, of Phil, v. 1, p. 246. trans. 

21 Windelband, A Hist, of Phil. , p. 316. 



— 26 — 

expression are the work of Aquinas, and, to 
repeat the words of Harris, 'his comprehension 
is confirmed by the profoundest thought of our 
time/ Some writers also remark that St. 
Thomas never got beyond the teaching of his 
master, Albertus Magnus. " Thomas of Aquin 
is led and determined by Albert, and it would be 
a great mistake to consider him an independent 
thinker. . . . For the historian of philosophy 
Thomas is but a very secondary person- 
age." 22 The relation of master and pupil in 
this case is of course very close, yet we can 
recognize the specific work of each. Windelband 
says justly: "The intellectual founder of this 
system (Scholasticism) was Albert of Bolls tadt. 
It owes its organic completion in all directions, 
its literary codification, and thus its historical 
designation to Thomas Aquinas. " 23 On the 
question of God itself, the exprofesso treatment 
of St. Thomas is much more extended and com- 
plete than that of his master, who only wrote as 
much of his Samma as we have, at earnest 
solicitation. 

Eucken says of Aquinas: "He was certainly 
no thinker of the first order . yet he was not on 
this account a mind of no consequence or a fana- 
tic. He was not much ahead of his times, but he 

22 Prantl. Geschkhte der Logik, v. 3, p. 107. 

23 Loc. tit., p. 311. 



— 27 — 

synthesized and reconstructed what the age 
offered, and thus satisfied a pressing need of the 
historical situation." 24 Dr. Lindsay, in the 
article referred to, though he says Scholasticism 
has received undue contempt, yet refers to the 
" servility of Aquinas before Aristotle." Prof. 
Dewey, in an article on Scholasticism, seems to 
think that Albertus and Thomas w r ere wholly 
dependent on Aristotle. He says: "In spite of 
(or better, because of) the conviction of Albertus 
and St. Thomas as to the relation of Aristotle to 
Church dogma, they are compelled to set aside 
certain doctrines as simply the products of reve- 
lation, utterly inaccessible to the natural mind — 
it being clear that Aristotle had not taught the 
doctrine of the Trinity or the Incarnation, 
&c." 2u In contrast we have the words of Prof. 
Royce, "He (Thomas) also vindicated for phil- 
osophy a certain limited, but very genuine, 
freedom of method and of opinion, within its 
own province. As a result, Thomas stands from 

24 Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker, pp 245-6, 
also, Thomas von Aquino und Kant. Bin Kampf zweier 
Welter? , Kant-Studien, v. 6. 

25 Diet, of Phil, and Psychol., Baldwin, vol. 2, p. 494. 
Prof. Dewey seems to forget that Albertus and St. Thomas 
believed in the Trinity and the Incarnation before they knew 
of Aristotle. They used the Stagyrite as an instrument; 
they explained these myteries, as far as human reason could 
go, by principles derived from Aristotle. This is rather 
evidence of independence of thought. 



— 28 — 

any fair point of view, Catholic or non-Catholic, 
decidedly high, not only as a theologian, but 
also as a rational inquirer." 26 

If we take for granted that St. Thomas was a 
thinker of note and did good service to his day, 
can we hold that he has a message for our day ? 
Opinion ouside the Church is not of a nature to 
warrant an affirmative answer. What Pope 
Leo intended by restoring the Philosophy of St. 
Thomas was not an imitation in the letter of the 
teaching of Aquinas, not the defending of specific 
doctrines whereon opinion is legitimately 
divided, not the adhering to statements that 
further knowledge has shown to be untenable; 
this much is held in a practical manner by all 
who are engaged in interpreting anew to our 
age the teaching of Aquinas. What the Pope 
desired, and what all true Neo-Scholastics hold 
as solid, are the essential principles that underly 
the Philosophy of St. Thomas. These are 
sound and have not yet been superseded. The 
Neo - Scholastic Movement is a school, if you 
will, as the followers of Descartes, Spinoza, 
Kant constitute a school; in this light it is 
entitled to as rational a consideration as any 
other philosophical movement recognizing a 
given thinker of the past as its head. Its fitness 

26 Pope Leo's Philosophical Movement and its Relations to 
Modern Thought.— Boston Evening Transcript, July 29, 1903. 



— 2 9 — 

is not a matter of a priori judgment, but must 
find its justification in meeting as well, if not 
better, the problems that our times are trying 
to solve 

The fitness of the Philosophy of St. Thomas, 
in its essentials, for our day is not admitted 
by non-Thomists. " The philosophy of the 
Middle Ages with its highest point of develop- 
ment, Thomas of Aquin, we considered con- 
quered and buried, " says Eucken. "Its growth 
in individual places seemed rather a souvenir 
of the past than a condition of the present, 
or even a germ of the future, but now it has 
forced itself again with its world -embracing 
power in the fore-front of life and asks, not for 
toleration, but for domination." 2 ' He repeats 
the thought with more detail, showing wherein 
he considers the philosophy of St. Thomas 
insufficient for our time: "for his day Thomas 
w^as the leader of all Christendom, to-day he 
can be but the leader of a party." 28 Paulsen 
is similarly minded, for in the preface to his 
Philosophia Militans, he sets up the Philosophy 
of Kant as the true one, and says, Kant not 
only destroyed Materialism and Naturalism, 

27 Die Philosophie des Thomas von Aquino und die Cultur 
der Neuzeit, Zeitschr. f. philosophische Kritik, vol. 87-88, 
p. 161. 

28 Die Lebensansch., p. 249. 



— 3° — 

but likewise, " dogmatic Supernaturalism or 
Scholastic Metaphysics." We will end with a 
statement of Prof. Royce. His article already 
referred to is very appreciative of Scholasticism 
and St. Thomas, yet he thinks the fundamental 
positions of the Philosophy of Aquinas call for 
readjustment if they are to meet the modern 
view of these problems. To quote him on the 
two points that bear on our work. "His 
(Thomas') theory of the nature and limits of 
human knowledge, a theory derived from 
Aristotle, especially calls not merely for restate- 
ment, but for readjustment, as soon as you try 
to apply it to the interpretation of our modern 
consciousness.' ' We shall state the theory of 
Aquinas in the following chapter, and try to 
show that it is still applicable. 

The other point bears still more directly on 
the subject we are handling, so we shall cite 
it at length. "The problem of the relation 
between God and the world, as St. Thomas 
treats that topic, is one which has only to be 
reviewed carefully in the light of modern science 
and modern philosophy, to secure an alteration 
of the essentially unstable equilibrium in which 
Thomas left this heaven - piercing tower of his 
speculation. Here I, of course, have no space 
to speak of a philosophical problem to which 
as a student of philosophy I have directed so 



— 3i — 

much of my attention — namely, the problem 
about the conception of God. But when I read, 
in more than one recent philosophical essay of 
Catholic origin, expressions that admit the 
decidedly symbolic and human character of the 
language in which even the dogmas of the 
Church have to be expressed so far as they 
relate to the nature of God, when stress is 
also laid, very rightly, upon that aspect of 
St. Thomas' teaching which emphasizes this 
very inadequacy of even the traditional formulas 
to the business of defining divine things, when 
I meet at the same time with admissions that 
St. Thomas' positive theory of the divine 
attributes involves these or these apparent 
contradictions, which still need philosophical 
solution — then, indeed, I see not that our more 
modern thinking is wholly right and Thomas 
wrong— but that Catholic Theology is nowa- 
days in a position where it is bound either to 
progress, or to abandon the whole business of 
reviving the spirit of serious philosophical think- 
ing, so that they like the rest of us are living 
in an age of transition.' ' 

These are but a few of the statements of the 
many that might be cited — Froschammer, 
Hermes, Giinther, and others might be quoted. 
We hope to show in this study that the 
estimates given against the value of the view 



— 32 — 

of St. Thomas are incorrect, and that the 
treatment of the question of God by Aquinas — 
a question of prime importance with him and 
all philosophy — is not a thing of the past. 



33' 



CHAPTER I. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 



SECTION I.— GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

Knowledge is a fact. What is the process of 
knowledge, and what is the value of knowledge, 
are the important considerations. What makes 
a thing knowable, how do we know it, and 
what is the validity of our knowledge? An 
answer to these questions gives the psychology 
and epistemology of knowledge. There is a 
sentence in one of the works of Aquinas that 
contains the factors involved in the problem of 
knowledge. " There are", says he, "but three 
requisites for knowledge, namely, the active 
power of the knower by which he judges of 
things, the thing known, and the union of 
both." 1 Before we can have knowledge, there 
must be something knowable, some one capable 
of knowing, and both the knowable object and 
the knowing subject must come into some 
union or relation. Knowledge is only realized 

1 De VerL, q. 2, a. 1, praeterea. 



— 34 — 

when the object and the subject enter into a 
determined relation. These elements are admit- 
ted by all philosophers as necessary for a theory 
of knowledge. We shall now consider their 
organic connection in the theory of St. Thomas, 
and also the objective value of our knowledge 
as resulting from this theory. 

It is a Scholastic axiom that all knowledge 
or every cognition is in the knower through an 
assimilation of the knower to the known. 2 The 
nature of this assimilation and how it is 
brought about forms the problem of knowledge 
for the Scholastics. This assimilation runs 
through all knowledge and is its basis. There 
are two sorts pf knowledge distinct in kind — 
sensory and intellectual. From the external 
senses that receive the forms of material things, 
without matter indeed, but yet with many 
material conditions, up through the internal 
senses which retain and combine the images 
of these forms, the human intellect, the angelic 
intellect, the Divine intellect, there is a steady 
rise and the attainment of more perfect knowl- 
edge on the basis of immateriality. The assimi- 
lation or likeness that is brought about 
between the knowing power and the object is 
not simply according to the nature of the object 



2 Omnis cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis 
ogniti. C. G., 1. 1., c 65. 



— 35 — 

in itself, but rather according to the nature of 
the knowing faculty. Hence the object is in 
the knower not according to its natural form 
as it exists in its real being, but through a 
representative form, through a form which the 
Scholastics called intentional. This represen- 
tative or intentional form was also known to 
them as species. The species in itself, as an 
entity, agrees in nature with the power in 
which it is, in representing it agrees with the 
object it stands for. It is sensible or intellectual 
(species sensibilis, species intelligibilis) according 
to the knowing faculty — senses or intellect. 
"For sensible vision as well as for intellectual, 
two things are required, viz., the power of 
vision and the union of the seen with the one 
who sees. For there is no actual vision except 
the things seen be in some way in the one 
seeing. ,,a This cognitive assimilation further 
demands from the object to be known some 
degree of immateriality, for the concept of 
knowledge and the concept of materiality are 
opposites. 4 
This is a brief statement of the question of 

3 Ad visionem tarn sensibilem quam intellectualem duo 
requiruntur ; scilicet, virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu. 
Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res yisa 
quodammodo est in vidente. Sum. Theol., I, q. 12, a. 2. 

4 Ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad rationem 
mater ialitatis, Be VerL, q. 2. 



— 36 — 

knowledge as set forth by St. Thomas. It can 
be reduced to three fundmenial principles, that 
we shall examine in detail, and thus arrive at a 
clearer view of the psychology of this system and 
the critical value given it by Aquinas. 

These principles are: First, knowledge is the 
result of the union of the subject and object; 
second, the object known is in the knowing sub- 
ject according to the nature of the knower; 
third, the perfection of knowledge is in propor- 
tion to the immateriality of the knowing sub- 
ject. In other words, the essence of knowledge 
consists in the intrinsic presence of the object in 
the knower in such a way that the knower is 
aware of it, and this recognition is due to an act 
that contains in itself the object as a known 
terminus. In knowledge the knowing subject 
and the known object must be one; this unity is 
attained by an assimilation based on imma- 
teriality. The w r ords unity, assimilation, imma- 
teriality, comprise the whole question. 

The truth of the first principle is beyond doubt, 
if w r e do not seek to determine the nature and 
origin of this resemblance or assimilation. It is a 
fact that we possess knowledge, and it is equally 
clear that we have not the object according to 
its natural or physical being, for the nature of 
the knowing power forbids this — hence there 
must be some means by which the object is made 



knowable and the union between the knower 
and the known takes place. This assimilation 
or union is of the essence of knowledge ; the ob- 
ject must be in the knower in such a way that it 
makes the subject know the object, and this is 
what is meant by saying that it is in the knower 
representatively. There is a two-fold similitude 
or likeness : there is one according to the nature 
of things and there is a representative one. 
This latter "likeness of the knower to the known 
is required for knowledge." 5 The subject and 
the object concur in one common action — the 
known object must be present to the knowing 
subject, according to the nature of the knowing 
subject, and the knowing subject by its activity 
must respond to the specific determination of the 
object. 6 

The part of the object in this union is to deter- 
mine the knowing faculty which of itself is 
indifferent and indeterminate; 7 and this deter- 



5 This representative likeness is the same as image, for it 
implies some imitative reproduction of another thing, of the 
object to be known. 

6 The unity of action in knowledge is due to two co-prin- 
ciples. On the side of the subject, there is no complete act 
without the co-operation of the object, and the object is 
incapable of effecting a complete act without the work of 
the subject. 

7 Sic etiam intellectus, si haberet aliquam naturam deter- 
minatam, ilia natura connaturalis sibi prohibet eum a 
cognitione aliarum naturarum. De Anima, 1. 3, lect. 7. 
The soul is quodammodo omnia. 



- Se- 
mination is brought about, as noted above, by 
some representative presence of the object, which 
the Scholastics called by the special name of 
species. This species is synonymous with the 
words forma and similitude), and is a special 
determination coming from the object by 
which the subject is aroused and directed 
to know the object itself. When the mind 
is not engaged in any actual cognition, it 
is inactive and indetermined ; the object acting 
on the mind determines the mind to know 
it. The element by which the object is in con- 
nection with the subject, which is its substi- 
tute, is called by the Scholastics species im- 
pressa; excited by this determination the mind 
acts, and the result is given in the species 
expressa by which the mind knows the object. 

This word species is of constant occurrence in 
the Scholastic theory of knowledge, so an under- 
standing of it will obviate misinterpretations, 
and will likewise simplify the problem as pre- 
sented in these terms. It is hardly necessary to 
say that the word species has no community of 
doctrine with the floating images of Democritus 
and Epicurus which Aristotle rejected, and which 
is not to be found in the best Scholastic writ- 



— 39 — 

ings. 8 The true meaning is simply this : the mind 
is affected or modified by objects acting on the 
knowing power, sense-organ or intellect. The 
mind is in a peculiar attitude or modified to per- 
ceive an object, The species has no independent 
existence, but is bound up with the state or con- 
dition of the mind viewed at the time of cogni- 
tion ; it is due to the action of objects on sense- 
organs or intellect. There are no pre-existing 
species, for the " knowing soul is in potentia to 
the species which are the principles of sensation, 
as well as to the species which are the principles 
of intellection... In the beginning, it is in potentia 
to all the species by which it understands." 9 It 
is the condition by which activity-sensory and 

8 Though so recent an article as that of Dr. Lindsay, al- 
ready referred to, has the following misconception of species : 
"Both Thomas and Duns Scotus held, each in his own way, 
to the doctrine of intelligible species, by which a copy of the 
object was supposed, in the process of knowledge, to arise 
and be seen by the soul." "In their doctrine of the "species 
intelligibiles n the two "Realists," Thomas and Duns Scotus, 
had alike followed, through some variations, the old Greek 
idea, that in the knowing process, by means of the coopera- 
tion of the soul and the external object, a copy of the latter 
arises, which is then apprehended and beheld by the soul." 
Windeband, A Hist, of Phil p. 325. This thought is quoted 
by Ladd in a note of his Phil, of Knowledge, p. 53. 

9 Anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tarn ad similitudines 
quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae 
sunt principia intelligendi. . . Est in principio in potentia ad 
hujusmodi species omnes. Sum, Theol., I. q. 84, a 3. 



— 40 — 

intellectual, is actualized. The intellect is act- 
ually intelligent through the intelligible species, 
as the sense is actual through the sensible 
species. 10 "The intelligible species is the formal 
principle of intellectual operation, as the form of 
any agent is the form of its specific operation/ ' 
Through it the object becomes known. The 
mind does not perceive it primarily, but it is the 
means of perception — "that which is understood 
is the very concept of things existing outside the 
mind." 11 It is the object that is understood, but 
by means of the species. "The intelligible species 
is not that which is understood but that by 
which the intellect understands." 12 The object 
is not inferred from the species, as though it were 
an intermediate representation, but the species is 
simply the means that brings about the union of 
subject and object resulting in knowledge. 

The species expressa was sometimes called 
intentio. Very often this word was made an 
adjective — intentionalis — in conjunction with 
species. This intentio in us is "neither the thing 
itself which is understood, nor is it the very 






10 Species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum sicut species 
sensibilis ad sensum. Ibid., 2. 85, a 2. There is a parallel 
between both species. 

11 Id vero quod intelligitur est ipsa ratio rerum existentium 
extra animam. C. G., 1. 2, c. 75. 

12 Species intelligibilis non est id quod intelligitur, sed id 
quo intelligit intellectus. Sum. Theol., I. q. 85, a. 2. 



— 4 i — 

substance of the intellect, but it is a certain like- 
ness conceived in the intellect of the thing that 
is understood." 18 It was also known in intel- 
lectual knowledge as verbum mentale. It is the 
terminus of the intellectual activity aroused by 
the intelligible species. This word intentional 
was used to show in what way the object was 
present to the knowing subject, to show the 
nature of the resemblance between the knower 
and the known. It offsets the view that the 
object is present in knowledge in its real and 
physical being; it is present really, but not ac- 
cording to the condition in which it is found in 
nature. This leads us to our second principle: 
The object known is in the knower according to 
the nature of the knower. 

We have now seen the meaning of the word 
species, and its fundamental importance in the 
Scholastic system. The first principle gives the 
nature of the species from the point of view of 
the object, as representative of the object; the 
second princple views the nature of the species 
from the standpoint of the subject, as it exists in 
the knower. It exists in the knower according 
to the nature of the knower. 

The second principle strictly taken is but a 

13 Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur 
neque est ipsa substantia intellectus, sed est quaedam simili- 
tude) concepta intellectu de re intellecta. C. G., 1. 4, c. 11. 



— 42 — 

corollary of the first rightly understood, for if 
knowledge is but the union of the subject and 
the object, both must be of the same nature or 
reduced to it before the union can be effected. 
"All knowledge is according to some form, 
which is the principle of knowledge in the 
knower. This form or species can be viewed 
in a twofold light : in its relation to the know- 
ing subject, and also in its relation to the object 
whose likeness it is. In the former it arouses 
the knowing faculty to cognitive activity, and 
in the latter it points out a definite object of 
knowledge. Hence the manner of knowing a 
thing is according to the condition of the 
knower, in whom the form is received according 
to his nature. But it is not necessary that the 
thing known exist according to the nature of 
the knower or according to that manner by 
which the form, which is the principle of know- 
ing, has existence in the knower/ ' u The manner 
of knowing must be that of the knower, but 

14 Omnis cognitio est secundum aliquam formam, quae est 
in cognoscente principium cognitionis. Forma autem 
hujusmodi potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo secun- 
dum esse, quod habet in cognoscente, alio modo secundum 
respectum quern habet ad rem, cujus est similitudo. Secun- 
dum quidem primum respectum facit cognoscentem actu 
cognoscere; sed secundum secundum respectum determinat 
cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum. Et ideo 
modus cognoscendi rem aliquam est secundum conditionem 
cognoscentis, in quo forma recipitur secundum modum ejus. 
Non autem oportet ut res cognita sit quae est cognoscendi 
principium, habet esse in cognoscente. Be Veri., q. 10, a. 4. 



— 43 — 

the thing itself in rerum natura need not be one 
with this mode, for knowledge is not "by means 
of identity, but by means of a certain represen- 
tation; whence it is not necessary that the 
nature of the knower and the known be the 
same." 15 This conformity of the subject and 
object is "not a likeness of conformity in nature 
but a likeness of representation only, as we 
are reminded of some man through a golden 
statue." 16 In fact, "the perfection of knowl- 
edge consists in this, that the thing be known 
to exist in that nature in which it is, and not 
that the nature of the thing known be in the 
knower." 1. 

The truth of this principle is emphasized 
indirectly or negatively by St. Thomas when 
he criticises the views of those who went astray 
on this point. Some of the ancient philosophers 
misapplied the axiom— "like is known by like"— 
and landed in a position the extreme opposite 
of that held by Plato. They understood this 
principle to mean that the "soul which knows 
all things is naturally made up of all: earth 



15 Be Veri., q. 2, a. 5, ad 7. 

16 Ad cognitionem non requiritur similitude* conformitatis 
in natura, sed similitude* repraesentationis tantum ; sicut per 
statuam auream ducitur in cognitionem hominis. De Veri. y 
q. 2, a. 5, ad 5. 

17 Ibid., ad 6. 



— 44 — 

that it may know earth, fire to know fire, and 
so of the rest." 18 This of course would make 
the soul corporeal, since it knows corporeal 
things; in fact, it would make it a compound 
of all things since it can know all things, and 
not only made up of the elements these philoso- 
phers considered as contained in their first 
matter. If their interpretation of this principle 
were true, then the possibility and diversity of 
knowledge would be at an end. 

St. Thomas likewise sets aside the theory of 
Plato regarding this principle. " Plato", he 
says, " seems to deviate from the truth in this 
matter, for since he considered all knowledge 
to take place by means of likeness, he believed 
that the form of the known is of necessity in 
the knower in that manner in which it is in 
the known." 19 This led Plato to conceive the 
independent reality of general concepts to bring 
about the requisite conditions for knowledge as 
they appeared to him ; ideas and not corporeal 
things would be the object of our intellectual 
representations, according to Plato. This theory 
results in an arbitrary knowledge, neglecting 



18 Ibid., a. 2. 

19 Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviare a veritate, quia cum 
aestimaret omnem cognitionem per tnodum alicujus simili- 
tudinis esse credidit, quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit 
similitudinis esse modo, quo est in cognito. Sum. Theol., 
q. 84, a. 1. 



— 45 — 

things as they are and failing to account for 
our knowledge of corporeal things. 

St. Thomas rejected these two views because 
they did not accord with what he conceived to 
be the basis of conformity between object and 
subject. His critical spirit is shown by his put- 
ting aside the Naturphilosophen and Plato, 
and embracing a principle contained in the 
book De Causis: That everything received 
is received according to the nature of the re- 
ceiver. 20 This principle Js important for the 
theory of knowledge, embracing as it does our 
second principle. We know the object directly, 
as noted before, and the object also has the 
prior activity in knowledge, yet it must adapt 
itself to the conditions of the knowing power. 
Subject and object must be so intimately con- 
nected as to form one sole principle of knowledge 
according to the axiom: Ah utroque notitia pari- 
tur a cognoscente et cognito. In this union the 
object comes under the conditions of the know- 
ing power, for the object is knowable only when 
it has entered the field of consciousness by being 
assimilated by the subject. 21 This assimilation 

20 Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum re- 
cipients. De Causis is a work of Proclus the Platonist. 

21 This assimilation is a vital assimilation. In the cognitive 
life there is exactly the same process of assimilation as in the 
organic life, the process of nutrition ; it is but a special and 
higher degree of assimilation. 



- 4 6- 

makes it an integral part of the knowing power, 
and thus a partaker of its nature. The subject 
also is modified by the object to the extent, that 
it is knowing under this condition and for this 
object. From the psychological point of view 
this principle presents no great difficulties, but 
it is important in the question of the objectivity 
of knowledge. 

The third principle flows easily from the two 
preceding. If knowledge depends on the assimi- 
lative union of object and subject, and if the 
object is known according to the nature of the 
knower, it follows readily that the knowableness 
of the object depends on its immateriality. " The 
concept of knowledge and the concept of materi- 
ality are opposites"; "the more immaterial 
things are, the more knowable they are." 22 "This 
principle or axiom is very important ; in a way, 
it underlies the whole question of knowledge, it is 
the condition that makes a thing knowable, and 
makes knowledge the possession of a particular 
class of beings. Immateriality, in general, is the 
capacity a thing has to be itself and to become 
something else. In knowledge, the object must 
be immaterial in itself or else immaterialized, and 
the subject must be immaterial — the object is 
assimilated and the subject assimilates. This 

22 Secundum ordinem immaterialitatis in rebus, secundum 
hoc in eis natura cognitionis invenitur. De VerL> q. 2, a. 2. 



— 47 — 

double aspect is brought out clearly by St. 
Thomas — immateriality on the part of object 
and subject. The distinction between a knowing 
being and one that does not know is based on 
immateriality. The non-knowing has simply the 
one form of its own being, whereas the knowing 
is capable of receiving the form of another thing, 
for the species or form of the known is in the one 
knowing. The non-knowing can be assimilated 
but cannot assimilate; the knowing has the 
power to assimilate and thus become more and 
more. Hence the nature of the non-knowing is 
more restricted and limited, whereas the know- 
ing has greater amplitude and extension. It is 
for this reason Aristotle said the soul is quodam- 
modo omnia. It is because of the universality of 
the knowing power, that matter, which is the 
principle of individuation and restricts the form 
to one condition or result, cannot be admitted 
into it; rather in proportion to the absence of 
materiality will the knowledge be the freer and 
more perfect. 23 If the soul w r ere naturally deter- 
mined in one direction, to one set of activities, 
all its operations would be influenced by this 
specific bent, just as all things taste bitter to an 
unhealthy tongue. The soul must then be capa- 

23 Quanto autem aliquid immaterialms habet formam rei 
cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Sum. Theol., I., q. 84, 
a. 2. 



- 4 8- 

ble of adjusting itself to receive the various 
cognitions we know it actually possesses, it 
must have in its nature none of those things it 
seeks to know and can know. 24 

St. Thomas has knowledge graded on the scale 
of immateriality — the knowableness of the object 
and the knowing capacity of the subject rest on 
the same basis. A thing is knowable in propor- 
tion to its immateriality, and a subject knows in 
proportion to the extent of the immateriality 
of its nature. There is a passage in the Summa 
Theologica, Part I, q. 84, a. 2, that brings 
out this fact clearly. Knowledge is per 
formam, and its concept is the opposite of 
the concept of materiality. When forms exist 
materially only — immersed in matter — there is 
no power of knowledge, as is the case in 
plants; but in proportion as the form of the 
thing is possessed more immaterially, the more 
perfect is the knowledge. Thus the intellect 
which has the form of the object freed from 
matter and all individuating conditions is more 
cognoscitive than the senses which possess the 
form, without matter it is true, yet with mate- 
rial conditions. Even among the senses them- 
selves this principle is verified, for vision is the 

24 Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil 
eorutn habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei natur- 
aliter, impediret cognitionem aliorum. Ibid., q. 75, a. 2. 



— 49 — 

most cognoscitive because it is the least mate- 
rial; likewise among concepts the degree of 
immateriality regulates the degree of perfection. 
There is no break in the application of this 
axiom, it leads straight tip to the highest know- 
able and the most perfectly knowing — God Him- 
self. The idea of immateriality as here under- 
stood, contains the idea of activity; potentia 
and matter are pratically one and are the op- 
posites of immateriality and actuality. 25 In God 
there is an utter absence of potentia and matter. 
He is characterized by the possession of their 
contraries, and thus he is especially knowable 
and knowing. " Since God, therefore, is the 
opposite extreme of matter, since He is entirely 
immune from all potentiality, it follows that He 
is especially knowable and especially know- 
ing." 26 
There are objects that are immaterial in 



25 St. Thomas uses the phrase, non enim cognoscitur ali- 
quid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum quod est 
in actu, very frequently. He uses this quality of actuality 
as a proof for the immateriality of the soul. "The species of 
material things as they are in themselves are not intelligible 
actu, because they are in matter. But as they are in the 
intellective human soul they are intelligible actu." Quodlibe- 
tum 3, a. 20. 

26 Quia Deus est in fine separationis a materia, cum ab 
omni potentialitate sit penitus immunis, relinquitur, quod 
ipse est maxime cognoscitivus et maxime cognoscibilis. De 
Veri., q. 2, a. 2. 



— 5 o — 

themselves and are knowable so far as they 
are concerned, and there are objects that do 
not possess this quality but must be brought 
to this condition before they are propria of the 
mind. God, the spirit world — including Angels 
and the souls of men, our own thoughts and the 
thoughts of others as thoughts, come under the 
first class; the second class embraces what we 
ordinarily understand by material objects. We 
shall take up the question of God shortly. 
That Angels come under this term is evident to 
all who accept the doctrine about Angels — 
"some essences are sine materia as separated 
substances which we call Angels. ,,2T The mind 
knows itself, and the content of the mind 
together with the mind itself is immaterial. 
From the fact that we perceive ourselves to 
understand we know that we have an intel- 
lectual soul, but to understand the nature of 
this soul there is need of a careful consideration 
— a subtilis inquisitio. In this latter quest many 
have erred through a misunderstanding of the 
principle — like is known by like. They perceived 
that they had a knowledge of material things 
and at once concluded that these objects were 
present to the soul materially, not recognizing 
that the concepts of knowledge and immaterial- 



' Sum. TheoL, I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3. 



— 5i — 

ity are opposites. Plato, as St. Thomas notes, 
rightly conceived the soul to be immaterial and 
its knowledge to be likewise immaterial, but 
his explanation of this truth was not satis- 
factory. He introduced unnecessary elements 
to account for this doctrine; he did not give 
the intellect the power to render a material 
object immaterial, but held there were imma- 
terial ideas independent of the object, and that 
it was these ideas or forms the mind knew. 
This theory is unlike that of St. Thomas, who 
says, " everything intelligible is immune from 
matter in se, or is abstracted from matter by 
the operation of the intellect/' 28 yet it is the 
actual recognition of immateriality as a 
requisite for knowableness. 

The knowledge the soul has of itself empha- 
sizes further this requisite of immateriality. 
St. Thomas holds that we have a two -fold 
knowledge of the soul — an actual and habitual 
one. We can simply know of its existence, and 
we can also know of its nature — two distinct 
points, "for many know they have a soul who 
do not know what the soul is," 29 do not know 
its nature. The soul becomes aware of itself 
through its acts — "one perceives that he has 
a soul, and lives, and is, because he perceives 

28 De Veri. f q. 13, a. 3. 

29 Ibid., q. 10, a. 9. 



— 52 — 

himself to feel and understand and to exercise 
the other functions of a life of this nature. " 30 This 
reveals its existence; "what the nature of the 
mind itself is, the mind can only perceive from 
a consideration of its object." 31 From a knowl- 
edge of its object, the soul comes to know its 
own nature. " Our mind can not so understand 
itself that it can immediately apprehend itself, 
but from apprehending other things it comes 
to a knowledge of itself. . . From the fact that 
the human soul knows the universal natures of 
things, it perceives that the species by which 
we understand is immaterial; otherwise it 
would be individualized and thus never lead 
to a knowledge of the universal." 32 The soul 



30 Aliquis percipit se animam habere et vivere et esse, quod 
percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia hujusmodi vitae opera 
exercere. De Veri., q. 10, a. 8. 

sl Ibid., q. 10, a. 8, ad 1. 

St. Thomas appreciated the difficulty of arriving at a 
knowledge of the nature of the soul. " Each one experiences 
in himself that he has a soul and that the acts of the soul 
take place within him, but to know the nature of the soul is 
most difficult." De VerL, q. 10, a. 8 ad 8. The same 
applies to our knowledge of the nature of God. 

32 Unde mens nostra non potest se ipsam intelligere, ita 
quod se ipsam immediate apprehendat ; sed ex hoc quod ap- 
prehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem. . . Ex hoc enim 
quod species qua intelligimus est immaterialis ; alias esset 
individuata, et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis. 
De VerL, q. 10, a. 8. 






— 53 — 

knows the universal, the proper object of the 
intellect is the essence of material things, this 
essence is immaterial, and the soul perceiving 
this immaterial essence recognizes its own 
immaterial nature, for operation follows being, 
the act is in accord with its source. 

The idea running through these principles is 
—knowledge is a vital act, an assimilation of 
subject and object. The degree of activity regu- 
lates the degree of knowledge, of perfection; this 
goes on without a break until we reach the most 
perfect knowledge in God. Before we consider 
the knowableness of God, we must outline the 
factors involved in the activity of intellectual 
knowledge in man. " There is, therefore, a per- 
fect and supreme grade of life, that of the intel- 
lect, for the intellect reflects upon itself and 
knows itself." 33 The human intellect though it 
can know itself, begins its knowledge with 
external things ; it is inferior to the Angelic and 
Divine Intellects, but leads to a knowledge of 
them. 

33 Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae, qui est 
secundum intellectum ; nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, 
et seipsum intelligere potest. C. G., 1. 4, c. 11. 



— 54™ 

SECTION II. — THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE. 

There are two kinds of knowledge in man 
arising from two sets of cognitive activity — the 
sensory and the intellectual. 1 The latter is of 
especial importance in arriving at a knowledge 
of God, so we shall present the stages of intel- 
lectual knowledge as found in St. Thomas. 

The human intellect is primarily and directly 
concerned with being in its widest acceptation. 
More specificially, it is busied with the essence of 
material things, the universal. This essence as 
it exists in material things is not in an imme- 
diate condition to be known, so there is a power, 
an intellectual activity, required to make it 
actually knowable or intelligible. This power 
is the active intellect, which by its abstractive 
power immaterializes the corporeal object and 
brings to light the intelligible species. This 
species is the likeness of the object in its specific 
nature; it makes the object actually intelligible 
and determines the intellect proper to know. 
This summary statement can now be viewed 
in its parts. 

"What is primarily and per se known by a 






1 Homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognoscitivis omnia 
rerum genera, intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia, 
sensu singularia et corporalia. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 57, a. 2. 



— 55 — 

cognitive power is its proper object." 2 "But 
being is primarily in the conception of the 
intellect, for everything is knowable in so far 
as it is actual. . . Whence being is the proper 
object of the intellect, and thus it is the first 
intelligible as sound is the first audible." 3 Being 
is here taken for actual and possible existence, 
"it comprehends all the differences and possible 
species of being, for whatever can exist can be 
understood." 4 As we are now constituted we 
are not concerned with all being directly, but 
with being as found in material things. "The 
first object of our intellect in our present exist- 
ence is not being and true of any sort, but 
being and true viewed in material things, 
through w r hich we come to a knowledge of 
all other things." 3 This passage contains the 



2 Id quod est pritno et per se cognitum a virtute cognosci- 
tiva est proprium ejus objectum. Sum. Theol, I, q. 85, a. 7. 

G Primo autem in conceptione intellectus est ens : quia 
secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, in quantum 
est actu. . . Unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus ; et 
sic est primum intelligibile sicut sonus est primum audibile. 
Sum. Theol, I, q. 5, a. 2. 

4 Est enim proprium objectum intellectus ens intelligibile, 
quod quidem comprehendit omnes differentias et species 
entis possibililis ; quidquid esse potest intelligi potest. C. G., 
1, 2. c. 98. 

5 Nee primum objectum intellectus nostri secundum prae- 
sentem statum est quodlibet ens et verum, sed ens et verum 
consideratum in rebus materialibus, ex quibus in cogni- 
tionem omnium aliorum devenit. Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, 
a. 3 ad 1. 



- 5 6- 

ftmdamental and oft-repeated truth that we 
start from material things as a basis and 
rise gradually to our most immaterial and 
metaphysical concepts. 6 

The specific or connatural object of the 
intellect is then the essence of material things. 
"Through the intellect it is connatural to us 
to know natures that exist only in individual 
matter, but not as they are in individual 
matter but as they are abstracted from it by 
intellectual consideration. Thus the intellect 
enables us to know things of this nature as 
universal. And this is beyond the power of the 
senses." 1 The intellect deals with the universal 
which, however, is found in sensible objects, 
and this power makes it superior to the senses. 
"Sensitive cognition is occupied with external, 
sensible qualities, but intellectual knowledge 



6 Proprium autem intellectus est quidquid est in sub- 
stantia rei. Igitur quidquid intellectus de aliqua re cognoscit, 
cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei. . . Cognitio 
intellectus oritur a sensu. . . Quidquid igitur est in re, quod 
non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae ejus, op- 
ortet esse intellectui ignotum. C. G., 1. 3, c. 56. 

7 Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere 
naturas quae quidem non habent esse nisi in materia 
individuali ; non tamen secundum quod sunt in materia 
individuali; sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per 
considerationem intellectus. Unde secundum intellectum 
possumus cognoscere hujusmodi res in universali; quod est 
supra facultatem sensus. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 12, a. 4. 



— 57 — 

penetrates to the very essence of the thing, for 
the object of the intellect is the quiddit}' of a 
thing." 8 "The proper object proportioned to 
our intellect is the nature of a sensible thing." 9 
This principle rests upon the very nature of 
man, his relation to matter. The knowable 
object is proportionate to the knowing power. 
This power varies according to its connection 
with matter. Man makes use of a bodily organ 
in knowing, thus he knows matter, but only 
what is essential to it reaches his intellect as 
its proper concept. Essence is intelligible for us 
only in so far as it is actualized, and it is 
actualized only in material things. Our mind 
has a natural tendency to know the intelligible 
essence, but it reaches it only through sensuous 
images. "Operation is proportioned to power 
and essence, but the intellectual in man rests 
on the sensitive, and thence its proper operation 
is to understand the intelligible in the phantas- 
mata (images)." 10 

8 Cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles 
exterioris, cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad 
essentiam rei; objectum enim intellectus est quod quid est. 
Sum. TheoL, 22% q. .8, a. 1. 

9 Proprium objectum intellectui nostro proportionatum, 
est natura rei sensibilis. Ibid., I, q. 84, a. 7. 

10 Operatio proportionate virtuti et essentiae ; intellec- 
tivum autem hominis est in sensitivo et ideo propria ejus 
est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus. De Memoria 
et Reminiscentia, lect. 4. 



- 5 8 — 

How is the mind to get at the universal, the 
intelligible in things, for this is its object. 
This question is answered by the theory of 
abstraction. The mind possesses a power 
called active intellect by which it brings in 
evidence the universal or the intelligible in the 
thing considered. The existence of such a 
pow r er, its relation to what is called the passive 
intellect, its function, and the result of its opera- 
tion, are all clearly set forth by St. Thomas. 

Nothing is changed from the potential to the 
actual save through something that is actual. 
Intelligibility requires the object to be actual, 
individualizing matter is opposed to this know- 
ableness, thus there must be an activity in the 
mind to draw from material things the essence 
they contain. This is the active intellect. If 
universals had an existence independent of 
matter, as Plato held, then this power would 
be unnecessary, for its sole purpose is to make 
actually intelligible the universal existing in 
material things. This power is then dependent 
on the doctrine that universals have a funda- 
mentum in re, in things themselves, and must 
be abstracted before they can become propria 
of the mind. This power is so necessary that 
"without it man can understand nothing. ,m Yet 

n De Veri., q. 1, a. 1 ad 3. 



— 59 — 

it is not of such a nature as to constitute 
what we might call a distinct mind ; it is rather 
closely associated with the passive intellect. 
The latter is the intellectual faculty proper — 
"the passive intellect is that by which man 
formally understands," 12 — the former is intel- 
lectual activity. They are distinct in the sense 
that we can ascribe different operations to 
them, but not in the sense of radical separation 
and totally independent action. "In every act 
by w r hich man understands, there is the con- 
current operation of both active and passive 
intellects. " 18 

The basis for the distinction between these 
two pow r ers rests on the relation of potency 
and act in general. 14 The mind is viewed as a 
passive power, immaterial and destined to know 



12 De Avima, 1. 3, lect 7. 

1? In omni actu quo homo intelligit, concurrit operatio 
intellectus agentis et intellectus possibilis De Mente, a. 8, 
ad 11. Ladd's statement that the power that apprehends 
the universal is an "intellective soul" is incorrect, and leads 
him to the following misconception: "This results in a 
division of the faculties of the soul, which is wholly incon- 
sistent with his (Aquinas') maintenance elsewhere of the 
true view of the soul as one, but gifted with diverse 
energies." Phil, of Knowledge, p. 53. St. Thomas never 
abandons the "true view of the soul as one, but gifted 
with diverse energies." 

14 "The active and passive intellects are diverse powers, 
as in all things there is an active and passive power." Sum. 
TheoL, I, q. 79, a. 10. This is the fundamental thought 
in the Faculty Theory of the Scholastics ; the principle itself 
is very extensive, operating throughout their whole system. 



— 6o — 

the intelligible, which must be immaterial and 
intelligible actu before it is an object of intel- 
lectual knowledge, "but the intelligible actu is 
not something existing in rerum natura," 15 hence 
there is need of an active power in the mind to 
bring about this intelligibility and actually 
account for the knowledge we possess. "The 
act of the passive intellect is to receive the 
intelligible, the action or the active intellect is 
to abstract the intelligible." 16 In discussing 
the general principles of knowledge, we saw 
that there was both passivity and activity 
in the operation of knowing, that both subject 
and object played a part in effecting knowledge. 
Here we have the object in the phantasma or 
imagination acted upon by the active intellect 
and the result admitted by the passive intellect, 
as the intelligible in things. " The active intellect 
is a certain power of the soul extending itself 
actively to the same things to which the passive 
intellect extends itself receptively. ' ' 1T The former 
enables the soul to "do all things' ' (omnia 



16 Sum. TheoL, I, q. 79, a. 3 ad 3. 

16 Actus intellectus possibilis est recipere intelligibilia ; 
actus intellectus agentis est abstrahere intelligibilia. Q. Dd., 
De Anima, a. 4 ad 7. 

17 Intellectus agens est. . virtus quaedam animae ad eadem 
active se extendens ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis 
receptive. Sum. Theol., 1, q. 88, a. 1. 



— 6i — 

facere), the latter to " become all things" 
(omnia fieri). 

We have said that the purpose of this active 
intellect is to bring out for the mind the real 
object existing in material things, to abstract 
the universal from them. It is an abstractive 
power and exercises itself solely on the intelligi- 
ble in sensible things. ''Everything is under- 
stood in so far as it is abstracted from matter, 
because the forms in matter are individual 
forms which the intellect does not apprehend 
as such." 18 To abstract is to know a thing 
existing individual^ in corporeal matter, but 
not in the manner in which it there exists. " To 
know what is in such individual matter, but 
not as it is in such matter, is to abstract the 
form from individual matter." 19 Knowledge 
proceeds from the more indeterminate to the 
less indeterminate, from the imperfect to the 
perfect, because the intellect is concerned with 
the universal in the individual. It knows the 
essence at once as constituent of the thing, 
and later on by reflection as applicable to 

18 Unumquodque intelligitur in quantum a materia ab- 
strahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individualis formae 
quas intellectus non apprehendit secundum quod hujus- 
modi. Ibid., I, q. 50, a. 2. 

19 Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, 
non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a 
materia individuali. Sum. Theol., I, q. 85, a. 1. 



— 62 — 

many others. The universal is not the result 
of a comparison between many objects in the 
sense of the Empiricists, and then recognized 
as universal because found in many or all, nor 
is the particular or individual known first by 
the intellect and then the universal. 

The active intellect abstracts the universal 
from the image in the imagination or phan- 
tasia. 20 The image is the instrumental cause 
in the process, the active intellect is the prin- 
cipal cause. The result partakes of the nature 
of both causes. Its relation to the image 
makes it the representation of a specific object, 
its relation to the active intellect makes it 
immaterial in nature. We have finally the 
intelligible species produced in the passive 
intellect. Sensation from which our knowledge 
takes its rise is not the full explanation of 
the universal— " sensitive cognition is not the 
total cause of intellectual cognition." 21 Abstrac- 
tion or the operation of the active intellect 
simply brings out the universal existing in 
the given individual object. "One and the 
same nature which was singular and made 



20 The pbantasia for the Scholastics was the faculty that 
retained the images of absent objects. It is now known 
as retentive memory. 

21 Sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis 
2 ognitionis. Sum, TheoL, I, q. 84, a. 6. 



-6 3 - 

individual in each man through matter, after- 
wards becomes universal through the action 
of the intellect refining it from individuating 
conditions. 22 

The active intellect is said to illumine the 
phantasma, and thus render it fit to arouse 
the passive intellect to an act of knowledge. 
Though the phantasmata or images of them- 
selves cannot act on the intellect because 
they are individual and exist in corporeal 
organs, yet since they are in the soul which 
is intellective, they have a special aptitude to 
become known to the passive intellect through 
the operation of the active intellect. As the 
senses receive greater power from their con- 
nection with the intellect, so the phantasmata 
by the power of the active intellect are put 
in a condition from which the intelligible 
species can be readily abstracted. This illumi- 
nation is simply the action of the active 
intellect, for the latter is not supposed "to 
imprint anything on the phantasma, but in 
union with the phantasma it produces the 
intelligible species in the passive intellect." 23 

22 Una et eadem natura, quae singularis erat et individuata 
per materiam in singularibus hominibus, efficitur postea 
universalis per actionem intellectus depurantis ipsam a con- 
ditionibus quae sunt hie et nunc. De Umversalibus. . 

23 The Commentary of the Conimbricenses, De Anima, 1. 3, 
c. 5, q. 1, a. 3 ad 1. 



-6 4 - 

The result of the operation of the active 
intellect is the intelligible species, which is 
immaterial and represents the thing in its 
specific nature abstracted from the material 
object. "What pertains to the specific con- 
cept of any material thing, as stone, or man, 
or horse, can be considered without the in- 
dividual principles which are not of the concept 
of the species. And this is to abstract the 
universal from the particular or the intelligible 
species from the phantasmata, namely, to con- 
sider the nature of the species without con- 
sidering the individual principles which are 
represented through the phantasmata/' 24 The 
intelligible species is received in the passive 
intellect and determines it to know. The intellect 
is passive, as we have seen, but when stimulated 
to understand, it is active. What produces the 
action is related to the intellect as its form, for 
form is that by which an agent acts. This form 
is the intelligible species, the intellectual repre- 
sentation of the object known. We might recall 



24 Ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cujuslibet rei 
materialis, puta lapidis, aut hominiis, aut equi, possunt 
considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de 
ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a par- 
ticular^ vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, consid- 
erari scilicet naturam speciei aliaque consideration individ- 
ualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur. 
Sum. TheoL, 1, q. 85, a. 1 ad 1. 






-6 5 - 

here that it is not the species that is known 
primarily by the mind, but the object it repre- 
sents; and moreover, the species is of the nature 
of the knower, and hence does not agree in 
nature with the physical being of the object. 
The last stage of the act of knowledge is the 
mental word, the recognition of the object and 
the internal expression of this recognition, and 
this word is " neither the thing itself which is 
understood, nor is it the very substance of the 
intellect, but it is a certain likeness conceived 
in the intellect of the thing which is under- 
stood, " 25 and by which we understand the 
object. This connects us at once with what 
St. Thomas has to say about the Validity of 
our Knowledge. 

SECTION in.— VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

It is evident from the discussion of the 
general principles of knowledge, and especially 
the process of intellectual knowledge, that the 
question of validity is practically taken for 
granted in the system of our author; it is an 
undercurrent directing and determining the 
statements and developments of knowledge in 
its various stages as set forth by Aquinas in 
detail. The reality of the object, of the external 



C. G., 1. 4, c. 11. 



— 66 — 

world, is rooted in the fundamental state- 
ments of knowledge thus far expressed. The 
union of subject and object, the manner in 
which the object is present to the knower, 
the intellectual process that gives birth to the 
intelligible in sensible objects, all look to some- 
thing extra animam — "the act of knowledge 
extends itself to those things which are out- 
side the knower, for we also know those 
things which are external to us." 1 According 
to Gardair, "St. Thomas seems to regard as 
indubitable the prime veracity of the senses 
rather than to demonstrate it." 2 Farges is 
in accord with this view. "The great 
Doctors of the Middle Ages believed in the 
immediate perception of bodies by the external 
senses as a primitive fact clearly attested by 
the consciousness of each man." 8 These state- 
ments become general when we recall that for 
Aquinas all knowledge takes its rise in the 
senses, according to the axiom : Nihil est in 

1 Actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra 
cognoscentem. Cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos 
sunt. Sum TheoL, I, q. 84, a. 2. 

2 L'Objectivite de la Sensation, Ar.tifiles de Phil. Chret- 
tienne, 1895, p. 17. 

3 Theorie de la Perception Immediate d'apres Aristote et 
St. Thomas. Ibid., 1891, p. 441. 



-6 7 - 

intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu. 4 
A few sentences will suffice to confirm the 
above view. First, as regards the senses. 
"The sense is a certain passive power capable 
of being changed by an external sensible ob- 
ject. " 5 "The sense always apprehends the 
the thing as it is, except there be an impedi- 
ment in the organ or in the medium." 6 Because 
"sensible objects exist actually outside the 
soul," 7 there is no need of an active sense 
corresponding to the active intellect. We have 

4 It is true to say as Ladd does — with St. Thomas "the 
psychological inquiry as to the nature, results, and cer- 
tainty of its (the intellect) functioning is thus made the 
most important of epistemological inquiries." But his under- 
standing of this product is inadequate, as his conclusion 
evidences — "with such views of the origin of knowledge 
as the foregoing, the validating of knowledge becomes a 
hopeless puzzle. Phil, of Knowledge, p. 53 That there 
is no inconsistency bet wee ri the psychology of knowledge 
and the epistemology of knowledge as treated by St. 
Thomas, will be clear, we think, from an exposition of 
his views. "The theories of validity ought to correspond 
to the theories of origin : It is thus — Nominalism, Con- 
ceptualism and Realism correspond perfectly to Seusism, 
Innatism, and Peripateticism. Peillaube, Theorie des Con- 
cepts, p 347. 

5 Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata 
est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Sum. Theol., I, q. 78, 
a. 3. 

6 Sensus semper apprehendit rem ut est, nisi sit impedi- 
mentum in organo, vel in medio. De Veri., q. 1, a 11. 

7 Sum. Theol, I, q. 79, a. 3 ad 1. 



— 68 — 

seen that all knowledge is by species and that 
the species is only the means of knowledge; 
what is primarily and immediately and actually 
known is the object the species represents. 
Moreover, both powers of cognition — sense and 
intellect — are passive and must be acted upon 
by the objects, to which they add nothing 
and from which they take nothing, before there 
is knowledge. This double phase of activity 
and passivity in knowledge, presupposes ex- 
ternal reality. This is expressed in a statement 
of A. Seth: " Knowledge is an activity, an 
activo-passive experience of the subject, whereby 
it becomes aware of what is not itself." 8 

We need say little about the reality contained 
in intellectual knowledge, for though this knowl- 
edge is distinct in kind from sensory, yet it rests 
on sensitive images as a basis, and the whole 
process of the active intellect is concerned with 
extracting the intelligible, the essence, wrapped 
up in the image, which is the proper object of 
the intellect. There is a twofold aspect of the 
operation of knowing in man, one wholly 
internal and another that has as its terminus 
" something existing outside him," 9 an external 
object. "The first object of the human intel- 



8 The Problem of Epistemology, Phil. Review, vol. 1, 
p. 513. 

9 Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, a. 2. 



-6 9 - 

lect is not its own essence, but something 
external, namely, the nature of a material 
thing. Hence what is primarily known by the 
intellect is an object of this nature, and 
secondarily, the act by which the object is 
known." 10 To multiply quotations would be 
useless and would largely repeat what was 
said when speaking of intellectual knowledge. 

We can then say we know the object, we 
know it as something external, and we know 
it at once. The perception of reality is not the 
result of an inference as Descartes and many 
moderns hold, but the idea represents the ob- 
ject at once without any intermediate presenta- 
tions. But how does the idea make the object 
known to us? What does it mean? The idea 
is a state of the mind, and it is also representa- 
tive of something-. In this second, its epistemo- 
logical aspect, as representative of something, 
what is its value? Seth admits the twofold 
aspect of the idea and yet holds: "Immediacy 



10 Nee sui intelligere est objectum priinum ipsa ejus essentia, 
sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et 
ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est 
hujusmodi objectum ; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus, 
quo cognoscitur objectum. Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, a. 3. This 
statement is exactly the opposite of the view held by 
Descartes and many modern psychologists, for whom the 
sensation is the only and the first immediate object of 
perception. 



— 7o — 

must be given up before any tenable theory of 
perception and any philosophical doctrine of 
Realism can be established." 11 St. Thomas 
maintains that the idea as representation, or, 
to make the statement general, the species 
which is the likeness or representation of the 
thing makes the thing itself known at once. 
If we hold with Berkeley that an idea can 
only be like an idea, we are shut off from a 
knowledge of the real existence of things 
material. The idea as an idea, as a state in 
the mind, of course, can only be like another 
idea, but when w^e recognize that " knowledge 
means nothing if it does not mean the relation 
of two factors, knowledge of an object by a 
subject," 12 and "that we are never restricted 
to our own idea as ideas; from the first dawn 
of knowledge we treat the subjective excita- 
tion as the symbol or revealer to us of a real 
world," 18 we see the aspect of the idea that 
looks toward something other than its presence 
as a mere mental state. It is only a question 
of what this something other is. And here we 
meet the second general principle of knowledge 
— the object is known according to the nature 
of the knower — from the critical point of view. 



11 Loc. rit., p. 515. 

12 A. Seth, loc. cit., p. 513. 

13 A. Seth, Scottish Philosophy, p. 103. 



— 7i — 

In the system of St. Thomas the answer to 
the something other is at hand : the idea repre- 
sents to the subject some real object that is 
known immediately by means of the idea, btit 
known according to the nature of the knower. 
The fact that everything the subject knows 
he knows according to his nature, renders the 
objections usually made on the score of incom- 
patibility of the nature of the knowing subject 
with certain objects that we say we do know, 
of little or no consequence; for though the 
intellectual idea as such is wholly immaterial, 
yet the image from which it has been derived 
is material, and the idea is simply the image 
considered in an immaterial way, namely, the 
essence freed from material conditions. 14 

The real difficulty from the modern point of 
view is to explain how the species represents 
the thing in itself, since the species is in the 



14 Quae (anirua) taraeu habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. 
Unam, quae est actus alicujus corporei organi; et huic con- 
naturale est cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia 
individuali ; unde sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia 
vero virtus cognoscitiva ejus est intellectus, qui non est 
actus alicujus organi corporalis. Unde per intellectum con- 
naturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non 
habent esse nisi in materia individuali rei, non tamen secun- 
dum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod 
abstrahuntur ab ea per consider ationem intellectus. Sum. 
TheoL, I, q. 14, a. 4. The close connection between the 
material image and the immaterial idea is here indicated. 



— 72 — 

knower according to the nature of the knower. 
Kant admits a relation between the subject 
and the object, but this relation is based upon 
an adaptation of the object to the subject, 
which imposes on the object its forms, cate- 
gories, or ideas; we know appearances, pheno- 
mena only; all knowledge is purely subjective 
due to internal elements, and hence a real 
knowledge of the nature of things is excluded, 
things in themselves cannot be known. For 
St. Thomas, there is also a relation between 
the subject and the object, but this relation 
is based on the natural proportion, though 
relative, of the object and the subject. This 
idea of a natural proportion is a fruitful and 
satisfying one in the system of Aquinas. When 
we consider that knowledge is a fact, and 
subject and object are brought in presence of 
each other in some way, the first natural 
suggestion seems to be, the subject and the 
object must be related to each other in a way 
that will account for this knowledge, there 
must be a proportion between them that w r ill 
enable us to resolve their connection if we go 
to work with the data on hand. It is not a 
great concession to admit with Dogmatism the 
reliability of our faculties in the quest of truth, 
and on this basis to account for the facts we 






— 73 — 

possess; it is, on the contrary, rather difficult 
to see the wisdom of any other proceeding. 15 

The definition of truth adopted by St. Thomas 
is familiar — adaequatio rei et intellectus. 1 * Strict- 
ly, this adequation is only found in the Divine 
Mind, for God alone knows things as com- 
pletely as they are knowable, since their truth 
depends on His Ideas. Things are measured 
by the Divine Ideas, whereas our ideas are 
measured by the things. Hence we simply 
have a proportional or relative knowledge of 
them, though it is true as far as it goes. 17 A 
faculty in normal condition, operating upon 
reliable data, always leads to truth. Each 
faculty has a specific portion of reality about 
which it is especially concerned, and when 
limited to this sphere it never gives a false 
report: "if the faculty is present, its judgment 
about its proper object wall never be at 

15 To all appearances, the objection so commonly urged 
against the proceeding of Kant as involving a vicious circle 
or leading to a contradiction, is well grounded. He seeks to 
prove that our faculties are incapable of arriving at truth, 
and in doing so uses the very faculties he has called in 
question. 

16 Per conformitatem intellectus et rei, Veritas definitur. 
Sum. Tbeol , I, q. 16, a. 2. 

17 Res naturales, ex quibus intellectus noster scientiam 
accipit, mensurant intellectum nostrum: sed sunt mensuratae 
ah intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia creata, sicut omnia 
artificiata intellectu artificis. De Veri., q. 1, a. 2. 



— 74 — 

fault. " 38 In sensitive knowledge the sense is 
always true when busied with its specific 
object — sight in case of color, hearing for 
sound, and the like, unless it is impeded in 
its normal action. Moreover, it seizes the 
object as it is. "The sense always appre- 
hends the thing as it is, unless there is an 
impediment in the organ or in the medium. 
The sense is not the dominus of falsity, but 
the imagination. " 19 If there is error, it will 
be found in the imagination, which puts to- 
gether the various elements that have come 
through the senses. The intellect works on 
this image, which represents an objective 
reality, and extracts the idea which will also 
be objective, since it is the deliverance of the 
image. The intellect can never be deceived 
about the essence, simply considered as appre- 
hended, for this is its specific object; but error 
may arise in the further processes of judg- 
ment and reasoning, owing to faulty proceed- 
ing. "The specific object of the intellect is 



18 Ad proprium objectum unaquaeque potentia per se 
ordinatur secundum quod ipsa: quae autera sunt hujus- 
modi, semper eodem modo se habent. Unde manente po- 
tentia non deficit ejus judicium circa proprium objectum. 
Sum. Theol, I, q. 85, a. 6. 

19 Sensus semper apprehendit rem ut est, nisi sit impedi- 
mentum in organo, vel in medio. Sensus non est dominus 
falsitatis, sed phantasia. De Veri., q. 1, a. 11. 



— 75 — 

the essence of a thing. Whence properly 
speaking, the intellect is never deceived about 
the quiddity of a thing, but it may be deceived 
about matters connected with the essence or 
quiddity while it relates one thing to another 
by judgment or ratiocination." 20 Truth or 
error is found, strictly, in the affirmation or 
negation of the judgment — in the componendo 
et dividendo of Aquinas — and in the reasoning 
based on these judgments. "In the intellect, 
truth and falsity are primarily and principally 
found in the judgment of the one w r ho affirms 
or denies." 21 The judgment and subsequent 
reasoning are true and have objective value 
if not impeded in their normal action, for 
they rest, through the idea, the image, the 
sense, on the reality of the object itself. 22 



20 Objectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei. 
Unde circa quidditatem per se loquendo intellectus non 
fallitur, sed circa ea, quae circumstant rei essentiam Tel 
quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinet 
ad alterum vel componendo vel etiam ratiocinando. Sum. 
TheoL, I, q. 85, a. 6. 

21 In intellectu autem primo et principaliter inveniuntur 
falsitas et Veritas in judicio componentis et dividentis. 
Be Veri., q. 1, a. 11. 

22 It is not surprising that this conformity or proportion 
should exist between things and the human mind, when 
we* recall, that, according to Aquinas, God is the author 
of both. They are the expressions of His Ideas, and in His 
Mind there is the most complete unity and harmony. "In 
Deo autem tot a plenitudo intellectualis cognitionis conti- 
netur in uno." Sum. TheoL, I, q. 55, a. 3. 



- 7 6- 

The idea, however, has certain qualities that 
are not found in the image that gave rise to 
it. The thing represented by the idea, the 
essence — is endowed with conditions of neces- 
sity and universality, whereas the image is 
contingent and particular. Whence does the 
idea derive these attributes ? Are they giverf in 
the representation of the object or are they 
simply due to the intelligence itself operating 
on the object, impressing a part of its sub- 
stance on the object? This recalls the Con- 
troversy about the Universals, and the 
Critical Theory of Kant. The position of St. 
Thomas — that of Moderate Realism — is well 
known. For him, the universal did not exist 
separate from the object as Plato held, nor 
was it simply a name with no corresponding 
reality as Nominalism maintained, but it was 
the result of mind and object. It existed in 
the mind but had its basis in the thing. 
" There is a threefold diversity of objects 
signified by names. There are some which, 
according to their whole being, complete in 
themselves, are extra animam, as man, stone. 
There some that have no extra-mental exist- 
ence, as dreams and chimerical images. There 
are some that have a fund amentum in re extra 
animam, but their formal completion is due 
to mental activity, as is the case with the 



— 77 — 

universal. " The universal is the result of the 
action of the mind, but it has its basis in the 
object. " Humanity is something in re, yet 
as there found it is not the formal concept 
of the universal, since extra animam there is 
no humanity common to many. . . I say the 
same of truth, because it has a fundamentum in 
re, but its concept is completed through the 
action of the intellect when, namely, it is 
apprehended in the manner in which it is." 23 The 
active intellect abstracts the universal from 
the mental image and gives it the final 
character of universality which existed but 
in germ, in potency, in the singular, contingent 
image. "It is the theory of the Active Intel- 
lect which solves the question so often agitated 
by modern philosophers: Whence comes it 

23 Eorum, quae significantur nominibus, invenitur trip- 
lex diversitas. Quaedam enim sunt, quae secundum esse 
totum completum sunt extra animam, et hujusmodi sunt 
entia completa, sicut homo, lapis. Quae autem sunt, quae 
nihil habent extra animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio 
chimerae. Quaedam autem sunt, quae habent fundamentum 
in re extra animam; sed eomplementum rationis eorum, 
quantum ad id, quod est formale, est per operationem 
animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid 
in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis cum non sit 
extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis. Simi- 
liter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re, sed 
ratio ejus completur per actionem intellectus, quando 
scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est. Com. on Lomb., I, 
Dis. 19, q. 5, a. 1. 



- 7 8- 

that the laws of reason accord with the laws 
of nature. " 24 The thought contained in the idea 
results from the presence of the image acted 
upon by the intellect, the image is the out- 
come of the deliverance of the sense, which 
in turn connects with external reality. So 
fundamentally, the external object is found 
in the highest operation of the intellect, for 
we can trace the object through the various 
stages that lead to the final act, and nowhere 
along the line of development are " we made 
aware of any elements that come from a 
source other than the presence of the 
object in relation to the knowing faculty. For 
Kant, anything that is universal, necessary, 
is subjective, hence if we apply these qualities 
to ideas they can only have an internal signifi- 
cance, and do not relate us with objective 
reality as it is in itself. For St. Thomas, if we 
begin with the real — as we do in sensation — 
and proceed logically with normal faculties, 
we end with the real; hence there is reality 
throughout the whole process of knowledge. 
We have already noted that all our ideas betray 
signs of their sensuous origin, for if a sense is 
wanting or injured the intellectual data that 
would result from it are absent; moreover, the 
image is also required when we wish to re-think 

24 Piat, Ulntellect Actif, p. 181. 



— 79 — 

what we have already thought about or 
known. This is further emphasized in our 
knowledge of immaterial beings, as of God; 
for we can know an object separated from all 
materiality only by analogy of sensuous things 
or by notions derived from them. 

The consequence of Kant's view on the 
question of the vaildity of our knowledge in 
contrast to that of Aquinas is found in the 
Relativity of Knowledge advocated by Hamil- 
ton and Spencer, and in the position of 
J. S. Mill, who also allies himself closely with 
Hume. What then is the extent of our knowl- 
edge? How much of reality. can we know, and 
do all men know the same amount? 

We know^ the universal, the essence in the 
material object, not exhaustively, however, but 
in a proportionate way ; that is, it is known 
by us in so far as our knowing power will 
permit us to know it — for the object is known 
according to the nature of the knower. Our 
make-up as man necessitates a connection w-ith 
matter that renders our knowledge dependent 
on it to such an extent as to exclude a perfect 
or complete grasp of the object itself. The 
thing to be known is the same for all men, but 
the intellectual state of the knower in the 
presence of the object depends upon his bodily 
condition and likewise on the good form of 



— So — 

the inferior powers of knowledge — sense and 
imagination — when the object was presented 
to them. 25 "The higher the intellect the more 
it knows, either a greater number of objects 
or at least more reasons for the same objects. " 26 
Again, "Some men can not grasp an intelligible 
truth unless it be explained to them part by 
part . . . others, who have a stronger intellect, 
can sieze much from few data." 27 All men, 
however, can know the object really, its essence, 

25 Sum. TheoL, I, q. 85, a. 8. There is no separation of 
mind and matter in the S3'stem of Aquinas to the extent 
of an unbridgable chasm between them. Man is body and 
soul; and it is man that knows. The aberrations from this 
view from the time of * Descartes are certainly instructive, 
and speak favorably for the doctrine that avoids all these 
apparent difficulties — such as psycho-physical parallelism 
is busied with — by interpreting faithfully the facts of 
consciousness. "'If any degradation is suffered by my 
cognitive faculty in thus being dependent on the causal 
efficiency of these physico-chemical processes which is called 
'my brain states', the remedy for this would seem to be 
in my not being an animal at all, rather than resorting 
to a theory which makes a complete breach between my 
mentality and my animality." Ladd, Phil, of Knowledge, 
p. 553. 

26 Quanto aliquis intellectus est altior, tanto plura cog- 
noscit. vel secundum rerum multidudinem, vel saltern 
secundum earumdem rerum plures rationes. C. G., 1. 3,c. 56. 

27 Sunt enim quidam qui veritatem intelligibilem capere 
non possunt, nisi eis particulatim per singula explicatur; 
et hoc ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero 
sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multa capere possunt. 
Sum. Theol , I, q 55, a. 3. 



— 8i — 

by a consideration of its manifestations. This 
is the important item in all knowledge, God 
not excepted, for if we can not know Him from 
what He manifests of Himself, then truly is 
knowledge of Him impossible. The causal idea 
here involved is at the basis of all validity of 
knowledge; it bears the whole burden of the 
knowableness of God in the system of St. 
Thomas, and will be considered at length 
shortly. 

Hamilton justly argues that if we had more 
means of knowledge, had better faculties, we 
should know more and better, but his conclu- 
sion to absolute relativity of knowledge based 
on this lack of powers is unwarranted. "But 
were the number of our faculties coextensive 
with the modes of being — had we for each of 
these thousand modes a separate organ com- 
petent to make it known to us, — still would 
our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, 
only of the relative. Of existence absolutely 
and in itself, we should then be as ignorant 
as w r e are now." 28 This position is answered 
in the statement of Straub: "It is true that we 
do not attain to all that is or can be in 
rerutn natura, by the senses, but it is one thing 
to say, what we seem to know in things is 



28 Metaphysics, v. 1, p. 153, lect. 9. 



— 82 — 

really in them, and it is quite another to con- 
tend, that we reach, by our knowledge, what- 
ever is present in things. " 29 

Spencer's conclusions to the relativity and 
inconceivability of what we are led to recognize 
as the legitimate outcome of our reasonings, 
rests on a misapprehension of the terms used. 
The statement of J. S. Mill: " Experience there- 
fore affords no evidence, not even analogies, 
to justify our extending to the apparently 
immutable a generalization grounded only on 
our observation of the changeable", 30 is opposed 
to the view of Aquinas — "Through the active 
intellect we know immutable truth from mut- 
able things, and we discern things themselves 
from their likenesses." 31 True objective reality 
and the principle of causality give us a reliable 
knowledge of things and allow us to arrive at 
an equally valid and non- relative view — 
always keeping in mind the limitations of our 
nature — of what really transcends the senses, 
and finally a view .of the systematic relation 
of things. Ladd summarizes his chapter on 



29 De Objectivitate Cognitionis Humanae, p. 39. 

30 Essays on Religion. 

31 Per quod (lumen intellectus agentis) immutabiliter 
veritatem in rebus mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus 
ipsas res a similitudinibus rerum. Sum. Theol. y I, q. 84, a. 
6adl. 



-8 3 - 

Knowledge and Reality in these words: "All 
this amounts to saying that the very existence 
of our cognitive activities, and of the products 
which mark their development, whether for 
the individual or for the race, rests upon the 
general assumption that things and minds do so 
causally determine each other as to show that 
they belong to one system of Reality." 32 Reality 
in its various relations and interdependences 
leads back to one author of all in whom we 
see the final and complete expression. This 
will come to light in the portion of the subject 
we are about to consider, where the principles 
we have just discussed will give us a knowledge 
of God, of whom St. Thomas says: "However 
meagre be our intellectual preception of divine 
knowledge, this will be more for us, as an 
ultimate end, than a perfect knowledge of 
inferior intelligible things." 33 

SECTION IV.— CAUSALITY AND KNOWLEDGE. 

As we have just intimated the principle of 
causality is frequently employed in the discus- 
sion of knowledge in general, and of the know- 
ableness of God in particular. Despite this fact, 
"the Scholastics did not make the principle 



32 Loc. cit.y p. 554. 
83 C. G., 1. 3, c. 25. 



-8 4 - 

of causality an object of special study," 1 though 
it is used by them continually. The power the 
effects have, or the phenomena that begin to 
be, to teach us about the nature of the 
something that gave them being is fully 
recognized, and elaborated to great extent 
by St. Thomas. And we might say this is 
the only form under which the question is 
presented. The idea of cause for Aquinas was 
acquired as any other idea; it was the result 
of the abstractive power — the active intellect — 
at work on the deliverance of sense. Ex- 
ternal reality was not doubted by him; he 
was aware of immediately perceiving phe- 
nomena coming into existence, beginning to 
be, both internally and externally; and these 
beginnings must have a something to account 
for them. Internally, the power of thinking 
and willing was open to immediate view; 
change and modification w T ere visible in the 
world; external objects gave rise to sensation, 
which in turn led to intellectual operation — 
the knowing powder is passive, the object is 
active; all these factors contribute to the idea 
of cause. The principle was analytic for him, 
possessing the universality that pertains to 
every contingent existence stripped of its 



1 Kleutgen, La Philosophie Scolastique, v. 2, p. 46. 



individual conditions; like all ideas it had its 
fundamentum in re, and in conjunction with 
the active intellect received its final form. 
Thus it was not Hume's observed uniformity 
of sequence due to custom, nor was it the 
subjective principle Kant made it out to be. 
St. Thomas, therefore, could not doubt its 
validity without running counter to his sys- 
tem of Moderate Realism, and the principle 
of causality, we note from his works, gave 
him no special alarm. 

It is well known that the Scholastics after 
Aristotle divided all causes into four classes : 
formal, material, efficient, and final. The 
formal and material are the constituent prin- 
ciples of a thing, and we get a knowledge of 
them from the operations and qualities of the 
thing. And these lead to a knowledge of the 
final cause or the purpose of the thing. Effi- 
cient cause is a principle determing by its 
action the existence of a contingent thing; 
it produces something, and thus establishes 
a nexus or connection between itself and the 
result of its operation, the effect or thing. 
Action is its basis — the cause is the principle 
or source of action, and the effect is the 
terminus of the action. Its essential character 
is production. Though not every cause is 
efficient, yet every cause looks toward ef- 



— 86 — 

ficiency in some way. We shall consider 
efficient causality especially, though the argu- 
ments that establish its validity are also 
valid for the other causes. 2 The product or 
effect of the cause is a manifestation of the 
nature of the cause and leads to a knowledge 
of the cause; and it is this point we wish 
to consider. 

This view of causality is based on the 
principle — omne agens agit sibi simile — every 
agent produces something similar to itself. 
The action of the cause consists in calling 
forth in the effect its own form which is a 
principle of activity — "for the active power is 
a principle of acting on something else." 3 From 
this similarity between the two, we can know 
something of the cause as shadowed in the 
effect. Similarity is an agreement in form. 
The cause is determined to some result either 
blindly, if a physical cause, or intelligently, 
if acting from the knowledge of a proposed 
end. The effect then pre-exists in its cause, 



2 The Scholastics did not limit causality to efficient 
causality, as is done in Modern Philosophy, but they con- 
sidered it in all its aspects, and regarded final as the 
most important. 

3 Ratio autem activi principii convenit potentiae activae. 
Nam potentia activa est principium agendi in aliud. Sum. 
TheoL, I, q. 25, a. 1. 



-8 7 — 

and thus every cause produces something like 
to itself; the closer the resemblance, the more 
perfect our knowledge of the cause. The effect 
may adequate or wholly express the power of 
the cause, or it may be but a far -off hint. 
" Every effect not equalling the power of the 
cause receives the likeness of the cause defi- 
ciently and not according to the same concept, 
so that what is divided and manifold in the 
effects, is simply and in the same way in the 
cause." 4 

The agreement may be specific, generic, or 
simply one of proportion, with a lessening 
knowledge power respectively. The effect is 
but the manifestation of the power of the 
cause according the axiom — operatio sequitur 
esse. "The effect shows the power of the 
cause only by reason of the action, which, 
proceeding from the power, is transmitted to 
effect. The nature of the cause is known 
only through the effect in so far as its 
power, which is in accord with nature, is 



4 Omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, 
recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eamdem ratio- 
nem, sed deficienter : ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter 
est in effectibus, in causa sit sitnpliciter et eodem modo. 
Sum. Theol.y I, q. 13, a. 5. 



— 88 — 

known. " 5 Moreover, " there is the same 
reason for the effect tending to the likeness of 
the cause, and for the cause assimilating or 
rendering the effect like to itself." 6 The effect 
is contained in the cause in some way, and 
imitates or resembles the cause in some par- 
ticular — and these are the two factors in 
similarity. "Every effect represents its cause 
aliqualiter, but diversely: For some effect 
represents the simple causality of the cause, 
but not its form, as smoke represents a fire. 
. . But some effect represents the cause even 
to the likeness of its form, as produced fire 
the fire which produces it." 7 Smoke and fire 
both represent their cause, fire, but not to 
the same extent; and each in its way gives 
a knowledge of its cause. There is, however, 



5 Non effectus ostendit virtutem causae nisi ratione 
actionis, quae a virtute procedens ad effectum terminatur. 
Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum nisi in 
quantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus ejus, quae natura 
consequitur. C. G., 1. 3, c. 21. 

6 Ejusdem rationis est quod effectus tendit in similitudinem 
agentis, et quod agens assimilet sibi effectum. C. G , 1. 3, 
c. 21. 

7 Omnis effectus aliqualiter repraesentat suam causam, 
sed diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam 
causalitatem causae, non autem formam ejus ; sicut fumus 
repraesentat ignem. . . Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat 
causam quantum ad similitudinem formae ejus; sicut ignis 
generatus ignem generantem. Sum. Theol., I, q. 45, a. 7. 



-8 9 - 

a distinction between the cause and the effect 
— "in every kind of cause, there is always 
found a distance (difference) between the cause 
and that of which it is the cause, according 
to some perfection or power." 8 Mr. Fiske, 
criticising the phrase we have just been dis- 
cussing — the cause is in some way like the 
effect— as defended by Mr. Adam in his "Inquiry 
into the Theories of History," says, "Mr. 
Adam's reply savors of mediaeval realism." 9 Mr. 
Fiske seems to demand a total likeness in all 
cases, which "mediaeval realism" exacted of 
only certain causes. With the distinctions of 
St. Thomas regarding the knowledge power of 
the effect, on the basis of likeness to the cause, 
the position of Mr. Fiske has no weight. 

The knowledge power of the effect depends on 
what sort of expression the cause has given of 
itself. Thus the Scholastics spoke of a univocal 
and an analogical cause. In general, the result 
of the operation of a univocal cause is a likeness 
in species between the cause and the effect, as 
that between a father and his son — here the 
effect equals the power of the cause. In the 
analogical cause, the likeness is not one of 



8 In omnibus enim causae generibus semper invenitur dis- 
tantia inter causam et id cujus est causa, secundum aliquam 
perfectionem, aut virtutem. Sum. Theol., I, q. 31, a. 1 ad 1. 

9 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, v. 2, p. 387. 



— 90 — 

quality, but one of proportional relation 
between cause and effect. In a univocal con- 
cept there is an agreement in word and in idea, 
and everything this idea expresses must apply 
equally and by the same right to all the objects 
of which it is affirmed. "Every effect of a 
univocal cause adequates the power of the 
cause," 10 and hence gives the most perfect 
knowledge of the cause that we can attain to. 
We do not mention equivocal cause, since 
"where there is pure equivocation there is no 
likeness in things, but only a unity of name"/ 1 
and hence it is not a source of knowledge. 
Truth is the proportion between concepts and 
things, as already noted. The analogical con- 
cept is not the full manifestation of the cause 
as the univocal, nor is it a mere metaphor as 
the equivocal, but it is between them and gives 
a real, though proportional, knowledge of the 
cause. It is not equivalent to a metaphor as 
Caldecott quotes St. Thomas as holding, when 
speaking of the applicability of certain attri- 
butes to God — "such as are predicable of Him 
only after the way of analogy or metaphor." 12 



10 Omnis effectus agentis uaivoci adaequat virtutem 
agentis. Pot., q. 7, a. 7. 

11 Ubi est pura aequivocatio nulla sitnilitudo in rebus 
attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis. C. G., 1. 1, c. 33. 

12 Selections from the Literature of Theism, p. 19. 



— 9i — 

Aquinas recognizes both analogy and metaphor, 
but with a great distinction, as we shall see 
later on. There is real knowledge in analogical 
predication. The proportion or relation in 
analogy may be based on the comparison of 
two objects to an independent third, or one of 
the two may be related to the other. This 
latter is the one of cause and effect, and pre- 
supposes that they have something in common 
in a way, however slight that may be, and 
thus we are led to a proportional knowledge 
of the cause by a consideration of the relation 
of the effect to the cause. 

St. Thomas has summarized briefly the three 
ways an effect can lead us to a knowledge of 
a cause. "One way, when the effect is taken 
as a medium for knowing the existence and the 
nature of the cause, as takes place in the 
sciences which demonstrate the cause through 
the effect. Another way, when the cause is seen 
in the effect itself in so far as the likeness of 
the cause results in the effect, as man is seen 
in a mirror on account of his likeness . . . 
The third way, when the likenss of the cause 
in the effect is the form by which its effect 
knows the cause. . . But by none of these ways 
by effect can the cause be known, unless the 
effect be adequate to the cause, in which the 



— 92 — 

whole power of the cause is expressed." 13 St. 
Thomas here refers to a complete knowledge of 
the nature of the cause, not a partial one. An 
adequate concept gives a knowledge of a thing 
as it is in itself, in as far as it is knowable — 
"a thing is known in itself when it is known 
through a specific likeness adequate to the 
knowable itself/ ' We can have some knowl- 
edge of a thing without having an adequate 
knowledge of it, and this partial knowledge 
is given us by all effects. "From every manifest 
effect we can demonstrate the existence of the 
cause. ,,u The producing power of secondary 
agents must be admitted, says Aquinas, "or else 
the nature of no created thing could be known 
through the effect, and all knowledge of natural 



13 Contingit enim ex effectu cognoscere causam multi- 
pliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod effectus sumitur ut 
medium ad cognoscendum de causa quod sit, et quod talis 
sit, sicut accidit in scientiis quae causam demonstrant per 
effectum. Alio modo, ita quod in ipso effectu videatur causa 
in quantum similitudo causae resultat in effectu : sicut homo 
videtur in speculo propter suara similitudinem . . . Tertio 
modo, ita quod ista similitudo causae in effectu sit forma 
qua cognoscit causam suus effectus . . . Nullo autem istorum 
modorum per effectum potest cognosci causa quid sit, nisi 
effectus causae adaequatus, in quo tota virtus causae 
exprimatur. C. G., 1. 3, c. 49. 

14 Ex quocumque effectu manifesto nobis potest demon- 
strari causam esse. Sum TbeoL, I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3, 



— 93 — 

science, which relies especially on demonstration 
through effects, would be taken away. 15 

The degrees of knowledge derived from the 
effect vary. "The perfection of the effect deter- 
mines the perfection of the cause." 16 The effect, 
however, as just noted, is seldom of such a 
character as to adequate the nature of the 
cause, hence we need many effects to make our 
knowledge more stable. Every actual effect " can 
be infallibly submitted to certain knowledge." 
"But when we know a contingent effect in its 
cause only, we have but a conjectural knowledge 
of it." 17 The larger the number of manifesta- 
tions and the greater, the more perfect will 
be our knowledge of the cause. "It is manifest 
that the causality of a cause and its power is 
known in proportion to the number and great- 
ness of its known effects." 18 This is important 
in determining our knowledge of God, for all 



16 Si igitur res creatae non habent actiones ad producen- 
dum effectus, sequitur quod nunquam natura alicujus rei 
creatae poterit cognosci per effectum, et sic subtrahitur nobis 
omnis cognitio scientiae naturalis, in qua praecipue demon- 
strationes per effectum sumuntur. C. G. f 1. 3, c. 69. 

16 Perfectio effectus determinat perfectionem causae. C. G., 
1. 3, c. 69. 

17 Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, a. 13. 

l0 Manifestum est quod causalitas alicujus causae et virtus 
ejus tanto magis cognoscitur, quanto plures et majores ejus 
effectus innotescunt. C. G., 1. 3, c. 49. 



— 94- 



creation is His work, it contains innumerable 
manifestations of His Power, and the more we 
know of them and the more deeply we enter 
into them, the more complete will be our idea 
of the Supreme Cause in whom all these effects 
find a single, harmonious setting. 



■95 — 



CHAPTER II 



THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD. 



SECTION I.— EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

The general principles of all knowledge and 
especially the elements involved in intellectual 
knowledge find their application in the question 
of God. This is quite natural, since for Aquinas 
there is a unity running through all things, 
so that the highest product of a given genus 
is practically the lowest being in the genus 
immediately above it. 1 There is more reason 
for this intimate connection between knowledge 
in general and the knowledge of God in par- 
ticular; for if we admit that we can know 
God at all, the natural inference is, that the 
process that leads to a knowledge of Him 
should follow lines similar to those that lead 
to a knowledge of anything. In both cases, 
we have the same human mind, the same data, 
and with the modifications coincident to a 
certain class or kind of objects, the same 



1 C. G., 1. 3,c. 97. 



- 9 6- 

principles should hold. As our knowledge 
becomes more complex, owing to the nature 
of the thing known, it admits new factors, 
though the fundamental elements are always 
the same. Likewise the knowledge we have 
of God rests on the general basis of knowledge, 
though there are and must be factors peculiar 
to it, else it would not really be an addition 
to our cognitions. 

The actual application of the principles thus 
far discussed will come in evidence as the ques- 
tion is developed. We may at once, however, 
briefly state the chief points of contact : 

1. All knowledge requires a relation of knower 
and known, thus God and man must be related 
in some way. 

2. Man knows only according to his own 
nature, hence our knowledge of God will be in 
terms of our intellect. 

3. A requisite for knowledge is actuality or 
immateriality, and the degree of knowledge is 
regulated by the degree of actuality; God is 
supremely actual, and hence infinitely knowable 
in Himself. 

4. All knowledge takes its rise in the senses — 
thus excluding innate ideas and intuitions ; but 
the intellectual idea is due to an abstractive 
power, the active intellect, operating on the 
deliverance of the sensitive image. The idea of 



— 97 — 

God arises from the same source as material 
things — it is not an intuition nor innate — but 
receives final expression only after we have 
purified it from imperfections, by a process that 
can be readily likened to the work of the active 
intellect. 

5. The validity of all knowledge, that of God 
included, depends on the proper relation between 
the reality of things and the truthfulness of our 
faculties, as already indicated. 

The problem of God raises two questions at 
the outset: Is there a God? and if so, What 
is the nature of God? The great difference 
between these two queries in the light of 
difficulty of solution, and also of importance 
in the conclusion reached, was fully recognized 
by St. Thomas, and the Scholastics generally. 
We have already noted the attitude of Aquinas 
regarding the existence and the nature of the 
soul, — "many know they have a soul who do 
not know what the soul is"; and again, "each 
one experiences in himself that he has a soul, 
and that the acts of the soul take place within 
him, but to know the nature of the soul is 
most difficult." 2 He is similarly minded on 
the points of God's existence and of God's 
nature. Existence and nature comprise the 



2 De Veri., q. 10, a. 8 ad 8. 



— 9 3 — 

Scholatic phrases of An Sit and Quid Sit. 3 
There is no doubt that if we prove the 
existence of an object, we must as a consequence 
know something about it, and in this sense 
Prof. Royce is right when he says: "A really 
fruitful philosophical study of the conception of 
God is inseparable from an attempt to estimate 
what evidence there is for the existence of God." 
The further statement — "the proof that one 
can offer for God's presence at the heart of 
the world constitutes also the best exposition 
that one can suggest regarding what one means 
by the conception of God," 4 is not sufficiently 
complete. In this view, existence and nature 
are correlative. If we have proven the existence 
of an object, we know its nature implicitly or 
fundamentally, but not explicitly; thus the 
mere existence is not the "best exposition" of 
the nature. We may prove the existence of God 
and still have but a vague general idea of what 
God is, as the proofs St. Thomas offers for God's 
existence show; it is only after a process of 
deduction and the analysis of the idea given 
by the proofs that we can be said to have an 
exposition worthy to be called a satisfactory 
or rounded conception. An adequate or proper 
concept of God can not be arrived at by the 

3 C. G.,1. 1, c 12. 

4 The Conception of God, pp. 6, 7. 



— 99 — 

human mind in its present condition — and to 
this extent the essence of God, His nature in se, 
remains unknown to us, yet there is a concept 
of God's nature that we can truly reach by 
determined methods, and this we hope to 
establish. 

Existence and conception can be considered 
independently. Whether we handle both or only 
one, we practically travel over the same ground. 
In a conception we are held to give as much as 
the human intellect can attain to regarding the 
idea of God ; in proving the existence of God 
we are only bound to as much as the facts 
contain that lead to this existence — we have 
still the analysis of this idea on hand. The 
existence alone lacks completeness, the concep- 
tion by itself is a mere idea. St. Thomas 
combines both, and only when both are treated 
is our quest a fruitful one. If God were an 
intuition, the questions of existence and nature 
would blend, would be one; if He is known 
only by demonstration they are distinct, 
though closely connected. 

How is the existence of God known? It is 
not known per se, says Aquinas, and hence it 
must be known by demonstration. St. Thomas 
considers the two great aspects under which 
a thing is knowable, before he advances evidence 
for God's existence. An object is knowable in 



ioo- 



itself — per se nota — and it is knowable rela- 
tively to us — quoad nos nota. A proposition 
is knowable in itself when the predicate is 
included in the concept of the subject or 
immediately connected with it. The propo- 
sition, man is an animal, is knowable in itself, 
because the predicate animal is included in the 
concept man. The same is true of first princi- 
ples ; but first principles are not only knowable 
in themselves but also immediately knowable 
to us. A proposition is knowable in itself and 
knowable to us w r hen w r e immediately perceive 
the necessary connection between the subject 
and the predicate — as in the first principle, the 
whole is greater than a part. 

When we come to the proposition God exists — 
Deus est — we have a proposition per se nota 
to one who understands the meaning of the 
words, God and exists. "But as we do not 
know what God is, this proposition is not per 
se nota, but needs to be demonstrated through 
those things that are more known to us, and 
less known in their nature, namely effects." 5 The 
existence of God must then be proven. To 
know a proposition per se, it is needful that 



5 Sed quia* nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis 
per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis 
nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per 
effectus. Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, a. 1. 



IOI — 

its terms and their relation be known; if either 
is unknown we can not speak of per se nota. 
It is not surprising that the existence of God 
is not known per se to us, "for our intellect 
is related to objects that are most known as 
the eye of an owl to the sun." 6 Before giving 
his proofs for God's existence, St. Thomas shows 
the insufficieny of the Argument of St. Anselm 
to prove the existence of God, and in general, 
of all positions that do not start with material 
things as a basis, and from them rise to a 
knowledge of God. 

The Ontological argument was advanced by 
St. Anselm, modified by Descartes, and supple- 
mented by Leibniz. It has likewise been 
handled by some other philosophers, either for 
commendation or rejection, such as, Spinoza, 
Locke, Kant, Hegel. We shall give briefly the 
position of the first three named, before we 
present the reason for its rejection by Aquinas. 

St. Anselm tells us that he had been seeking 
a long time for one argument that would suffice 
to establish the existence of God — "a single 
argument that would require no other for its 
proof than itself alone; and alone would suffice 
to demonstrate that God trulv exists." 7 After 



6 Ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum, noster intellectus se 
habeat, ut oculus noctuae ad solem. C G., 1, c. 11. 

7 Preface to Proslogium. 



— 102 — 

a weary struggle in thought he finally reached 
the following argument: Even the fool, he 
says, has the idea of the being than which 
nothing greater can be conceived, though he 
does not understand it to exist. "And what- 
ever is understood exists in the understanding. 
And assuredly that than which nothing greater 
can be conceived, cannot exist in the under- 
standing alone. For suppose it exists in the 
understanding alone, then it can be conceived 
to exist in reality, which is greater. . . There 
is no doubt that there exists a being, than 
which nothing greater can be conceived, and 
it exists both in the understanding arid in 
reality." 8 Descartes held that we have an 
idea of a supremely perfect being. The idea 
which is clear and distinct, contains in itself 
the idea of existence, for if we think of a 
mountain we must recognize that there is a 
valley, for the two are inseparable; so if we 
have the idea of the infinite, the idea of existence 
necessarily accompanies it. This perfect being 
must contain all perfection, but existence is a 
perfection and thus cannot be wanting to 
it. 9 Leibniz gives the form of the argument 
as set forth by Anselm and Descartes thus : 
"God is the greatest or (as Descartes says) 

8 iMf.,c.2. 

9 Principia Philosophiae, part 1, 14; Med. 3. 



— io3 — 

the most perfect of beings, or rather a being 
of supreme grandeur and perfection including 
all degrees thereof. That is the notion of 
God." He goes on to say, "The Scholastics, 
not even excepting their Doctor Angelicus have 
misunderstood this argument and have taken 
it as a paralogism ; in which respect they were 
altogether wrong. It is not a paralogism, but 
it is an imperfect demonstration which assumes 
something that must still be proved in order 
to render it mathematically evident; that is, 
it is tacitly assumed that this idea of the 
All-great or All-perfect being is possible, and 
implies no contradition. And it is already 
something that by this remark it is proved 
that assuming that God is possible He exists, 
which is the privilege of divinity alone." This 
element of possibility is what Leibniz added 
to the argument, and of which he said, "We 
have the right to presume the possibility of 
every being, and especially that of God, until 
someone proves the contrary." 10 

We may be easily mislead by the Ontological 
Argument, and any position in fact, that seeks 
to rest simply on ideas that are- common to 
mankind as a result of circumstances, and that 
does not probe into the history and develop- 



10 Nouveaux Essais, c. 10. 



— io4 — 

ment of these ideas. St. Thomas wisely remarks 
that "men are accustomed to hear and invoke 
the name of God from infancy; but custom, 
and especially that dating from childhood, 
has the force of nature; whence it is brought 
about that those things by which one is im- 
bued from boyhood are as firmly held as if 
they were naturally and per se known. More- 
over, this happens because we do not distinguish 
between a thing known in itself simply and 
as known by us." 11 Anselm, of course was 
aware of the difference between an idea and the 
objective existence of a corresponding thing — 
he says, "it is one thing for an object to be in 
the understanding, and another to understand 
that the object exists. " 12 He also admitted the 
a posteriori argument for God's existence, as 
did Descartes likewise. Yet in the argument 
under consideration, he lays great stress on 
the fact that from the idea of God we can pro- 
ceed further and come to reality, but he does 
not speak of the origin of this idea or its 
basis in anything outside the mind. And this 
is where it diverges from the view of Aquinas, 

11 A principio homines assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et 
invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a prin- 
cipio, vim naturae obtinet ; ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a 
pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneantur ac si essent 
naturaliter et per se nota. C. C, 1. 1, c. 11. 

12 Pros., c. 2. 



— io5 — 

who first traces the steps that lead to this 
idea before he seeks to specify it. The word 
God does not awaken the same idea in all 
men," for some believed God to be body"; 
granting that it did, "it would not follow 
that what is understood by this name is 
in rerum natura, but only an intellectual idea." 13 

The flaw in the argument is the passage from 
the ideal to the real, and St. Thomas pointed 
this out clearly, though unfortunately he did 
not go further and tell us how he arrived at 
this distinction. The fact that he made this 
distinction is evident, and refutes the unwar- 
ranted imputation of naive realism. It was 
perhaps his undoubted trust in reality that 
prevented him from going beyond a mere 
reference to the distinction between the ideal 
and the real. 14 

St. Thomas regards the argument as a petitio 
principii. "His (Anselm's) argument proceeds 
from this supposition that he posits some being 



15 Dato enitn quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine, Deus, 
significari hoc quod dicitur (scilicet illud quo magis cogitari 
non potest) ; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat 
id quod significatur per notnen, esse in rerum natura, sed in 
apprehensione intellectus tantum. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 2, 
a. 1 ad 2. 

14 Modern philosophers, as a rule, when they refer to this 
argument, give Kant the credit for picking the flaw in it, 
though he simply repeats the criticism given by St. Thomas. 



— 106 — 

than which no greater can be thought." 15 "Un- 
less we concede there is something in rerum 
natura than which no greater can be thought", 16 
we can think something greater. The fact that 
we can think God not to exist "does not arise 
from the imperfection or uncertainty of His 
existence, but from the weakness of our intellect 
which can not see Him through himself, but 
through His effects. And thus we are lead to 
know His existence by demonstration." 17 

The existence of God is then a matter of 
demonstration. There are two kinds of demon- 
stration — one from cause to effect, the other 
from effect to cause. The former is called 
propter quid or a priori, the latter quia or a 
posteriori. "When some effect is more manifest 
to us than its cause, we proceed through the 
effect to a knowledge of the cause. From every 

15 Ratio sua procedit ex hac suppositione, quod suppon- 
atur aliquid esse quo majus cogitari non potest. Com. on 
Lomb.y I, Dis. 3, q 1, a. 2 ad 4. 

16 Non enim inconveniens est, quolibet dato vel in re, vel in 
intellectu, aliquid majus cogitari posse, nisi ei qui concedit 
esse aliquid, quo majus cogitari non possit in rerum natura. 
C. G. 1. 1, c. 11. 

17 Nam quod (Deus) possit cogitari non esse, non ex 
imperfectione sui esse est, vel incertitudine, quum suum, 
esse, sit secundum se manifestissimum, sed ex debilitate 
intellectus nostri, qui eum intueri non potest per ipsum, 
sed ex effectibus ejus. Et sic, ad cognoscendum ipsum esse, 
ratiocinando perducitur. C. G., 1. 1, c. 11. 



— 107 — 

effect the existence of its specific cause can be 
demonstrated, provided its effects are more 
known to us, for since effects depend on a cause, 
the effect given, the cause must necessarily exist. 
Whence the existence of God, as it is not per 
se known to us, is demonstrated through effects 
known to us." 18 

The existence of God is proven from effects. 
The fundamental statement and fact in this 
question from man's standpoint is this: God, 
as all other objects, is known from material 
things. "Though God exceeds all sensible 
things and sense itself, yet His effects, from 
which we prove His existence, are sensible. As 
the origin of knowledge is in sense, so of those 
things which surpass sense." 19 "The human 
intellect by its natural power cannot grasp the 
substance of God, since our intellectual knowl- 



18 Cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quani 
sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. 
Ex quolibet auiein effectu potest demonstrari propriam 
causam ejus esse, si tamen ejus effectus sint magis noti 
quoad nos; quia cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito 
effectu, necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, 
secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demon- 
strable est per effectus nobis notos. Sum. Theol., I, q. 2, a. 2. 

19 Etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, ejus tamen 
effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum 
Deum esse, sensibiles sunt; et sic nostrae cognitionis origo 
in sensu est, etiam de his quae sensum excedunt. C. G., 1. 1, 
c. 12. 



— 108 — 

edge in this life takes its rise in the senses. . . 
Yet from material things our intellect rises to 
a divine knowledge, a knowledge of God's 
existence and the qualities it is proper to 
attribute to Him as the First Cause. " 20 Material 
things are diverse, and a rational consideration 
of any class of them will lead us to a conclusion 
above and beyond the members of the class, 
singly or collectively taken. We seek to know- 
as much of them as can be known and while 
thus engaged we are brought to a something 
that agrees with them in a way, and yet sur- 
passes them to a much greater extent. We 
suspect this something has more to do with 
the material things before us than a simple 
view of them seems to warrant. 

In this spirit, a spirit that allows the 
reasoning faculty to pursue what appears its 
legitimate course in dealing with phenomena, 
St. Thomas considers five lines of facts and 
follows them back to what is for him an 
inevitable logical conclusion. These proofs are 
so many evidences of his basic principle of 

20 Ad substantiam ipsius capiendam, intellectus humanus 
non potest naturali virtute pertingere, quum intellectus 
nostri, secundum modum praesentis vitae, cognitio a sensu 
incipiat. . . Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster 
in divinam cognitionem, ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et 
alia hujusmodi, quae oportet attribui primo principio. 
C. G. } 1. 1, c. 3. 



— log — 

knowledge — that all our knowledge conies from 
material things, takes its rise in the senses. 

In the formation of the concept of God, then, 
there are two factors — material things and 
the reasoning faculty. We perceive objects 
about us the reason of whose existence is not 
self-evident nor self-explanatory, and there is 
in man a natural desire to get at the bottom 
of things, to seek an explanation of what he 
sees. What is this natural desire in the system 
of Aquinas ? 

St. Thomas admits that each man has as a 
natural endowment, a tendency to God, which 
affects his whole being. There is the desire 
for unlimited happiness, and perfection in its 
fulness, and the desire for a completely satisfied 
inquisitiveness. "Man naturally desires hap- 
piness/' and thus God, "in so far as God is 
the beatitude of man." 21 "There is a certain 
general and confused knowledge of God, which 
is, as it were, present to all men." And this 
is true "because man by natural reason can 
readily arrive at some knowledge of God, for 
men seeing that the things of nature move 
according to order, understand that there is 
some ordainer of these things, for there is no 
ordering without an orderer." Yet this general 



L Sum. Theol., I, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1. 



— uo- 
view does not reveal, " who or of what nature, 
or if there be but one orderer of nature." 22 Those, 
therefore, who contend that God is immediately 
known because He is the adequate explanation 
of things, must remember that our concept of 
this adequate principle of all is at first very 
vague. It exists however, and resting on it 
St. Thomas builds up a position that we might 
call the Nature-God Tendency, "the intellectual 
substance tends to divine knowledge as a last 
end." 23 

This tendency or disposition is principally an 
internal affair, a spontaneous expression of 
our nature, yet even here the starting point, 
the basis of its operation, lies in things with- 



22 Est enim quaedam communis et confusa Dei cognitio, 
quae quasi omnibus hominibus adest. . . Quia naturali 
ratione statim homo in aliqualem Dei cognitionem pervenire 
potest ; videntes enim homines res naturales secundum ordi- 
nem creatum currere ; quum ordinatio absque ordinatore non 
sit. . . Quis, autem qualis, vel si unus tantum est ordinator 
naturae nondum stat in ex hac communi consideratione 
habetur. C. 6?., 1. 3, c. 38. 

23 Substantia igitur intellectualis tendit in divinam cogni- 
tionem sicut in ultimum finem. C. G., 1. 3, c. 25 Driscoll 
apty calls this tendency by the name of ' spontaneous knowl- 
edge of God.' It is distinguished by two important charac- 
teristics, he says, "a) It arises from rational nature by the 
use of faculties connatural to all. Hence it is not an 
intuition, nor is it the result of a special faculty, b) It is 
universal with human nature. God. Pref. to 2nd ed., 
p. VIII. 



— -Ill — 

out, in sensible objects. The mind cannot rest 
in these objects, but advances, "for nothing 
finite can quiet the desire of the intellect." Thus 
as there is a "natural desire to know in all 
intellectual natures, so there is a natural desire 
to dispel ignorance or nescience." 24 We are 
therefore lead to as thorough a knowledge and 
as complete an explanation of things as our 
powers admit. The imperfect desires to attain 
perfection in a given sphere, "for he who has 
an opinion about a certain thing, which is an 
imperfect knowledge of that thing, from this 
very fact is incited to desire a scientific knowl- 
edge of it. . . We do not think we know an 
object if w r e are ignorant of its substance, 
whence our principal aim in knowing a thing 
is to get at its nature or quiddity." 20 We per- 
ceive that men act, and we attribute their 
action to a certain cause to which we give 
the name soul, though we know not as yet the 

24 Nihil finitum desiderium intellectus quietare potest. . . 
Sicut naturale desiderium inest omnibus intellectualibus 
naturis ad sciendum, ita inest naturale desiderium ignorant - 
iam seu nescientiam pellendi. C. G. f 1. 3, c. 50. 

25 Omne enim quod est imperfectum in aliqua specie desid- 
erat consequi perfectionem speciei illius; qui enim habet 
opinionem de re aliqua, quae est imperfecta illius rei notitia, 
ex hoc ipso incitatur ad desiderandum illius rei scientiam. . . 
Non enim arbitramur nos aliquid cognoscere si substantiam 
ejus non cognoscimus. Unde et praecipuum in cognitione 
alicujus rei est scire de ea quid est. C. G., 1. 3, c. 50. 



112 



nature of the soul, if it be body, or how it affects 
the operations we witness." 26 

Philosophy was born in the " natural desire all 
men have of knowing the causes of what they 
see", and not until they "have the cause, are 
they at rest. The quest however does not cease 
until they have reached the first cause, for then 
only do we consider our knowledge perfect 
when we know the first cause. Man naturally 
desires to know the first cause as if an ultimate 
end." 27 It is easy to see whither this thought 
leads; this desire " tends toward something 
definite. We find as a fact in this desire of 
knowing the more one knows, the greater is 
one's desire to know; hence this natural desire 
of man for knowing tends toward some deter- 
mined end. But this end can be no other than 



26 Quam videmus hominen rnoveri et alia opera agere, per- 
cipimus in eo quandam causam karum operationum quae 
aliis rebus non inest, et hanc causam animam nominamus, 
nondum tamen scientes quid sit anima, si est corpus, vel 
qualiter operationes praedictas efficiat. C. G. y 1. 3, c. 38. 

27 Naturaliter inest omnibus hominibus desiderium cognos- 
cendi causa earum quae videntur; unde, propter admira- 
tionem eorum quae videbantur quorum causae latebant, 
homines primo philosophari coeperunt; invenientes autem 
causam quiescebant. Nee sistit inquisitio quousque per- 
veniatur ad primam causam ; et tunc perfecte nos scire 
arbitramur quando primam causam cognoscimus. Desiderat 
igitur homo naturaliter cognoscere primam causan quasi 
ultimum finem. C. G., 1. 3, c. 25. 



— ii3 — 

the most excellent that is knowable which is 
God." 28 Again, in accordance with the general 
principles of knowledge we come to the same 
conclusion. "Man naturally desires to know 
the cause of every known effect, but the human 
intellect knows ens universale, therefore it 
naturally desires to know its cause, which is 
God only." 29 

We can then state, that there is innate in man 
a faculty or power which abstracts particular, 
general, transcendental concepts from the data 
of the senses, and which from these concepts, by 
a process of negation and combination, forms 
other concepts, even the concept of God; and 
finally, a natural tendency which seeks the 
cause of things known, and is not at rest until 
it finds the first cause, and knows its nature 
in some way. 80 To this extent the idea of God 

28 Quod igitur vehementius in aliquid tendit postea quam 
prius, non movetur ad infinitum, sed ad aliquid determina- 
tuna tendit. Hoc autem invenimus in desiderio sciendi; 
quant o enim aliquis plura scit, tanto majori desiderio affec- 
tat scire. Tendit igitur desiderium naturale hominis in 
sciendo ad aliquem determinatum finem. Hoc autem non 
potest esse aliud quam nobilissimum scibile, quod Deus est. 
C. G., 1. 3, c. 25. 

29 Cujuslibet effectus cogniti naturaliter homo causam scire 
desiderat. Intellectus autem humanus cognoscit ens univer- 
sale. Desiderat igitur naturaliter cognoscere causam ejus, 
quae solum Deus est. C. G. f 1. 3, c. 25. 

30 This statemeut is taken fromHontheim's Theodicea, p. 19. 



— ii4 — 

is innate in us. Hontheim and others think it 
better to refrain from speaking of this innate 
idea of God at the present time, on account of 
the danger of abuse, yet it exists in the sense 
explained and is so admitted by St. Thomas, 
and it is but just to those who hold we have 
an immediate or innate idea of God — as this 
word innate is usually understood — to admit 
the amount of truth their view contains. 31 

This concession however, does not do away 
with the necessity of demonstration and analy- 
sis for attaining the idea of God in so far as 
the human mind can attain it. Aquinas does 
not lose sight of his main thesis— that all knowl- 
edge rises from the senses. " There is a certain 
confused estimation by which God is commonly 
known by all or most men . . . and there is also 
a knowledge of God by way of demonstra- 
tion" 32 — the former is the knowledge common 



31 Moreover, this shows that the view St. Thomas took 
of the problem of God was broad and flexible, and offsets 
the impression that the idea of God for him was a rigid, 
formal conception — Being and nothing else, and this even in 
Pantheistic sense, as we find stated by J. W. Hanne in Die 
Idee der Absoluten Personlicbkeit, pp. 486-494. There is 
much material in Aquinas to lengthen out the point we 
have just touched on in the text. 

82 Communiter ab omnibus vel pluribus (Deus) cognoscitur 
secundum quamdam aestimationem confusam . . . cognosci- 
tur (Deus) per viam demonstrationis. C. G. t 1. 3, c. 48. 



— ii5 — 

to all, a vague knowledge; the latter is a proper 
knowledge of God resting on argument and 
proof. Moreover, he does not allow a greater 
certainty to conclusions based on the data of 
consciousness as consciousness, "for although 
the human mind has greater likeness to God 
than inferior creatures, yet the knowledge of 
God which is derived from the human mind 
does not exceed the kind of knowledge which 
arises from sensible things, since the soul only 
knows its nature because it understands the 
natures of sensible objects. Whence God is not 
known through this source in a higher way 
than the cause is known through the ef- 
fect." 33 This statement bars innate ideas from 
the system of Aquinas, as well as what is now 
called Personal Idealism, which cuts away from 
the sensible world and tries to find in conscious- 
ness alone its view of God. St. Thomas says we 
gain nothing by this procedure, for whence comes 
our knowledge of consciousness ? From sensi- 
ble things. Hence it is, that after the admis- 



33 Quamvis autem mens humana propinquiori Dei similitu- 
dinem repraesentat quam inferiores creaturae, tamen cog- 
nitio Dei, quae ex mente humana accipi potest, non excedit 
illud genus cognitionis quod ex sensibilibus sumitur, cum et 
ipsa anima de seipsa cognoseat quid est, per hoc quod 
naturas intelligit sensibilium. Unde nee per hanc viam cog- 
nosei Deus altiori mo do potest quam sicut causa cognoscitur 
per effectum. C. G., 1. 3, c. 47. 



— n6 — 

sions already noted, he sets out to prove 
the existence of God from five points of view, 
each, however, starting from material things. 

The first argument is taken from the fact of 
motion. This St. Thomas calls "the more 
manifest way" or fact to start with. "It is 
certain and evident to sense that there is 
movement in the world, but what is moved is 
moved by another, for nothing is moved except 
it is in potency to the movement it undergoes. 
Naught passes from the potential to the actual 
save through the actual . . . for the same thing 
cannot be potential and actual at the same time 
under the same aspect, but only under diverse 
aspects. . . It is thus impossible that from the 
same point of view, and in the same manner, 
something be mover and moved, or something 
move itself. . . Therefore whatever is moved must 
be moved by another." Everything in motion 
is moved by another, but we cannot admit this 
"process in infinitum, otherwise there would 
be no first mover, and consequently no motion. 
. . Therefore we must come to some prime mover 
that is moved by no other, and all understand 
this to be God." 

The second argument rests on the "concept 
of efficient cause. We find in these sensible 
things an order of efficient causes ; yet we do 
not discover, nor can we, that anything is its 



— ii7 — 

own efficient cause, for thus it would be prior 
to itself which is impossible." These causes are 
related — first, intermediate, and ultimate; the 
last depends on the intermediate, and these, 
whether one or many, depend on a first, or 
else they themselves should not exist, which is 
contrary to fact, and we should be obliged to 
admit an infinite regress. "We must therefore 
posit some efficient first cause, which we call 
God." 

We have then the argument from contingent 
or possible being to necessary being. We find 
certain things that are indifferent to existence. 
They may or may not exist ; but things of this 
nature were not always. If all things were 
thus indifferent, there would have been a time 
when there was no existence. If this is true 
then there would be no existence now, which 
is false, for "nothing begins to be except 
through what is." There must then be some 
necessary existence in things. This necessary 
being or existence has the cause of its necessity 
in itself or from without. If from without we 
are again on the path of efficient causes, and 
thus can not proceed in infinitum. "Therefore, 
we must posit something necessary per se, 
whose necessity is not caused, but which is the 
cause of necessity to others. And this we call 
God." 



— n8 — 

The various degrees of perfection found in 
things, is the basis of the fourth argument. In 
objects we find that we can apply the particles 
"more" or "less" to their qualities of goodness, 
truth, and the like. This comparison rests on 
agreement with a standard which is fully what 
they are in part. In a given line of perfection 
we have degrees in various proportions, there 
must then be an absolute perfection in this 
line which is the basis and standard of these 
degrees. "Therefore there is something which 
is the cause of the being, goodness, and every 
perfection of all beings, and this we call God." 

The last argument leads to an intelligent 
being from the idea of order in things. We see 
objects that are irrational act for an end, and 
this not occasionally but always, or at least 
most frequently they act to attain what is 
best; thus this action is not due to chance. 
But irrational objects can not act thus unless 
they are directed by some rational or intellectual 
being. " Therefore there is something intelligent 
by which all natural things are ordained 
to an end. And this we call God." 34 

34 These arguments are taken from the Sum. TheoL, 
I, q. 2, a. 3. 



— 119 — 
SECTION H.-THE FIRST CAUSE. 

The principle running through the proofs is 
that of causality. The result of each line of 
evidence is the outcome of the application of 
this principle. The facts of motion, contingency, 
production, and the like, in the world, call for 
an explanation; an ultimate explanation of all 
phenomena is the one point that marks off 
divine causality from created causes. In second- 
ary causes, we find the immediate, partial 
reason for a given event, in divine causality, 
the principle is pushed to its limit and we reach 
the final reason for all events. This final ex- 
planation is the goal of every philosophical 
system, and rests on the amount of knowledge 
the phenomena about us can give us of their 
ultimate cause. 

Whether we regard the principle of causality 
as objective with St. Thomas, or make it sub- 
jective as Kant and his followers hold, this 
much at least is certain: we perceive things, 
phenomena, that call for an explanation, and 
there is in man a natural tendency to seek the 
explanation of things — these two factors com- 
bined lead us to an ultimate ground or reason 
of appearances. A Conception of God might 
then be defined, the ultimate explanation of 
what the individual or conceiver thinks needs 



120- 



explanation. In this sense, we can have no 
contention with the Conception as such, but 
if there is disagreement it must be looked for 
much further back — in the theory of reality, 
which depends on the theory of knowledge. 
And here is where the need of a true theory of 
knowledge is absolutely necessary. Thus the 
Agnostic Unknowable God is the result of the 
doctrine of the Unknowable in general. The 
Idealistic Conception of God is the logical 
outcome of the denial of external reality. The 
Intuitionists go astray in considering God as 
primo and per se known. Those who say that 
God is a necessary Postulate, deny the real 
proving power of His manifestations. The 
position of Aquinas is based on the principles 
already discussed — the consideration of phe- 
nomena, material things, lead us to their final 
explanation. This is illustrated by the argu- 
ments advanced for proving God's existence. 

Some consider the first four proofs as instances 
of efficient causality, and the fifth as teleological. 
Others regard the four kinds of causes utilized — 
first and second proofs represent effiicient cause, 
the third, material cause, the fourth, formal 
cause, and the fifth, final or exemplar cause. 
Whatever view we take, the result is practi- 
the same for the proving power of the effects. 
Though efficient causality was not the only 



121 



or the principal one for the Scholastics, yet 
as already noted, every cause looks toward 
efficiency, and hence the effects of each cause 
give us a knowledge of the cause; and this 
for our purpose is the important aspect of 
causality. 

We might, as an instance, consider the knowl- 
edge w T e can derive of the nature of the final 
or exemplar cause from a consideration of its 
effects. This is the fifth argument that leads 
to God as Intelligence — the other arguments, as 
arguments, present Him as Prime Mover, First 
Cause, Necessary Being, Perfect Being, respec- 
tively. The axiom — omneagens agit sibi simile — 
gets a higher meaning when the agens acts by 
intelligence. Here enters the idea of a free 
agent, and unlike an agent that acts with its 
physical being only and is limited to one 
determined effect, w-e have now a variety of 
effects depending on the choice of the intelligent 
cause. "The effects proceed from a cause as 
they preexist in a cause, since omne agens agit 
sibi simile* But the effects preexist in the cause 
according to the nature of the cause/ ' * Aquinas 
concludes that the effects of human and divine 



1 Effectus procedit a causo agente, secundum quod prae- 
existunt in ea; quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexis- 
tunt autem effectus in causa secundum modum causae. 
Sum. TheoL, I, q., 9, a. 4. 



— 122 



causality are present to these causes "according 
to an intelligent nature." The effect agrees 
with the idea or prototype in the mind of the 
agent. Here we meet the question of Divine 
Ideas which are the measure of things, and of 
which we receive a knowledge from a consid- 
eration of their expression in nature. 

Ideas or forms in general are distinct or rather 
different from the existent objects, and can be 
viewed under a twofold aspect. They may be 
the principle of knowledge of a thing, and then 
we have the idea, form, or species as already 
discussed — for the thing itself must be known 
if the idea, according to which the thing is 
made, is known. They may be the exemplars 
of the existent things, for the intelligent agent 
acts only in so far as he has in his mind the 
idea or model of what he is to produce, and 
this idea must be a determined, specific one or 
the result would be fortuitous. In this sense, 
the idea is causal, it is the plan the agent 
follows in his operations. There is then an 
agreement between the idea and the object 
based on it. " The exemplar forms of the Divine 
Intellect are productive of the whole object, 
both matter and form. And hence they 
embrace not only the nature of the species but 
also the specific character of the individual — 



— 123 — 

first, however the nature of the species." 2 All 
creation, all finite effects, have their originals 
in the Mind of God; hence by a knowledge of 
these effects we are led back to a knowledge of 
their models, and through the models we learn 
something of the nature of the cause. 

These ideas in the Divine Essence constitute 
God's knowledge of things other than Himself, 
which are based on these ideas. "Idea does not 
signify Divine Essence as Divine Essence, but 
only as it is the likeness or concept of this or 
that object." 3 And again, "the Essence of God 
is the idea of things, not indeed as essence, but 
as it is understood." 4 "Thus God by knowing 
His essence knows other things, as effects are 
known through a knowledge of the cause." 5 On 
the basis of things as having their models in 

2 Formae exemplares intellectus divinae sunt factivae 
totius rei, et quantum ad materiam, et quantum ad for- 
mam; et ideo respiciunt creaturam non solum quantum ad 
naturam speciei, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem 
individui, per prius tamen quantum ad naturam speciei. 
Quodl. 8, q. 1, a. 2. 

3 Idea non nominat divinam essentiam, in quantum est 
essentia, sed in quantum est similitudo vel ratio hujus vel 
illius rei. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 15, a. 2 ad 1. 

4 Essentia Dei est idea rerum, non quidem ut essentia, sed 
ut est intellecta. Be Veri., q. 3, a. 2. 

5 Sic Deus cognoscendo suam essentiam, alia cognoscit, 
sicut per cognitionem causae cognoscuntur effectus. C. G. 
1. 1, c. 68. 



— 124 — 

the Divine Mind, on the same principle that 
effects give us a knowledge of their cause, we 
rise to a knowledge of God. 

" Creatures lead us to a knowledge of God 
as effects conduct to the cause. Natural reason 
can know of God only what is proper to Him 
as the principle or cause of all beings." 6 The 
manifestations of God are numerous, and must 
be so, since "no creature can be equal to God," 
though He as "every cause tends to produce 
His likeness in the effect in so far as the effect 
can receive it. . . Hence there is required a multi- 
plicity and variety in created things so that a 
perfect likeness of God, according to His nature, 
be found in them." 7 Even with effects that are 
numerous, and that vary in greatness, "we ex- 
perience daily that there is a defect in our knowl- 
edge, for there are many qualities of sensible 
objects of which we are ignorant, and in many of 
those qualities which we do apprehend by sense, 



6 Creaturae ducunt in Dei cognitionem, sicut effectus in 
causam. Hoc igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci 
potest, quod competere ei necesse est, secundum quod est 
omnium entium principium. Sum. Theol , I, q. 32, a. 1. 

7 Non enim creatura potest esse Deo aequalis. . . Quum 
enim omne agens intendit suam similitudinem in effectum 
inducere, secundum quod effectus capere potest. . . Oportuit 
igitur esse multiplicitatem et varietatem in rebus creatis, ad 
hoc, quod inveniretur in eis Dei similitudo perfect a secundum 
modum suum. C. G., 1. 2, c. 45. 



— 125 — 

we do not attain to perfect knowledge. To a 
much greater extent therefore is human reason 
insufficient to investigate all that is intelligible 
about that most excellent, transcendant sub- 
stance." 8 We are capable however, of attaining 
a partial knowledge, which though not ade- 
quate is true as far as it goes. 

There are a few misapprehensions of the view 
of Aquinas about the nature of the First Cause 
that ought to be removed before we take up 
specifically the Quid Sit, or what we can know 
about the Nature of God. God is a universal, 
permanent, continuous cause, present in each 
phenomenon by His actuality, and contributing 
more to the result of the created secondary 
activity than the immediate secondary cause. 

St. Thomas says that the very unity and 
simplicity of God is the reason why He can 
produce many and diverse effects, just as he 
holds that the soul knows all things precisely 
because it is none of those things it knows. 
"The divine power is not limited to one effect; 
and this comes from its simplicity, for the 

8 Idem manifeste apparet ex defectu, quern in rebus cognos- 
cendis quotidie experinmr. Rerum enim sensibilium plurimas 
proprietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum, quas sensu 
apprehendimus, rationem perfecte in pluribus invenire non 
possamus. Multo igitur amplius excellentissmae sub- 
stantiae; transcendentis, omnia intelligibilia humana ratio 
investigare non suflicit. C. G , 1. 1, c. 3. 



— 126 — 

nearer a power is to unity, the nearer it is 
to infinity, and can extend itself to more ob- 
jects." 9 The effects are in proportion to their 
cause and get their character from their most 
perfect cause. " Therefore the distinction in 
objects, in which consists the order of the uni- 
verse (but the order of the universe is what is 
best in all created beings), is not the result of 
secondary causes but rather the intention of the 
First Cause." 10 Moreover the First Cause con- 
tributes more to the effect than the immediate 
secondary cause. " Every cause is in some man- 
ner the cause of being, either substantial or 
accidental. But nothing is the cause of being 
except in so far as it acts in the divine power. 
Therefore every cause operates through the 
power of God." 11 "God is more of a principal 
cause in each action than even the secondary 






9 Virtus divina non limitatur ad unum effectum ; et hoc 
ex ejus simplicitate provenit, quia quanto aliqua virtus est 
magis unita, tanto magis est infinita et ad plura se potest 
extendere. C. G., 1. 2, c. 42. 

10 Non igitur rerum distinctio, in qua ordo universali (opti- 
mum autem in omnibus creatis est ordo universi) consistit, 
causatur ex causis secundis, sed magis ex intentione primae 
causae. C. G., 1. 2, c. 42. 

11 Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa essendi, vel 
secundum esse substantiate vel accidentale; Nihil autem est 
causa essendi, nisi in quantum agit in virtute divina. Omne 
igitur operans operatur per virtutem Dei. C. G. } 1. 3, c. 67. 



— 127 — 

agents. ,M2 There is, however, true secondary 
causality. "The causality of inferior eifects is 
not attributed to the divine power in such a 
a way that the causality of the inferior causes 
is taken away." 13 Nor is the effect to be con- 
sidered "as due, partly to God and partly to 
the natural agent; but the whole is from both 
under a different aspect, as the same whole 
effect is attributed to the instrument, and also 
the w r hole to the principal cause." 14 

This intimate presence of God in all activities 
will help us to understand the idea of the First 
Cause in the proofs for God's existence. There 
are two opinions on this point among those 
who hold that these proofs demonstrate God's 
existence. One maintains that the existence of 
God is proven from the fact that an infinite series 
of causes is impossible, and hence we must come 
to a First Cause, God. The other holds that 
the idea of the First Cause is valid independently 
of the series, and this, to our mind, is the view 

12 Deus igitur principalis est causa cujuslibet actionis 
quam etiam secundae causae agentes. C. G ., 1. 3, c. 67. 

18 Non ergo causalitas effectuum inferiorum est ita attri- 
buenda divinae virtuti, quod subtrahatur causalitas inferi- 
orum agentium. C. G., 1. 3, c. 69. 

14 Non partim a Deo, partim a naturali agente fiat, sed 
totus ab utroque secundum alium modum ; sicut idem effec- 
tus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam 
totus. C. G , 1 3, c. 70. 



— 128 — 

of Aquinas, gathered from his general treatment 
of Causality. It might be called the intensive 
view. According to it, a thorough consideration 
and complete explanation of any effect will 
lead us to a knowledge of the First Cause, 
and thus we need not go through a series to 
find God at the end, and then only the First 
in the series. He is in every activity and can 
be known as the full explanation of the event. 
To the mind of St. Thomas, the proofs have 
efficacy even were there an infinite series, for 
he gives them as metaphysically demonstrative, 
and yet he admits the possibility, or rather 
the non- contradiction of the eternity of the 
world. 15 The important point to his mind is 
the understanding of the effect or effects given, 
for the simple but complete consideration of an 
effect is sufficient to reach the First Cause. 
If this is true, then the objections raised on 
the score of the impossibility of conceiving 
an infinite series fall to the ground, for the 
simple reason that the existence of the First 
Cause in the view of Aquinas is not bound up 
with the infinite series. Prof. Huxley maintains, 
the First Cause is but the first of a series, 
with a causal character similar to the other 
members of the series; we can not reach a 



16 Cfr. Sertillanges, Preuve de Texistence de Dieu et l'eternit£ 
du monde. Revue Thomiste, Sept., 1897. 



— 129 — 

true First Cause according to him, for the 
process is one ad infinitum. 16 Nor is God a 
Cause in the sense of Deism, a transcendant 
Cause that created the world and now leaves 
it to itself. God is both transcendant and 
immanent. If we understand the meaning that 
Aquinas gives to the First Cause it will not 
be exact to say, as Caldecott does, that by 
the first and second proofs, "he (Aquinas) 
reaches only an initial Cause and does not 
bring out permanence of operations." 17 Calde- 
cott says, however, that immanence is contained 
in the remaining arguments. It is but fair 
to admit that the two proofs as given say 
nothing of immanence, but their implication 
takes account of it. The proofs of St. Thomas 
are briefly stated; to understand their full 
content we must seek for light in other portions 
of his works. Any of the proofs carried to 
its complete expression would not only give 
us the existence of God, but likewise His nature 
in so far as we can know it. This close 
relation between existence and nature is often 
overlooked, especially by the Agnostic, who 
arrives at existence and then fails to use the 
privilege of deduction and analysis at his 



16 Huxley's Hume, p. 149. 

17 Selections from the Literature of Theism, pp. 24, 26. 



— 130 — 

disposal to learn something of the nature of 
God. We now propose to utilize our birth-right. 

SECTION III.— NATURE OF GOD. 

The existence of God found as the result of 
the five proofs advanced by St. Thomas does 
not give us all we can know about Him, and 
thus it is, the work of elaboration just begins 
at this point. We repeat, that what follows 
is implicitly contained in the proofs, but its 
detailed exposition is the outcome of deduction 
and analysis. The same principle — that of 
causality— which proved there was a God, now 
goes further, and shows to what extent we 
can know the nature of God. The position of 
St. Thomas and Spencer offer a great contrast 
on this point, and it will be well to show in 
what way. Both admit a First Cause as the 
inevitable conclusion of a consideration of 
causality in the world, both admit manifes- 
tations of this Frst Cause; but here the 
agreement ends. Spencer says God is unknow- 
able, though He manifests Himself—" the 
Power which the Universe manifests to us is 
utterly inscrutable" 1 — , St. Thomas says, God 
is knowable because of His manifestations — 
"whence we know God's relations to creatures 



1 First Principles, p. 46. 



— i3i — 

because He is the Cause of all, and how He 
differs from creatures since He is none of those 
things He has caused." 2 This divergence is 
emphasized at various points, and we shall 
note them as occasion demands. "Each asser- 
tion respecting the nature, acts, or motives of 
that power which the Universe manifests to us, 
has been repeatedly called in question, and 
proved to be inconsistent with itself, or with 
accompanying assertions. Yet each of them has 
been age after age insisted on, in spite of a 
secret consciousness that it would not bear 
examination. ,, 3 For Aquinas, notwithstanding, 
God is knowable. He is knowable in Himself; 
and He is knowable relatively to us in a given 
manner and to a certain extent. 

We do not know God in himself, we do not 
know Him comprehensively, nor intuitively, yet 
we know Him really, to a certain extent. The 
proofs have given us some idea of God ; they 
have shown Him to be an existent Something, 
a Being of some sort. We have shown that 
being is the prime and adequate object of the 
intellect, hence God as being is knowable to the 



2 Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad crea- 
turam, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et differentiani 
creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum 
quae ab eo causantur. Sum Theol., I, q. 12, a. 12. 

3 Spencer, Ibid. p. 101. 



— 132 — 

human intellect. But the proportionate object 
of our intellect is not being as such, but the 
essence of material things, hence our knowledge 
of God must be based on a consideration of 
material things. A thing is knowable in se and 
it is knowable in relation to us. " Every real 
existence has two sides, being -for -itself and 
being -for -others." 4 This distinction in our 
present question brings to view two of the 
general principles of knowledge : Immateriality, 
which determines the degrees of the knowable- 
ness of an object in se considered ; and, all that 
is known, is known according to the nature of 
the knower, all our knowledge is in terms of 
our own intellect. 

God in Himself is infininely knowable, because 
He is supremely actual. "Because God is the 
opposite extreme of matter, because He is 
entirely immune from all potentiality, it follows 
that He knows and is knowable in the highest 
degree." 5 The role of immateriality in knowl- 
edge has already been discussed; the proofs 
give us God as Actus Purus, Pvire Actuality, 
and thus He is knowable in Himself as infiinitely 
as He knows Himself. "Since God is most 
immaterial, it follows that He is in the height 






4 A. Seth, Some Epistemological Conclusions, Phil. Rev., 
v. 3, p. 57. 
b De VerL, q. 2, a. 2. Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, a. 1. 



— 133 — 

of cognition." In addition to what has been 
said previously, we shall refer to the question 
of matter and form when presenting the ideas 
contained in the attributes of Infinity and 
Omniscience. 

The phrase " God in Himself" has been 
criticised by Prof. Flint as meaningless, but it 
has a real significance as we find it in the 
works of Aquinas. "We can not know the 
'God in Himself ' of sundry sages and divines, 
for the simple but sufficient reason that there 
is no such God to know." 6 He calls this "God 
in Himself" as vain as Kant's " thing-in-itself". 
When he states what He considers the only 
intelligible use of the phrase, he simply presents 
what was clear to the mind of Aquinas and 
those who follow him in this question. "There 
is no God without powers, affections, attributes, 
relationships; and when viewed in these — in 
His omnipotence and omniscience, His holiness 
and love, His Creatorship, Fatherhood, or 
Sovereignty — He is viewed "in Himself", in the 
only true and reasonable sense, — that is, as 
distinct not from His own characteristics, but 
from other beings." 7 This is the idea of God 
derived from created things, of which St. 



6 Flint, Agnosticism, p. 580. 

7 Ibid., p. 582. 



— 134 — 

Thomas says: "We can know God's relation 
to creatures, because He is the cause of all; we 
can know how He differs from creatures because 
He is none of those things He has caused, and 
He is none of them, not through defect on His 
part but through supereminence." 8 The knowl- 
edge of God in se, of God in Himself, is 
unattainable by us, is an extent beyond us, 
of which St. Thomas says — "to show the 
ignorance of this sublime knowledge it is said 
of Moses that 'he approached to the darkness 
in w T hich God was'." 9 We know God only by 
His manifestations, as Prof. Flint says, but 
this does not preclude other means of knowl- 
edge, means not given us in our present 
condition. 

When we come to consider our actual knowl- 
edge of God, we see it is neither comprehensive 
nor intuitive. We comprehend a thing when 
"we know it as far as it is knowable." 10 "To 
comprehend a power or capacity is to know 
its complete extension." 11 There is nothing that 



s Sum. TheoL, I, q. 12, a. 12. 

9 Ad hujus sublimissimae cognitionis ignorantiam demon- 
strandani, de Moyse dicitur (Exod., 20: 21) quod accessit 
ad caliginem in qua erat Deus. C. G., 1. 3, c. 49. 

10 Omne autem quod comprehenditur ab aliquo cognos- 
cente, cognoscitur ab eo ita perfecte sicut cognoscibile est. 
C. G., 1. 3, c. 35. 

11 Idem igitur est cognoscere omnia in quae potest aliqua 
virtus, et ipsam virtutem comprehendere. C. G , 1. 3, c. 56. 



— 135 — 

can exhaust the divine nature or mirror it 
perfectly, because — and this is the sole and 
oft -repeated answer — there is no effect that 
adequates the power of the Cause, no creature 
is a full copy of its Creator, no creature is 
God. "It is impossible for any created likeness 
to totally represent God. There is something 
which each and all creatures leave unexpressed, 
and yet this is a something which is contained 
in the conception God in Himself. God is as 
truly incomprehensible as He is truly knowable. 
"God is knowable but not to the extent that 
His essence is comprehended, because the knower 
has a knowledge of the object known not 
according to the nature of the object but 
according to his own nature. But the nature 
of no creature attains to the height of the 
Divine Majesty Itself. Whence it follows, no 
creature knows Him perfectly as He perfectly 
knows Himself." 12 We do not know God 
comprehensively, but we are ever getting a 
clearer and a wider knowledge of Him, con- 
scious, however, that there will always be a 

12 Deus cognoscibilis est non autem ita cognoscibilis, ut 
essentia sua comprehendatur. Quia omne cognoscens habet 
cogmtionem de re cognita, non per motum rei cognita sed 
per modum cognoscentis. Modus autem nullius creaturae 
attingit ad altitudinetn divinae majestatis. Unde oportet 
quod a nullo perfecte cognoscatur, sicut ipse seipsum perfecte 
cognoscit. Com. on Lomb., I, Dis. 3, q. 1, a. 1. 



— 136 — 

limit — the necessary distance between uncreated 
and created existence. " Through effects we 
know God's existence, that He is the Cause of 
others, above others, and distinct from all. 
This is the limit and most perfect stage of our 
knowledge in this life, whence, as Dionysius says, 
we are united to a God as it were unknown. 
This is true even when we know what God 
is not, for what He is remains entirely un- 
known." 13 

This last thought seems a discouraging con- 
clusion, and apparently renders further quest 
useless. Did St. Thomas confound a simple, 
partial knowledge with a comprehensive one as 
do Agnostics, he w r ould be forced to stop with 
Spencer at the mere existence of God and de- 
clare Him unknowable beyond this point. Be- 
fore we detail the actual knowledge that man 
can attain of God's nature, we must show 
that Intuitionism and Ontologism are not the 
means of acquiring this knowledge. 

Ontologism, or the immediate vision of God, 
held by Malebranche, Gioberti, and Rosmini, is 
practically identical with the Innate-idea view 
when there is a question of our knowledge of 
God. In general, it brings God and the human 
mind in immediate conscious contact; it does 



13 C. G., 1. 3, c, 49. 



— 137 — 

away with all intermediate ideas between God 
and the human soul; it considers God the 
first object of our thought and the first object 
that we know; it holds that we see God im- 
mediately, and from this intuition, as origin 
and source, arises all our intellectual knowledge. 
According to Malebranche, we see our ideas 
or universals in God. Sensation for him does 
not constitute the first stage of knowledge; in 
fact, it has no direct function in knowledge. He 
maintains that we know all things in their 
ideas, that these ideas are particular deter- 
minations of the idea of being in general, and 
this idea of indeterminate being is the idea 
of God. For Gioberti, God is the first object 
that we know, and we know Him immediately ; 
He is both the primum ontologicum and the 
primum logicum — the first existence, and the 
first known. His formula, Ens Great Existentias 
— Being creates existences — details this imme- 
diate intuition. We know Being— the self-exist- 
ing Divinity, we know It as creative, and we 
know the result of this creative action, viz., 
existences. For him, then, our " first intel- 
lectual act is an intuition of God creating the 
world." Gioberti distinguishes direct and 
reflex knowledge, and is followed in this matter 
by subsequent Ontologists. The first or direct 
intuition of God, who is the first object known, 



— i 3 8- 

is obscure and indeterminate, but by means of 
sensation and intercourse with men, this intui- 
tion becomes clear, determined, and then we 
have reflex knowledge. Rosmini's theory, that 
the idea of being is innate in us has made him 
an Ontologist, for this idea is the "idea of God, 
the creative cause of finite beings/ ' u 

The view of Ontologism is in opposition to 
the theory of Aquinas. All our ideas arise from 
material things ; the essence of material things 
is the first and proper object of the intellect, 
and it is only by the resemblance and contrasts 
of these sensible objects that we come to a 
knowledge of spiritual things, and of God. 
" Since the human intellect, according to our 
present condition in life, cannot understand 
created immaterial substances, much less can 
it understand the essence of an uncreated sub- 
stance. Therefore we must simply say that 
God is not the primum known by us, but 
rather we come to a knowledge of God through 
creatures. . . But the first object of our knowl- 
edge in this life is the quiddity of a material 
thing, which is the object of our intellect, as has 
been said so often. ,M5 Our manner of knowing 

14 Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 14. 

15 Cum intellectus humanus secundum statum praesentis 
vitae non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas, 
multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae in- 



— 139 — 

which must be in accordance with our nature 
— for the object known is in the knower accord- 
ing to the nature of the knower — renders it 
impossible that God should be immediately 
known to us, or be the first object of our 
knowledge. Though every mind is concerned 
with all being, yet it is not being in general 
which is the specific or immediate object of 
every knower, but being under the condition 
that corresponds most nearly with the nature 
of the knower. Thus man who is a composite 
of soul and body can not know spirit immed- 
iately or primarily, for it does not correspond 
the most readily to his nature ; he can only form 
a direct concept of those things which are pro- 
portioned to his nature. We have sensible and 
intellectual powers of knowledge, and our 
knowledge comes through the senses; thus it 
is impossible that we should have an immediate 
vision of God. 

St. Thomas rejects Ontologism in express 
words. "Some have said that the first thing 
which is known by the human mind in this life 
is God Himself, who is the first truth, and that 

creatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est, quod Deus non est 
primum a nobis, cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in 
Dei cognitionem pervenimus. . . Primum autem quod intel- 
ligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, est quid- 
ditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus objectum, ut 
multoties supra dictum est. Sum. Theol.,1, q. 87, a. 3. 



— 140- 

through this all other things are known. But 
this is manifestly false, for to know God through 
His essence is the beatitude of man, whence it 
would follow that every man is happy. " 16 The 
seeing of God in His essence is logically con- 
tained in Ontologism, though its supporters 
explicitly assert we do not thus see God. In 
God all things are one, there are no distinctions 
— "one is the first of beings possessing the full 
perfection of all being, which we call God." 17 If 
Ontologism were true, it would follow that 
no one could err — "since in the Divine Essence 
all things that are said of it are one, no one 
could err in those matters which are spoken 
of God; experience proves this to be evidently 
false." 18 Experience proves that we have no 
immediate vision of God, and the very concept 
we have is the result of a process far from in- 
tuitive, or identical with immediate knowledge. 
"Moreover, what is first in intellectual knowl- 



16 Quidam dixerunt quod primum quod a mente humana 
cognoscitur etiam in hac vita, est ipse Deus qui est Veritas 
prima, et per hunc omnia alia cognoscuntur. Sed hoc aperte 
est falsum : quia cognoscere Deum per essentiam est hominis 
beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnem horainem beatum esse. 
Super Boetium De Trinitate, c. 1, ad 3. (Opusculum 68). 

17 Unum est primum entium, totius esse perfectionem 
plenam possidens quod Deum dicimus. C. G., 1. 3, c. 1. 

18 Cum in divina essentia omnia quae dicuntur de ipsa sint 
unum, nullus erraret circa ea, quae de Deo dicuntur, quod 
experimento patet esse falsum. Opus. 68. 



pl- 
edge ought to be most certain"; 19 but the very 
discussion and divergence of opinion regarding 
the concept and nature of God show that we 
have no immediate vision of Him. 

We are now ready to present the treatment 
that Aquinas has given the nature of God, in 
the light of our knowledge. If we consider the 
proofs of God's existence simply in their formal 
character, regard only the explicit ideas they 
contain, we see at once we have nothing like a 
satisfactory or complete concept of God. How 
indefinite the designation at the close of each 
line of evidence! The words, ens or aliquid, 
being or something, are as close as we are 
admitted to gaze at the object of our search. 
Though it is true there is specification to the 
extent of saying this ens or something is Prime 
Mover, First Cause, Necessary Being, Perfect 
Being, Intelligent Being, yet there is not the con- 
fidence of assertion that we look for in a final 
statement of the greatest, most interesting, and 
most far-reaching of problems. Again, he simply 
says, and this we call God. There is, however, 
a great deal implied in these statements, or 
more correctly in the underlying thought of 
the proofs, and this admits of an explicit unfold- 
ing, at the end of which we shall have our 

19 Iterum ea, quae sunt prima in cognitione intellectus 
oportet esse certissima. Opus. 68. 



— I 4 2 — 

concept as complete as it left the hands of 
Aquinas, and, to our mind, as satisfying as we 
can hope to make our concept of God in this 
life. 

The basic thought of the proofs, the idea that 
contains in itself the various predications that 
an analysis of it makes clear, has been given 
us by St. Thomas himself; and the method 
used in developing it is plainly stated and 
thoroughly carried out. The proofs have shown, 
says Aquinas, "that there is some prim um ens 
which we call God. We must consider its at- 
tributes," 20 we must analyze it. This is the 
general idea, and the method used in specifying 
it is the method of remotion or elimination. In 
the same chapter we have another phrase for 
the primum ens: "In proceeding in our knowl- 
edge by the method of remotion, we shall accept 
the principle (which was demonstrated in the 
proofs) that God is omnino immobilis (omnino 
immutabilis). ,,21 

By deduction and analysis, by the a priori 
method, St. Thomas analyses the primum ens 

20 Ostenso igitur, quod est aliquod primum ens, quod Deum 
dicimus, oportet ejus conditiones investigare. C. G., 1. 1, 
c. 14. 

21 Ad procedendum, igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam 
remotionis, accipiamus principium (id, quod ex superioribus 
jam monstratum est), scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immo- 
bilis. C. G., 1. 1, c. 14. 



— 143 — 

of the proofs to see what further knowledge 
we can have of God. He realizes fully the diffi- 
culty of the present operation, for there may 
be error at each step. In a few- introductory 
sentences to the third question of the first part 
of the Sumtna Theologica, he maps out his 
position very well, saying, we shall rather con- 
sider what God is not than seek to know w T hat 
He is. The same attitude is shown at the open- 
ing of the analysis of the idea in his Contra 
Gentes. "It is the way of remotion, the process 
of elimination, that we are to use in considering 
the Divine Nature. For the Divine Substance 
by its immensity exceeds every form which our 
intellect attains. And thus we cannot appre- 
hend it by knowing what it is, but we have 
some knowledge of it by knowing what it is 
not." 22 True to the theory of knowledge, this 
question is pursued in terms of the constitution 
of our minds, it is what our intellect can attain 
through a consideration of things about us. 

What is this method of remotion ? What part 
does it play in our knowledge ? It is one of the 
three ways employed by St. Thomas in discus- 

22 Est autem via remotionis utendum, praecipue in con- 
sideratione divinae substantias Nam divina substantia 
omnem formam, quam intellectus noster attingit, sua 
immensitate excedit; et sic ipsam apprehendere non pos. 
sumus cognoscendo quid est, sed aliqualem ejus habemus 
notitiam cognoscendo quid non est. C. G. } 1. 1, c. 14. 



— 144 — 

sing what attributes can be applied to God, to 
find out what is contained in the primum ens. 
The other two ways are called ways of causality 
and eminence. Causality is the most universal, 
since the whole question of God is discussed in 
its terms ; eminence implies that all predications 
of God have a meaning beyond or more exten- 
sive than the words themselves denote when 
applied to creatures, or our understanding of 
them contains — in God their full connotation 
is reached. The way of remotion, however, is 
characteristic of the process under consideration, 
since, as Aquinas says, we are rather seeking 
to know what God is not than what He is. 
We repeat, it is included under the way of 
causality. 

The method of remotion might be likened to 
the work of the active intellect, as already 
suggested. We saw that the active intellect 
was engaged in rendering the phantasma or 
image intelligible, by removing from it the 
material conditions that prevent it from being 
known by the intellect proper; it eliminated 
the elements that forbade the union of the 
knower and the known, it brought to view the 
essence, the real nature of the object, which 
alone is knowable directly by the intellect. In 
our present question, the process is negative, 
but the result is positive, as St. Thomas takes 



— 145 — 

care to point out. "The more we can remove 
from an object by our intellect the nearer we 
approach to a knowledge of it; the more 
differences we see in an object in comparison 
with other things, the more perfectly we know 
it, for everything has a specific being distinct 
from all others. " 23 This specific being is reached 
by knowing the genus under which it is included, 
and "by the differences by which it is distin- 
guished from other things.' ' 

In the case of God, there is no genus under 
which He can be placed, " nor can we distinguish 
Him from other things by affimative differences, 
but only through negative ones/' 24 Every 
difference, whether affirmative or negative, 
contracts or limits the object, and allows us 
"to approach nearer to a complete designation 
of the object.' ' This method is thus applied: 
"If we say that God is not accident, we dis- 
tinguish Him from all accidents ; then if we add 
that He is not body, we mark Him off from 



23 Tanto enim ejus notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto 
plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus rernovere; 
tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscimus, quanto 
differentias ejus alia plenius intuemur; habet enim res 
unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium ab omnibus aliis 
distinctum. C. G., 1. 1, c. 14. 

24 Nee distinctionem ejus aliis rebus per amrmativas 
differentias accipere possumus, oportet earn accipere per 
differentias negativas. Ibid. 



— 146 — 

some substances. And thus we might, through 
negations of this nature, separate Him, step by 
step, from all that is not Himself. This will 
indeed give us a specific view of His substance, 
since He will be known as distinct from all, 
yet our knowledge will not be perfect, we shall 
not know what He is in Himself." 25 Spencer 
declares God unthinkable, because we can find 
no marks or characters that distinguish Him 
from objects we know. He lays down the 
canon: "Whence it is manifest that a thing 
is perfectly known only when it is in all respects 
like certain things previously observed; that 
in proportion to the number of respects in 
which it is unlike them> is the extent to which 
it is unknown; and that hence when it has 
absolutely no attribute in common with any- 
thing else, it must be absolutely beyond the 
bounds of knowledge." 26 This sounds very much 
like the statement of St. Thomas just quoted, 
but when Spencer applies these principles to 



25 Si dicimus Deum non accidens, per hoc quod ab omnibus 
accidentibus distinguitur. Deinde, si addamus ipsum non 
esse corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiam in aliquibus sub- 
stantiis; et sic per ordinem, ab omni eo quod est praeter 
ipsum, per negationes hujusmodi, distinguetur ; et tunc de 
substantia ejus erit propria consideratio, quum cognoscetur 
ut ab omnibus distinctus. Non tamen erit perfecta cognitio, 
quia non cognoscitur quid in se sit. Ibid. 

26 First Prin., p. 80. 



— 147 — 

God by way of corollary the agreement is at 
an end. 

" A thought involves relation, difference, like- 
ness. Whatever does not present each of these 
does not admit of cognition. And hence we 
may say that the Unconditioned, as presenting 
none of them, is trebly unthinkable." 27 For 
Aquinas, the Unconditioned or God presents all 
three of them in some way, and thus is trebly 
thinkable. We have just shown how God is 
known on the principle of remotion, by differ- 
ences; relation and likeness will be considered 
soon. 

The method of remotion or elimination is but 
one of three, as already remarked; these three 
supplement each other to such an extent that 
they are practically inseparable. The three 
conditions of thought laid down by Spencer 
are fulfilled in this three-fold method, and thus 
make the Agnostic unknowable knowable. 
When we ascribe an attribute to God which 
means knowledge of God to the extent of the 
attribute, we rest on the fact that God, as 
everything else, can only be known by what 

27 Spencer, Ibid., p. 82. 
Fiske repeats the same idea. "Upon what grounds did 
we assert the unknowableness of Deity ? We "were driven 
to the conclusion that Deity is unkno wable, because that 
which exists independently of intelligence and out of relation 
to it, which presents neither likeness, difference, nor relation, 
cannot be cognized. Outlines of Cosmic Phil, v. 2, p. 413. 



— 148 — 

He manifests of Himself. His manifestations 
appealing "to our intellects leads us to know 
what we are able to know of Him. God is 
known to us from creatures by the relation of 
cause, by way of eminence, and remotion." 28 We 
name an object as it is known to our intellect, 
for names or "words are referred to what they 
signify by means of an intellectual concep- 
tion. " 29 How does God manifest Himself? 
Through creatures, through the objects in the 
world about us. A consideration of these ob- 
jects leads us to an ultimate explanation of 
them, to their cause— God. If we are to know 
more of this Cause, we must learn from all our 
experiences, for we can name Him only as these 
make Him known. 

We can not, however, rise at once from a 
consideration of a given class of objects to an 
attribute appropriate to God. The knowledge 
we derive from creation does not lift us immedi- 
ately to a knowledge of the final Object, Source, 
and End of all. St. Thomas lays down certain 
rules which are to guide us in this matter — 
they have been called Canons of Attribution. 



28 Deus cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis secundum habitu- 
dinem principii, et modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sum. 
Theol. y I, q. 13, a. 1. 

29 Voces referuntur ad res significandas mediaute concep- 
tione intellectus. Ibid. 



— 149 — 

They safeguard the separate existence of God, 
and also, as Caldecott points out, ward off 
the imputation of Anthropomorphism. God, 
for Aquinas, is infinite perfection, hence we can 
apply no name to Him that will derogate from 
this character. 30 Every name that implies per- 
fection without connoting imperfection, is ap- 
plied to God in the proper and the full sense 
of the word; this name, however, is applied to 
Him in an eminent way, w T hich is not at all 
applicable to creatures; finally, words connot- 
ing imperfection may be applied to God meta- 
phorically. We have here the ideas of God as 
Cause, all else as effects, and the relation 
between the two. We can compare God and 
creatures because they are similar in some way, 
but the result of our comparison can only be 
expressed analogically. 

When we discussed the question of causality 
in general, we saw that there was some simi- 
larity between the cause and the result of its 
operation, based on the axiom — omne agens 
agit sibi simile. This similarity may be one 
of quality or one of proportion ; in the former 
there is specific or generic likeness, in the latter 
there is an analogical likeness. We also saw 

30 God is infinite perfection, since as Cause of all things, 
He contains in Himself in some way all effects. Cfr. Sum. 
TheoL, I, q. 4, a. 2. 



— 15° — 

that the cause is known by the effect it pro- 
duces, and this is the only way we know it — 
thus we know it by its actual exercise. The 
activity of an agent is its forma, and this is 
simply the divine likeness in things; "for since 
the form is that which gives being or existence 
to a thing, but each thing, in as far as it has 
being, approaches to the likeness of God who 
is simple Being itself, it is necessary that the 
form be nothing else than the divine likeness 
participated in things." 31 The common element 
of likeness, then, between God and creatures is 
that of Being. There is no generic or specific 
agreement, but one "according to some analogy, 
as being is common to all. In this manner 
those things which are of God, as First and 
Universal Cause of all being, are likened to Him 
in as far as they are beings." 32 
The idea of relation is closely connectd with 



31 Cum enim forma sit secundum quam res habet esse : res 
autem quaelibet, secundum quod habet esse, accedat ad 
similitudinem Dei, qui est ipsum suum esse simplex ; necesse 
est quod forma nihil est aliud quam divina similitudo par- 
ticipata in rebus. C. G., 1. 3, c. 97. 

32 Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere continea- 
tur, effectus ejus adhuc magis remote accedat ad similitudi- 
nem formae agentis: non tamen ita quod participet 
similitudinem formae agentis secundum eamdem rationem 
speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam ; 
sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo ilia 
quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei, inquantum sunt entia, et 
primo et universali principio totius est. Sum. TheoL, I, 
q. 4, a. 3. 



— i5i — 

similarity in this question of analogy. We have 
seen that knowledge implies a relation or union 
of knower and known. When we come to seek 
a knowledge of God, how is this relation to be 
understood ? If God or the Absolute is defined 
as the unrelated, then we are at a standstill in 
our discussion; and Spencer truly remarks — 
"It is impossible to put the Absolute in the 
category with anything relative so long as the 
Absolute is defined as that of which no necessary 
relation can be predicated." 33 St. Thomas dis- 
cusses this point by means of a distinction. 
He says there are two kinds of relation— real 
or actual, and conceptual. In a relation there 
are two terms or extremes, the subject and the 
object, and the foundation or basis that con- 
nects them both — the reason why one is re- 
ferred to or related to the other. If both terms 
are real, the relation is real — this real relation 
exists in things independently of the operation 
of the intellect. The relation is conceptual or 
relatio rationis when one term is real and the 
other only a concept — this relation depends on 
the consideration of our mind. On the basis 
of this distinction, we know how far we can 
attribute to God what we see in creatures. The 
real relation contains the idea of something in 



1 First Prin., p. 81. Cfr. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 116. 



— 152 — 

both terms, each term contributing something 
to the relation, as the relation of mover and 
moved. In the conceptual, there is the idea of 
unchangeableness in one term and change only 
in the other. St. Thomas says, to determine 
whether an animal is on the left or on the right 
side of a column does not depend on any change 
in the column but on the changed position of 
the animal. This element of fixedness he applies 
to God — "Since God, therefore, is beyond the whole 
order of creatures, and all creatures are ordained 
to Him and not conversely, it is manifest that 
creatures are related to God Himself, but there 
is no real relation of God to creatures, but one 
of concept only, in so far as creatures are related 
to Him." 34 Thus, whatever names we apply 
to God are not based on "any change in Him, 
but on change in creatures/ ' Strictly speaking 
then, we cannot say that God is like creatures, 
though the reverse is true ; and this rests on the 
fact that God in no way depends on creatures, 
He receives absolutely nothing from them. God 
is like a standard that measures the perfections 
of all objects, and as we speak of objects re- 

34 Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum orditiem creaturae, et 
omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso ; 
manifestum est quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum 
Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio ejus ad 
creaturas; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum, 
creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 13, a. 7. 



— as- 
sembling their standard more or less closely, 
but not of the standard resembling the objects 
— though they have points that are common to 
a certain degree — so God is not spoken of as 
similar to creatures, but conversely. 

The contradiction that Spencer, quoting 
Mansel, finds in the ideas of Cause and 
Absolute and Infinite, are not born of a proper 
understanding of the terms. If the meaning he 
gives them were true, then we certainly could 
not know the Absolute. Ladd justly remarks: 
"All philosophy or attempt at philosophy, 
even the most agnostic, necessarily assumes 
some sort of conscious mental relation of man 
to the Absolute; but on the other hand, all 
philosophy or attempt at philosophy^ however 
dogmatic, is forced to acknowledge some sort 
of a limit beyond which any such relation as 
can properly be called * knowledge ' can not be 
claimed to extend.' ' He gives certain definitions 
of the Absolute which of their very nature 
render knowledge of It out of the question. 
If the Absolute is designated as the totally 
unrelated there is no knowledge to be had of 
it. The Absolute must have some content, can 
not be an abstraction — "That which has no 
positive characteristics that are presentable or 
representable in consciousness, can not be 
known . ' ' Another unknowable form — ' ' You 



— i54~ 

can not know, or know about, the Absolute, 
if by this term you mean to designate the nega- 
tion of all positive or particular characteristics/ * 
While we agree with these statements, there is 
one aspect we can not endorse — "Nor is knowl- 
edge of the Absolute possible if this word must 
be identified with the unchanging, — with that 
which is absolved from all alterations of its 
own states or of the relations in which those 
states stand to human consciousness. ,,35 In 
addition to what has already been said, the 
further presentation of the view of Aquinas will 
show that our knowledge of the Absolute does 
not require change in the Absolute. We can 
apply certain attributes to Him, derived from 
a consideration of His manifestations. 

Are these attributes the same in kind in 
God and creatures, or is it a matter of degree 
only? The general answer is obvious. God 
who is independent and self-existent Being, and 
creatures who are essentially dependent and 
caused can not be classed together, as Spencer 
justly remarks. "Between the creating and 
the created there must be a distinction trans- 
cending any of the distinctions existing between 
different divisions of the created." 36 And here 
Spencer finds another reason for calling God 

35 Phil, of Knowledge, pp. 593, 594, 595, 596, 597. 

36 First Prin. p. 81. 



— 155 — 

unknowable : knowledge implies classification, 
but God can not be classed with the created, 
and hence we can not know^ Him. St. Thomas 
has the same distinction "between the creating 
and the created", but by analogy and eminence, 
he finds that God is knowable in some way. 
"We can not know the truth of divine things ", 
says Aquinas, "according to their nature, hence 
it must be known according to our own nature. 
But it is connatural to us to arrive at the 
intelligible from the sensible . . . that from those 
things that w^e know, the soul may rise to the 
unknown. We know more truly what God is 
not than what He is . . . hence what we say of 
God is not to be understood as proper to Him 
in the same manner as it is found in creatures, 
but through some manner of imitation and 
likeness. The eminence of God is more expressly 
shown by removing from Him w T hat is most 
manifest to us, material things". 37 The likeness 
is n^t a "participation of the same form . . . 

37 Non possumus veritatem divinorum secundum modura 
suum capere ; et ideo oportet quod nobis secundum modum 
nostrum proponatur. Est autem nobis connaturale a 
sensibilibus in intelligibilia venire . . ut ex his quae novimus 
ad incognita animus surgat . . . De Deo verius cognoscimus 
quid non est, quam quid est. Et ideo cum de omnih-us quae 
de Deo dicimus, intelligendum sit quod non eodem modo 
sibi conveniunt, sicut in creaturis inveniuntur, sed per 
aliquem modum imitationis et similitudinis ; expressius 
ostendebatur hujusmodi eminentia Dei, per ea quae sunt 
magis manifesta ab ipso removeri. Haec autem sunt 
corporalia. Com. on Lomb., I, Dis. 34, q. 3, a. 1. 



— 156 — 

but it is a certain likeness of proportion, which 
consists in the same relation of proportions, as 
when we say eight is to four as six is to three, 
and the mayor is to the city what a pilot is to 
a ship." 38 

The attributes applied to God and creatures 
have a relation of proportion — we do not grasp 
their full expression in the Divine Being, though 
we seem to do so when they are found in 
creatures. "When the name wise is applied 
to a man, it in a way circumscribes and com- 
prehends the thing signified, but not so in the 
case of God, where the thing signified still 
remains as uncomprehended and exceeding the 
signification of the name." 39 "Since God is His 
being which no creature is," His relation to 
being and all attributes differs from that of 
creatures, "for what is in God simply and 
immaterially is in the creature materially and 

8b Quaedam similitudo enim est per participationem 
ejusdem formae; et talis similitudo non est corporalium 
ad divina. Est etiam quaedam similitudo proportional- 
itatis: sicut se habent octo ad quattuor, ita sex ad tria 
et sicut se habet gubernator ad navem. Ibid, ad 2. 

39 Cum hoc nomen, sapiens, de homine dicitur, quodammodo 
circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam ; non autem 
cum dicitur de Deo ; sed relinquit rem significatam ut 
incomprehensam et excedentem nominis significatam. Sum. 
TheoL, I, q. 13, a. 5. 



— 157 — 

manifoldly." 40 " It then follows that attributes 
are applied to God and creatures according to 
analogy, that is proportion. . . And thus what- 
ever is said of God and creatures is said as there 
is some relation of the creature to God as to a 
principle and cause, in which preexist excellently 
all the perfections of things. . . In those things 
which are said analogically, there is not one 
concept as in univocals, but the name which is 
used manifoidly signifies diverse proportions to 
one thing." 41 This proportion or relation of 
objects in the analogical sense is not, as St. 
Thomas points out, based on an agreement to 
something distinct from the two objects related, 
and which "must be something prior to both, 
to which both are related," but is reference 
based on something found in each, "where the 



40 Deus autem alio tnodo se habet ad esse quam aliqua 
alia creatura; nam ipse est suum esse, quod nulli alii 
creatttrae competit. Cum quod in Deo est immaterialiter 
et simpliciter, in creaturis sit materialiter et multipliciter. 
Pot., q. 7, a. 7. 

41 Dicendum est igitur quod hujusmodi nomina dicuntur de 
Deo et creaturis, secundum analogiam, id est proportionem. 
. . Et sic quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secun- 
dum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad princi- 
pium ad causam, in quae praeexistunt excellenter omnes 
rerum perfectiones. . . Neque enim in his quae analogice 
dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis . . . sed nomen 
quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones 
ad aliquid unum. Sum. Theol., q. 13, a. 5. 



-158- 

one is prior to the other/ ' In God and creatures 
the basis of analogy is the relation of cause and 
effect — "nothing is prior to God, and He is prior 
to the creature/ ' There is then a reason for 
saying that "good and other qualities are pre- 
dicated commonly of God and creatures/' and 
that is, because "the divine essence is the super- 
excellent likeness of all things." 42 

God as First Cause contains in absolute per- 
fection the shadowings of Himself, yet St. 
Thomas remarks that the unchangeableness of 
God is not affected by this : for He is wise and 
good and the like, antecedently and independently 
of the existence of these qualities in creatures. 
These predications are not simply a matter of 
degree, nor yet do they wholly differ in kind; 
still we can see that we have a peculiar case 
here in the relation of creatures to God. God 
occupies a position that nothing else can occupy, 
as regards what is known to us, and conse- 
quently we are on solid ground while we mount 
from human considerations to a knowledge of 
the Divine. It is not hard for us — if it is not 
rather a necessity — to admit that our feeble ut- 
terances find a realization in God much beyond 



42 Divina essentia est omnium rerum similitudo superexcel- 
lens. Bt ex hoc modo similitudinis contingit quod bonum et 
hujusmodi praedicantur communiter Deo et creaturis. Pot., 
q. 7, a. 7 ad 6. 



— 159 — 

anything we can see here in creation, and that 
the phrase, God is all this eminently, is happily 
and suggestively chosen. On the strength of the 
view of Aquinas just presented, the questions of 
J. S. Mill may be understood at their true value. 
"To say that God's goodness may be different 
in kind from man's goodness, what is it but 
saying, with a slight change of phraseology, that 
God may possibly not be good?" And again, 
"I will call no Being good, who is not what I 
mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow 
creatures." 43 God is all that creatures are and 
eminently more ; this method of eminence leads 
us as near to a proper or quiddative concept of 
God as we can reach. 

We have then a right to attribute to God 
certain qualities on the basis of creatures, 
because there is some similarity between the 
effects and their causes. The effects are many, 
and thus offer various ways of approach to a 
specification of our Idea of God. Moreover, the 
nature of our intelligence is such that we can 
not grasp the essence of anything at once, but 
it is only by degrees that we arrive at a com- 
plete knowledge of it, in so far as it is knowable 
to us. This is all the more true in our dealings 
with the nature of God — we stammer rather 



43 Quoted by Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Phil, v. 2, p. 407. 



— i6o- 

than speak. Yet we must not forget, that 
though our Conception of God is a human 
concept, as all our concepts must be, yet it is 
a true Concept of God, as far as we can attain 
it. St. Thomas thus expresses this matter: 
"Our intellect apprehends divine perfections in 
the manner in which they exist in creatures, and 
it names them as it apprehends them. In the 
names, therefore, that we give to God we must 
consider two things — the perfections themselves 
that are signified, as gooodness, life, and so on, 
and the manner of signifying them." The per- 
fections themselves as perfections "are properly 
applied to God, even more properly than to 
creatures, and are predicated of Him with 
priority", 44 since He is the Cause; but the 
manner of predication depends on the nature 
of our mind. This distinction seems to answer 
fully the misgivings of Prof. Royce about the 
adequacy of the treatment of St. Thomas 
regarding the divine attributes. 45 " Our intellect 
since it knows God from creatures, to under- 

44 Intellectus autem noster eo inodo apprehend.it eas secun- 
dum quod sunt in creaturis ; et secundum quod apprehendit, 
ita significat per nomina. In nominibus igitur quae Deo 
attribuimus, est duo considerare scilicet perfectiones ipsas 
significatas, tit bonitatem, vitam et hujusmodi; et modum 
significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant hujus- 
modi nomina proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam 
ipsis creaturis; et per prius dicuntur de eo. Sum. Theol., 
I. q. 13, a. 3. 

* Or. pp. 30, 31. 



— i6i — 

stand God, forms conceptions proportioned to 
the perfections proceeding from God to creatures. 
These perfections preexist in God unitedly and 
simply, in creatures they are divided and mani- 
fold . . . To the various and multiple concep- 
tions of our intellect, there is but one principle, 
altogether simple, imperfectly understood by 
those conceptions." 46 This sounds like Anthro- 
pomorphism. 

In one sense, as so many Theists have pointed 
out, all our knowledge is anthropomorphic, for the 
simple reason that we must think as anthropoi, 
as men. Martineau writes : " In every doctrine 
therefore, it is still from our microcosm that we 
have to interpret the macrocosm ; and from the 
type of our humanity as presented in self knowl- 
edge, there is no more escape for the pantheist 
or materialist than for the theist. Modify them 
as you may, all causal conceptions are born 
from within, as reflections or reductions of our 
personal, animal, or physical activity: and the 
severest science is in this sense, just as anthropo- 
morphic as the most ideal theology." 47 Balfour, 
contrasting Theology and Science, says, "for 
controversial purposes it has been found con- 
venient to dwell on the circumstance that our 
idea of the Deity is to a certain extent necessarily 

46 Sum. Theol.,.1. q. 13, a. 3. 

47 A Study of Religion, v. 1, p. 336. 



l62 — 

anthropomorphic while the no less certain, if 
somewhat less obvious, truth that an idea of 
the external world is also anthropomorphic, 
does not supply any ready argumentative 
weapon. " 48 In this sense, our idea of God must 
be anthropomorphic, and no one should be sur- 
prised thereat. When, however, it is said we 
transfer to God simply and without any modifi- 
cation what we perceive in all experience, then 
Anthropomorphism ceases to be tenable. 

Spencer finds a gradually diminishing Anthro- 
pomorphism in the history of religion, though, 
to his mind, it is still very prominent. " Indeed 
it seems somewhat strange," he says, "that 
men should suppose the highest worship to lie 
in assimilating the object of their worship to 
themselves. Not in asserting a transcendant 
difference, but in asserting a certain likeness, 
consists the element of their creed which they 
think essential." 49 We have already discussed 
the nature of likeness or similarity. He goes on 
to say, "It is still thought not only proper but 
imperative to ascribe (to God) the most ab- 
stract qualities of our nature. To think of the 
Creative Power as in all respects anthropo- 
morphous, is now considered impious by men 
who yet hold themselves bound to think of the 

48 Defence of Philosophic Doubt, c. 12, p. 244. 

49 First Prin. f p. 109. 



— 163 — 

Creative Power as in some respects anthropo- 
morphous, and who do not see that the one 
proceeding is but an evanescent form of the 
other." 50 This objection of Spencer is fully met 
by the Canons of Attribution laid down by St. 
Thomas, and especially, if we remember, that 
Aquinas considers our knowledge, and chiefly 
the principle of causality, as objective and 
universal. 

We certainly do ascribe to God "the most 
abstract qualities of our nature", but we do 
this in a way that removes all suspicion that 
our Concept of God is not worthy of Him, 
according to His manifestations to us. In brief, 
by causality, we recognize God as containing 
all the perfections that we perceive in His 
works, by remotion or negation, we eliminate 
all imperfections as found in their human 
expression and arrive at a positive perfection, 
and then we ascribe this perfection to God in 
an eminent way — we say, it finds its realization 
in Him in a manner proper to a self-existent 
Being. This method avoids the charge of 
Anthropomorphism which has been justly made 
to those who have neglected it. "The omission 
of careful treatment of the method of appli- 
cation in the writings of many Englishmen who 



60 Ibid., p. 110. 



— 164 — 

belong to the Demonstrative School has laid 
them fairly open to the charge of anthropo- 
morphism. " 51 No true Theist would admit that 
his Conception of God is anthropomorphic, 
nothing is further from his mind than to con- 
ceive God in this way; he must then seek a 
form of presentation that will adequately 
express the view he holds. All Theists, in a 
way, betray signs of a proper conception, and 
if one ventures to question the insufficiency or 
incompleteness of their position by pointing out 
lacunae, they immediately reply, what you 
suggest is contained in my treatment. This 
attitude was emphasized in the discussion that 
followed Prof. Royce's lecture on The Concep- 
tion of God, at the University of California. 
God was discussed under the Attribute of 
Omniscience. The criticism offered was, that 
other and essential attributes of God were 
ignored; Prof. Royce, in his reply, stated, that 
these were implied. This is but an illustration 
of the tendency to contract the Infinite and fit 
It into a mould that will contain any idea we 
choose to form of It. The desire for unity, for 
an all-embracing unity is a worthy one, but 
must not run counter to actual conditions. 52 We 



61 Caldecott The Phil of ReL, p. 60. St. Thomas belongs 
to the Demonstrative School. 

52 Cfr. St. Thomas and Modern Thought, K. A. Pace, Cath. 
Univ. Bulletin, v. 2. 



— i6 5 — 

do not wish to say that one can not confine 
one's self to the discussion of a single attribute, 
but one should not seek a rounded concept in 
this way. It is contrary to the nature of our 
mind, and it is unfair to the subject. 

Prof. Royce at the end of his argument 
claims that his position is essentially that of 
St. Thomas. The method, I think, is the same, 
granting the basis on which it rests, but the 
completed Concept is entirely different. As far 
as the single attribute Omniscience is concerned , 
from the author's premises, no fault is to be 
found with it, and, though rigorously speaking, 
it contains the other attributes, it is not 
satisfying to rest in it as there set forth. We 
propose, therefore, to present briefly the most 
important and essential attributes of God as 
found in Aquinas, and show how his Theory 
of Knowledge and Canons of Attribution are 
made use of in attaining these, and the result 
will be the rounded Concept of God according 
to St. Thomas. 

SECTION IV.-— APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES. 

The Concept of the Infinite. It was the sup- 
posed inadequacy of finite things to lead to a 
concept of the Infinite, that gave birth to Onto- 
logism, which posits an immediate vision or 
intuition of G©d. The formation of this and 



— i66 — 

other concepts brings out clearly the need of a 
well-defined and consistent theory of knowledge, 
as well as the demand for methods that make 
for a legitimate application of the theory. " Our 
intellect in understanding, reaches to the infinite; 
as evidence we have the fact, for any given finite 
quantity, it can think a greater. This tendency 
of the intellect would be in vain, were there not 
some infinite intelligible thing. There must then 
be some infinite intelligible thing which must be 
the greatest of things; and this we call God. 
Again, the effect cannot extend beyond its cause. 
But our intellect can only come from God, who 
is the First Cause of all, therefore our intellect 
cannot think anything greater than God. If 
therefore we think something greater than every 
finite, it follows that God is not finite." 1 This is 
not the argument of St. Anselm, for its basis is 
the relation of cause and effect. Thus from finite 
things, from effects, through the operation of 
our intellect, we reach the Infinite. 

How can finite things lead to the Infinite? 
Are we not simply piling finite upon finite as 
Locke held, and at most landing at the indefinite 
with a i something beyond '? We cannot actually 
know infinite quantity, because "we could only 
understand it by receiving part after part . . . 

1 C. G., 1. 1, c. 43. 



— 167 — 

and thus the infinite could not be known unless 
we enumerated all its parts, which is impossi- 
ble. " 2 This is not the idea of the infinite applied 
to God, for "God is not called Infinite privatively 
as quantity.' ' Here enters the idea of matter 
and form, implying perfection and imperfection. 
" A thing is called infinite because it is not finite. 
Matter is made finite in a way through form, 
and form through matter. . . Matter is perfected 
through the form by which it is made finite, 
and thus the infinite as attributed to matter has 
the concept of the imperfect, for it is as matter 
without form. But form is not perfected through 
matter, but rather its amplitude is restricted, 
whence the infinite considered from the side of 
form not determined by matter has the concept 
of the perfect. ,, 3 God then " is not called Infinite 



2 (Infinitum) non potest intelligi nisi accipiendo partem 
post partem . . . et sic infinitum cognosci non posset actu, 
nisi omnes partes ejus numerarentur ; quod est impossible. 
Sum. Theol., I. q. 86, a. 2. 

3 Infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod non est finitum. 
Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma 
per materiam. . . Materia autem perficitur per formam per 
quam finitur ; et ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur 
materiae, habet rationem imperfecti ; est enim quasi ma- 
teria non habens formam. Forma autem non perficitur per 
materiam magis per earn ejus amplitudo contrahitur ; unde 
infinitum, secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae non 
determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Sum. 
Theol, I. q. 7, a. 1. 



— i68 — 

privatively as quantity, for the infinite of this 
nature is reasonbly unknown, because it is as 
matter without form, which is the principle of 
knowledge. But He is called Infinite negatively, 
as form per se subsisting, not limited through 
receiving matter." 4 "The formal Infinite, which is 
God, is known in Himself, but unknown to us on 
account of the defect of our intellect, which in our 
present condition has a natural aptitude to 
know material things. And thus now we can 
know God only through material effects." 5 The 
difficulty arising from the disproportion of the 
finite and the infinite is answered on the basis of 
analogy or proportion, in as far as " proportion 
signifies some relation of one to another, either 
of matter to form or of cause to effect. Thus 
nothing forbids a proportion of the creature to 
God according to the relation of the understand- 
ing to the understood, as also according to the 
relation of the effect to the cause." 6 We might 
recall here the principle of knowledge, that the 
species is not the thing known primarily, but the 
object which it represents. It is finite of course, 

4 C. G., 1. 3, c. 54. 

5 Infinitum autem formale, quod est ^Deus, est secundum se 
notum ; ignotum autem quoad nos, propter defectum intel- 
lectus nostri qui secundum statum praesentis vitae habet 
naturalem aptitudinem ad materialia cognoscenda. Sum. 
Theol., I. q. 87, a. 2. ad 1. 

6 C. G., 1. 3, c. 54. 



— 169 — 

but it contains the object, the infinite, in the 
imperfect and negative way that we know it, 
and in so far gives 11s a true concept. The con- 
cept is positive also, though it is reached by way 
of remotion. Moreover, we see evidence here of 
the principle of knowledge — that all things are 
known according to the nature of the knower. 
We know God in our finite way, but the object 
known is the Infinite represented by the species. 
The ideas in this concept are — matter and form, 
imperfection and perfection. God is pure form 
without any matter, He is therefore perfect, 
infinitely perfect. We can know Him as infinite 
however, only through objects that have a 
material covering. We remove this material 
covering by abstraction and negation, and then 
we arrive at an idea of God under one aspect, 
that of Infinite Perfection. 

God is Omniscient. Since " God is in the height 
of immateriality, it follows that he is on the 
summit of cognition. 1 ' We have seen the 
position of immateriality in the theory of 
knowledge, it is the basis of knowledge for the 
knower and the known. "The immateriality 
of a thing is the reason of its knowableness, 
and the degree of knowledge depends on the 
degree of immateriality." ' The discussion of 

7 Immaterialitas alicujus rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; 
et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis. 
Sum. Theol. I. q. 14, a. 1. 



— 170 — 

the Infinite showed that God was pure form, 
and hence wholly immaterial, and thus infinitely 
knowable and knowing. " We find in the world 
many things moving through intelligence, it is 
then impossible that the Prime Mover be with- 
out intellect." 8 Again, irrational objects tend 
toward ends, and this is not by chance, hence 
this "end must be given them by another who 
is the founder of nature . . . but he could not 
give a purpose to nature unless he were intelli- 
gent. " 9 God's knowledge and that of man 
differ. "Man has diverse cognitions according 
to the objects known.". His knowledge is 
successive, and admits of varying degrees of 
certitude, which he expresses by various names, 
as wisdom, intelligence, and the like. In God 
there is but a simple cognition to which we 
can apply these different names, yet in such a 
manner "that from each of them as they are 
used for divine predications we exclude what is 
of imperfection in it, and retain only what is 
of perfection." 10 "Everything that pertains to 

S C. G.,1. 1, c44. 

9 Ibid., c. 56. 

10 Homo autem secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas 
cognitioues . . . Unde simplex Dei cognitio omnibus istis 
nominibus nominari potest ; ita tamen quod ab unoquoque 
eorum, secundum quod in divinam praedicationem venit, 
secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid 
perfectionis est. Sum. Theol., I. q. 14, a. 1 ad 2. 



— i7i — 

the imperfect mode proper to the creature must 
be excluded from the meaning of the name." 11 
God is not simply intelligent, but He knows all 
things at once; "every intellect that under- 
stands one thing after another, is sometimes 
potentially intelligent and sometimes actually . . • 
But the Divine Intellect is never potentially, but 
always actually intelligent, hence it does not 
understand things successively, but it under- 
stands all things at once." 12 Prof. Royce says, 
the Being that is Omniscient "would behold 
answered, in the facts present to his experience, 
all rational, all logically possible questions. 
That is, for him, all genuinely significant, all 
truly thinkable ideas would be seen as truly 
fulfilled, and fulfilled in his own experience. " 
Again, "His experience then, would form one 
whole, but the whole as such would fulfil 
an all-embracing unity, a single system of 
ideas." 18 But in what way is He all this ? Here 
Prof. Royce goes astray. It is true he admits, 
that God has "richer ideas than our fragments 
of thoughts"; and he also truly remarks, "these 
things, wherein we taste the bitterness of our 
finitude, are what they are because they mean 



11 Quandocumque nomen sumptum a quacumque perfeo 
tione creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab ejus signifi- 
catione omne illud quod per tin et ad imperfectum modum 
qui competit creaturae. Ibid., ad 1. 

12 C. G., 1. 1, c. 56. 13 Loc. tit., p. 10. 



— 172 — 

more than they contain, imply what is beyond 
them, refuse to exist by themselves, and at the 
very moment of confessing their own fragmen- 
tary falsity assure us of the reality of that 
fulfilment which is the life of God." 14 We can 
not, however, admit his statement when he 
enters into details, for he seems to find realized 
in his Omniscient Being things that St. Thomas 
was careful to exclude, by his method of remo- 
tion. The absence of this discrimination leads 
Prof. Royce to say, "the total limitation, the 
fragmentariness, the ignorance, the error, — yes 
(as forms or cases of ignorance and error), the 
evil, the pain, the horror, the longing, the 
travail, the faith, the devotion, the endless 
flight from its own worthlessness, — that con- 
stitutes the very essence of the world of finite 
experience, is, as a positive reality somewhere 
so experienced in its wholeness that this entire 
constitution of the finite appears as a world 
beyond which in its whole constitution, nothing 
exists or can exist." 15 "Evil, pain, horror", 
are not known as a "positive reality" for they 
are negations and imperfections, and hence find 
no place in God except through a knowledge 
of their opposites — "because God knows bona 
He also knows mala", for evil is "privatio 



14 Ibid., pp. 14, 15. 
16 Ibid., pp. 46, 47. 



— 173 — 

boni". 16 All imperfection and limitation must 
be removed from the Omniscient, the above 
quotation limits the Omniscient to the sole 
experience of the finite in its entirety, " beyond 
which, in its whole constitution, nothing exists 
or can exist.' ' We have then in the Concept 
of the Omniscient according to St. Thomas, the 
ideas of immateriality and actuality, the requi- 
sites for knower and known. Our knowledge 
is perfect as it approximates to the full 
expression of these qualities ; we know only 
through material conditions, we remove these 
and arrive at a knower, who, because He is 
on the apex of immateriality, is likewise on the 
summit of cognition. 

God is Omnipotent. This attribute is but the 
extension of the action of the will. Apart from 
the identity of all perfection in God, St. Thomas 
frequently unites the ideas of intelligence and 
power. " Power is not attributed to God as 
something really different from His knowledge 
and will, only conceptually; power means the 
principle of executing the command of the will 
and the direction of the intelligence. These three 
are one in God." 17 Practically the same reasons 



16 Sum. TheoL, I. q. 14, a. 10. 

17 Potentia non ponitur in Deo ut aliquid differens a scientia 
et a voluntate, secundum rem; sed solum secundum rationem; 
inquantum scilicet potentia import it rationem principii ex- 



— 174 — 

that lead us to ascribe Omniscience to God lead 
us to attribute Omnipotence to Him. We see the 
evidence of will in rational creatures, and we 
see the natural inclination of all things to an 
end ; the short-comings and imperfections mani- 
fested in our endeavors, for we are often 
thwarted and only attain success by overcom- 
ing obstacles, bring us to a will where all this 
is absent, and where execution is co-extensive 
with rational determination. The idea of cause 
runs though the whole presentation of this at- 
tribute, and thus largely repeats what we have 
already said. " It is further manifest that every- 
thing according to its actuality and perfection 
is the active principle of something. . . God is 
pure act and simply and universally perfect, nor is 
there any imperfection in Him. . . In God there- 
fore, is the highest power." 18 God is a cause 
that the effect cannot fully express, as we saw in 
the discussion of similitude. "God is not a uni- 
vocal agent, for nothing agrees with Him 

18 Manifestum est enim unumquodque secundum quod est 
actu et perfectum, secundum hoc est principium activum ali- 
cujus. Deus est purus actus, et simpliciter et universaliter 
perfectus, neque in eo aliqua imperfectio locum habet. Unde 
maxime ei competit esse principium activum, et nullo modo 
pati. Ibid., q. 25, a. 1. 

equentis id quod voluntas imperat, et ad quod scientia diri- 
git. Quae tria Deo secundum idem conveniunt. Sum. TheoL, 
I. q. 25, a. 1 ad 4. 



— 175 — 

specifically or generically. . . But the power of 
a non-univocal agent is not wholly expressed 
in the production of its effect. " 19 Thus effects 
or creation do not express the limit of His 
power, for there is nothing to contrain Him 
to this full expression. We have then, a concep- 
tion of free, infinite power, arrived at from a 
consideration of limited and imperfect power 
here below. The limitations are removed and 
we have Omnipotence. 

God is a Person. The attribution of Person- 
ality to God sums up briefly the w 7 hole method 
of divine predication according to St. Thomas. 
" Person means what is perfect in all nature, 
viz., subsistence in a rational nature. Whence, 
since whatever partakes of perfection is to be 
attributed to God because His essence contains 
all perfection in itself, it is proper that this name 
person be predicated of God, but not in the same 
manner as it is said of creatures, but in a more 
excellent way." 20 The word person is not given 



19 Deus non est agens univocum. Nihil enim aliud potest 
cum eo convenire neque in specie, neque in genere. . . Sed 
potentia agentis non univoci non tota manifestatur in sui 
effectus productione. Ibid., a. 2 ad 2. 

20 Persona signifLcat id quod est perfectissimum in tota 
natura ; scilicet subsistens in rationali natura. Unde cum 
omne illud quod est perfectionis Deo sit attribuendum, eo 
quod ejus essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem, con- 
veniens est ut hoc nomen persona de Deo dicatur ; non tamen 
eodem modo quo dicitur de creaturis, sed excellentiori modo. 
Ibid., q. 29, a. 3. 



— 176 — 

more prominence specifically in the writings of 
Aquinas, for the simple reason that its com- 
ponent elements — intelligence and will — are fully 
treated by him. He answers an objection to the 
effect that this name person is not applied to 
God in the Scriptures, by saying there was no 
need of the word until the idea it stood for was 
called in question. This name is especially ap- 
propriate to God " since to subsist in a rational 
nature is great dignity. " 21 The terms of the 
definition given by Boetius, adopted and ex- 
plained by St. Thomas — person is the individual 
substance of a rational nature — are realized in 
God. Individual means one, distinct from others; 
substance means existence per se, no need of any 
other for its existence; rational nature means 
intelligible nature in general, not the discursive 
way of reasoning of our intelligence. In this 
light, the definition is perfectly valid, receiving 
confirmation from the various elements that 
compose it. Today it would be interesting to 
show in the light of psychological experiment 
that personality is actually a perfection. I do 
not think the above definition would need modi- 
fication as giving the essentials of the concep- 
tion, though it is possible that certain qualities 

21 Magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere. . . 
Sed dignitas divinae excedit omnem dignitatem; et secundum 
hoc maxime competit Deo nomen personae. Ibid., ad 2. 



— 177 — 

usually attributed to personality would be 
shown to rest on a less secure basis than is 
ordinarily supposed. As yet there is no decided 
case even against any of these, such as unity, 
permanence, and the like. 22 Mr. Bradley has a 
bit of reasoning, on the subject of personality, 
that is after the fashion of Aquinas. "The 
Absolute, though known, is higher, in a sense, 
than our experience and knowledge ; and in this 
connection I will ask if it has personality. . . 
We can answer in the affirmative or negative 
according to its meaning. Since the Absolute 
has everything, it of course must possess person- 
ality. And if by personality we are to under- 
stand the highest form of finite spiritual 
development, then certainly in an eminent degree 
the Absolute is personal. For the higher (we 
may repeat) is always the more real. And, since 
in the Absolute the very lowest modes of expe- 
rience are not lost, it seems even absurd to raise 
such a question about personality." 28 Thus, 
again, this concept is derived from what we 
perceive in rational creatures; we eliminate its 
imperfection as there found, and in the refined 
condition we attribute it to God. "This name 
person is not proper to God, if we consider 
whence the name arises, but if we consider what 



1 Cfr. Piat, La Personne Humaine. 
! Appearance and Reality, p. 531. 



- i 7 8 — 

the name signifies it is highly proper to 
God." 24 

We might go through the whole series of at- 
tributes as found in St. Thomas, and we should 
note the same principles operating through, all. 
When we considered the proofs for God's exist- 
ence w r e arrived at five aspects of God, and w r e 
have just considered a few more in detail to 
illustrate his method and to show how con- 
sistent he is throughout the long and difficult 
handling of the Conception of God as known by 
us. Yet did we follow this discussion to its end, 
prolong it as we would, the final outcome would 
not be a strictly proper or adequate concept of 
God. We should only know God in a way, 
though our ■ 'knowledge w r ould be real and 
thorough to that extent — a fact long ago 
pointed out by St.Chrysostom, and valid against 
Agnosticism. A partial knowledge, says he, is 
not absolute ignorance, nor is relative ignorance 
the absolute, absence of knowledge. 20 We can 
designate at most, the lines along which our 
endeavors are to move in forming as perfect a 
Concept of God as is in our powder. These have 



24 Quamvis hoc nomen, persona, rion conveniat Deo quan- 
tum ad id a quo itnpositutn, est nomen; tamen quantum ad id 
ad quod significandum imponitur, maxime Deo convenit. 
Sum. TheoL, I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 2. 

25 Com. in Matth., 21: 23. 



— 179 — 

been well expressed by Hontheim. To form a 
concept of God it is sufficient: a) to have the 
things of the world, from which we can conceive 
perfection in general, and single perfections in 
particular; b) to have a faculty of the mind to 
overcome contradictory notions, by which we 
can conceive individual perfections, denying the 
conjoined imperfection, by which especially we 
can think of them without limit, as infinite; c) 
that we can unite into one notion the perfections 
thus conceived. 26 These are the principles of 
Aquinas that we have tried to set forth in our 
presentation. He follows them out faithfully, 
and accepts the conclusion they offer. The con- 
cept is analogous, derived through a species or 
similitude that reflects God mediately. All 
knowledge is through species, but we have no 
immediate species of God, hence, strictly, no 
proper or quiddative concept, for a concept of 
this nature should agree alone with the object 
it represents. 

St. Thomas then, not without meaning, gives 
as the most appropriate name of God — Qui Est. 
He gives his reasons for this attitude ; they are 
taken from the meaning of the phrase, from its 
universality, and from its co-signification. "It 
does not mean any form, but being itself, and 



26 Theodicea, p. 19. 



— i8o — 

since the Being of God is His essence, which is 
proper to no other, it is manifest that among 
other names, this especially names God properly, 
for everything is named from its form." 27 All 
other names " determine God in a way, but our 
intellect can not know God at present as He 
isinse." 28 Finally, this phrase means "esse in 
praesenti, and thus is properly applied to 
God, for His Being knows neither past nor 
future. " 29 This phrase — Qui Est — is the proper 
Concept of God considered in Himself, since He 
alone is self-existent Being, and all else depend- 
ent, created existence; but this concept does not 
say enough for us as it stands; it is truly 
comprehensive of all the attributes we can con- 
ceive of God, yet not satisfying to us. There is a 
two-fold tendency of the human mind — the one 
to contraction and the other to expansion. 
We desire to press into as small a compass as 
possible the greatest amount of matter, and 
thus we seek for a telling phrase and an all- 
embracing idea. The other tendency asserts 
itself when we seek to know to its fullest the 
subject we are handling. We use every available 



27 Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. 
Unde cum esse Dei sit ipsa ejus essentia, et hoc nulli alii 
conveniat, manifestum est quod inter alia uornina hoc maxime 
proprie nominat Deum. Unumquodque enim denominatur a 
sua forma. Sum. Theol., I. q. 13, a. 11. 

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 



— 181 



means to make it yield all that it contains, we 
analyze it thoroughly. St. Thomas has recog- 
nized both these tendencies in the question of 
God. He has given us the short phrases — Actus 
Purus, Omnino Imrnutabilis, Qui Est ; but know- 
ing how little these convey to our minds as they 
stand, he has subjected them to a careful and 
detailed analysis with the result that we have 
tried to express. "God considered in Himself is 
altogether one and simple, but still our intellect 
knows Him according to diverse conceptions, 
because it cannut see Him as He is in Him- 
self." 30 We shall then follow the lead of our 
intelligence at work on created things and 
arrive at the varied and full number of perfec- 
tions they mirror forth, for they are but 
ambassadors of a King whose riches they 
can not fully portray; and the result of 
it all will be a Concept, showing, that "God is 
One, Simple, Perfect, Infinite, Intelligent, and 
Willing." 31 



30 Deus autem in se consideratus est omnino unus et sim- 
plex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas concep- 
tiones ipsum cognoscit ; eo quod non potest ipsum, ut in 
seipso est, videre. Ibid., I, q. 13, a. 12. 

31 Opus. 2. 



i8 3 



EPILOGUE. 



It has been well said that Agnosticism is 
rather a mental attitude than a doctrine. There 
is so much truth in it, and it enters so largely 
into the actual state of our cognitions, that 
it is unfortunate that it should have set itself 
to combat ex professo the limited knowledge 
that it is our portion to attain and possess. 
Its position, however, is not legitimate, and the 
human mind will hold all the more tenaciously 
to its birthright, because it is so meagre, and 
still more because there are men leagued to 
wrest this little from it. And yet Agnostics 
themselves lay claim to a great store of knowl- 
edge, quite sufficient to destroy their profession 
of ignorance. There is some truth in the state- 
ment of Ladd: "A more stupendous system of 
alleged cognitions that have absolute value, and 
that concern ultimate and permanent entities 
and unalterable truths, has never been put 
forth by any reflective mind than the system 
issued under the cover of this agnosticism." 1 A 
definition of terms would go a great way in 



1 Phil of Knowledge, p. 592. 



— 184 — 

giving the true position of the limits of our 
knowledge. 

We find it frequently stated in Theistic presen- 
tations that the manifestation of the Creator 
in His works is of such a nature that a further 
knowledge of Him through another source, 
namely, Revelation, is almost a necessary 
consequence. In fact, Prof. Flint devotes a 
chapter in his work on Theism, to discussing 
what he calls the Insufficiency of Mere Theism. 
St. Thomas also advocates the moral necessity 
of Revelation in arguments that have become 
commonplaces in Apologetics. The knowledge 
of God is "the result of a studious inquiry " 
that most men can not undertake — either on 
account of their "natural indisposition to 
know", their occupations in life, or indolence, 
since the "consideration of almost the whole 
of philosophy is related to the knowledge of 
God." Moreover, this would be a lifelong 
quest, and even then "on account of the weak- 
ness of our intellect in judging, error is generally 
found in the investigation of human reason." 
"Therefore the Divine Clemency has fruitfully 
provided, that even those things that reason 
can investigate, be held by faith; and thus all 
men can easily become partakers of divine 
knowledge, without doubt and without error." 2 

2 C. G. y 1. 1. c 4. 



-i8 5 - 

Revelation gives us a firmer and more extended 
knowledge than we can attain to by the simple 
light of reason. Yet St. Thomas finds the gift 
of Revelation very inadequate to exhaust the 
knowledge we can have of God. 

We have seen how St. Thomas held that all 
men have a knowledge of God in confuso, in 
the sense explained; they ascend to a higher 
knowledge through Demonstration, which is 
still very imperfect ; Revelation adds its portion, 
and still, to the mind of Aquinas, we are far 
from being satisfied. Man craves for more 
knowledge, he is longing for a view that will 
end his desires wdiile it will not cease to employ 
his knowing pow T er. This satisfaction and 
reposeful mental activity can only find a home 
in the presence of the Power that implanted this 
unrest in man. "We, in as far as we know that 
God exists, and other facts already presented, 
are not quieted in desire, but we desire yet to 
know God in His essence ", 3 w r e seek His Face. 
St. Thomas then concludes that man's ultimate 
happiness is to know God. Ultimate happiness 
is to be sought in the operation of the intellect 
alone, since no desire leads to such a height as 
the desire of understanding the truth. All our 
desires, whether of pleasure or any kind what- 



3 C. G., 1. 3, c. 50. 



— i86- 

soever, can not rest in aught else. But the 
desire of truth is not satisfied till it reach the 
highest Source and Author of all."' 4 

We noted before that in the system of Aquinas 
God is the Creator and End of Man. The 
imperfection of our knowledge, and the desire 
we have for a more and more perfect knowl- 
edge, opens out the prospect of another life to 
Aquinas, where the God we know so little about 
at present will be known as the Infinite, All- 
embracing Reality that will give us not only 
intellectual peace, but will spread before us 
riches now unknown. Aquinas then justly 
remarks, "let those blush who seek the 
happiness of man, so highly placed, in lower 
things." 5 



4 C G., 1. 3, c 50. 

5 C. (?., 1. 3. c. 49. 



i8 7 - 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



WORKS OF ST. THOMAS. 

Summa Theologica. Pars Prima, Questions 2-26, 44-49. 

(Commentaries of Cajetan and Capreolus). 
Summa Contra Gentii.es. Books 1; 2, cc. 1-27; 4, 17-25, 49-76. 

( Commentary of Ferrariensis). 
Commentary on the Sentences of the Lombard. Book 1. 

QUAESTIONES DlSPUTATAE : 

De Potentia Dei, articles 11. 

De Creatione, articles 19. 

De Simplicitate Divinae Kssentiae, articles 11. 

De His Quae Dicuntur De Deo, articles 4. 

DE VeriTate : 

Quaestiones : 1. De Veritate, articles 12. 

2. De Scientia Dei, articles 15. 

3. De Ideis, articles 8. 

5. De Providentia, articles 10. 
10. De Mente, articles 13. 
OpuscuIvA : 

13. De Differentia Divini Verbi et Humani. 

14. De Natura Verbi Intellects. 

2. Compendium Theologiae ad Fratrem Reginaldum. 
42. De Potentiis Animae. 
51. De Intellectu et Intelligibili. 
68. Super Librum De Trinitate. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIES. 

Bibliographie thomiste de 1878 a 1888. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 
Sep. 1888, 577-603. 

Schneid, M. Die Litteratur iiber die thomistsche Philoso- 
phic seit der Encyclika Aeterni Patris. Jahr. f. Phil. u. 
Spek. Theol., 1887, 269-308. 

WORKS ON SCHOLASTICISM. 

DeWulf. Histoire de la Philosophic Medievale. 1900, 259- 
290. 



— i88 — 

Dubinin Review. Authority of the Scholastic Philosophy. 

v. 13, N. S., 33-48. The Relation of Scholastic to Modern 

Philosophy, v. 20, 281-326. Pope Leo XIII. and Modern 

Studies, v. 3, 3. S. , 190-210. 
GuThun. La Scolastique et Aristote. Annal. de Phil. Chret , 

1882, 255-262. 
HaurEau. Histoire de la Philosophe Scolastique. v. 2. 
HEBERT, M. Thomisme et Kantisme. Annal. de Phil. 

Chret., 1886, 364-385. 
Pica vet, F. Le Mouvement Neo-Thomiste. Revue Philoso- 

phique, v. 33, 281-309; v. 35, 394-422. 
Regno isr DE. Quelques mots sur la Scolastique. Annal. de 

Phil. Chret, 1885, 17-30. 
Royce, J. Pope Leo's Philosophical Movement and its Rela- 
tions to Modern Thought. Boston Evening Transcript. 

July 29, 1903. (To be found also in The Review of Catholic 

Pedagogy, Dec 1903.) 

Stockl. Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters. v. 2, 
421-734. 

Talamo. L'Aristotelismo Delia Scolastica. 1881. 

Turner, W. History of Philosophy. 1903, 343-381. 

Ward, W. The Scholastic Movement and Catholic Philoso- 
phy. Dublin Review, v. 25, 3. S., 255-272. 

WORKS ON ST. THOMAS. 

Kucken. Die Philosophie des Thomas von Aquino und die 
Cultur der Neuzeit. Zeitschr. f. Phil. u. Philos. Kritik, 
v. 87-88. Thomas von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf 
zweier Wei ten. Kant-Studien,v. 6. 

Adeodatus, Aurei,. Die Philosophie des hi. Thomas von 

Aquin. Koln, 1887. pp. 64. (It answers Bucken's article.) 
Church Quarterly Review. St. Thomas Aquinas, v. 11, 

59-78 
Domet de Vorges. Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, 

par dom Mayeu Lamey. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1885, 

595-6o5. 
Dubein review. Letter of Pope Leo XIII. on St. Thomas of 

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Franchi Ausonio. Le caractere general de S. Thomas et sa 

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1887. 



Glossner, M. Die Philosophie des hi. Thomas von Aquin. 

Gegeu Freschammer. Jahr. f. Phil. n. Spek. Theol. 

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Gutbereet, C. Thomas von Aquin und Iinmanuel Kant. 

Der Katholik, v. 73-2, 1893, 1-16, 139-152. 
D'HuEST, Mon. Panegyrique de S. Thomas d' Aquin. Annal. 

de Phil. Ciiret., 1884, 189-209. 
Werner, C. Der heilige Thomas von Aquino. 3 vols. New 

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Vaughan, R. B. St. Thomas, his Life and Labors, 2 vols. 

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Barberis, A. Vesthe*simetrie et la psychologie de S. 
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Baceeaere van, F. L. St. Thomas's Philosophy of Knowl- 
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Beee, S. S. Agnosticism. Christian Thought, 8th series, 
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Bombard. De l'objectivite de la metaphysique. Annal. de 
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Bonnety, A. Nouvel examen de 1 'opinion de S. Thomas sur 
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Buleiot, J. La veritable Assimilation scolastique. Annal. de 
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Charevre, J. P. L' Assimilation scolastique. Annal. de Phil. 
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Domet DE Vorges. Theorie de la connaissance, d'apres 
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Dubein Review. St. Thomas's Theory of Knowledge, v. 25, 
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Farges, A. Theorie de la perception immediate d'apres 
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Fonsegrive. La mesure de nos connaissances objectives. 
Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1892, 614-623. 



— 190 — 

Gardair, J. Theorie de la connaissance d'aprds S. Thomas. 

Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1891, 373-382, La connaissance 

d'apres S. Thomas d'Aquin. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1887, 

572-596. 
Gredt, P. J. Das Erkennen (as found in St. Thomas). Jahr. 

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Gardair, J. L'objectivite de la Sensation. Annal. de Phil. 

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Clarke, R. F. The Sources of Agnosticism. Month, v. 45, 
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Some More Agnostic Fallacies. Ibid , v. 46, 375-391. 

Harris, W. T. Thoughts on the Basis of Agnosticism. Jour- 
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Mackay-Smith, A. Agnosticism. Christian Thought, 2nd 
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MomeriE, A. W. Agnosticism. London, 1889. 3rd Edit. 

PiaT, C. L'Intellect Actif. Paris. 

RobERTy De, E. Agnosticisme. Paris, 1892. L'lnconnais- 
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REGNON de. Metaphysique des causes d'apres saint Thomas 
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Straub, F. De objectivitate cognitionis humanae. 

Schmid, A. Erkenntnisslehre. Freiburg, 1890, 2 vo's. v. 1, 
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Ward, J. Naturalism and Agnosticism. Gifford Lectures, 
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Wiixmann, O. Geschichte des Idealismus. 3 vols. 1896, v. 2, 
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GOD. 

Ansei<m, St. In Philosophical Classics. Chicago. 1903. (The 
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Barry, G. W. The Battle of Theism. Dublin Review, v. 12, 
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Bertin. La Preuve de 1' Existence de Dieu du Proslogium 
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Response aux objections. Ibid., 277-286. 

BERTAUiyD, P. A. Etude critique des preuves de V existence 
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— iQi — 

Boedder. Natural Theology (Stonyhurst Series). 
Bowne, B. P. Philosophy of Theism. New York, 1889. 
Braun. La notion d'Absolu et l'existence de Dieu. Annal. 

de Phil. Chret., 1892, 79-121. 
Brockhoff, J. Die Lehre des hi. Thomas von der Brkenn- 

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351; 1888, 122-137; 1889, 182-197; 1891, 33 2 -357, 451-468. 
Broglie de. La formation dans l'ame de l'idee de Dieu. 

Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1892, 506-517. Le principe de 

raison suffisante et l'existence de Dieu. Ibid., 1889, 

393-417- 
Caird, J. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. 

1901. 
Caro, B. L'idee de Dieu et ses nouveaux critiques. Paris, 

1864. 
Chrysostom, Bro. The Theistic Argument of St. Thomas. 

Phil. Rev., v. 2. 
Cai,decoTT, A. The Philosophy of Religion. London. 1901. 

Selections from the Literature of Theism. Hdinburg. 1904. 
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Driscoi.1,. Christian Philosophy. God. Sec. and rev. ed. 

Benzigers. 1904. 
Domet DE VoRGES. L'Inconnaissable et M. Fouille*e. Annal. 

de Phil. Chret., 1894, 389-400, 552-560. 

DuQUESNOY, F. Les preuves de 1' existence de Dieu re*duites 

& une preuve unique. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1891, 

161-183, 
DuTERTRE, P. La raison humaine n'a ni la connaissance 

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Chret., 1 851, 325-343. 
Dziewicki. Le Dieu d'Aristote. i\nnal. de Phil. Chret., 1881, 

1070-1085. 

EssER, T. Rosminian Ontology (Not founded on St. Thomas) 

v. 21, 3. S., 35-47. Dub. Rev. 
Krmoni, V. La personnalite de Dieu et la critique contem- 

poraine. Annal de Phil. Chret., 1892, 20-50. 
Farges, A. L'idee de Dieu dans Aristote. Annal de Phil. 

Chret., 1894, 560-586. L'idee de Dieu. Paris. 
FEivDNER. Die sogenannte Aseitas Gottes als konstitutives 

Princip seiner Wesenheit. Jahr. f. Phil. u. Spek. Theol., 

1893. 421-441. 



— 192 — 

Fenei*on. Traits de l'existence de Dieu. 1872. 

Funt, R. Theism. Scribner. 1896. 7th Edition. Anti- 

Theistic Theories (Baird Lecture, 1877). Agnosticism. 

Scribner. 1903. 
Fiske, J. The Idea of God, as Affected by Modern Knowl- 
edge. Boston, 1895. Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy. New 

York. 1884, 2 vols. v. 1, cc. 6, 7; v. 2, part 3, cc. 2, 3. 
Fraser, A. C. Philosophy of Theism. Scribner, 1896. 
Gabayl, F. Zum Begriff des Absoluteu Jahr. f. Phil. u. 

Spek. Theol., 1903, 207-225. 
GasqueT, J. R. Present Position of the Arguments for the 

Existence of God. Dub. Rev. v. 14, 3. S., 65-78. 
Gayraud. L'argument de saint Anselme. Annal. de Phil. 

Chret, 1887, 163-205. 
Gheyn van den. La definition de la religion d'apres S. 

Thomas. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1891, 36-58. 
Glossner, M. Der Gottesbegriff in der neueren und neue- 

sten Philosophic Jahr. f. Phil. u. Spek. Theol., 1894. 

( Supplement. ) 
Goblet d'Alviela. L'Idee de Dieu. Paris. 1892. 
GrouslE, L. A un philo^ ophe qui a demontre* 1' existence de 

Dieu. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1898, 5-23. 
GuTBERi/ET, C. Die Theodicee Miinster. 1890, 2nd Edition. 
GuyTon, A. L'argument de saint Anselme. Annal. de Phil. 

Chret., 1894, 263-283. 
Hanne, J. W. Die Idee der Absoluten Personlichkeit. 
Harper, T. From Logic to God. Dub. Rev. v. 11, 3. S., 

373-307. 
Harris, S. S. The Theistic Argument from Man. Christian 

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HEBERT M. La Derniere Idole. Etude sur La "Person- 

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of the Parliament of Religions, 1893, Chicago. 
Hili,, T. The Absolute, A Person. Christian Thought, 5th 

Series, 3 2I "335- 



— 193 — 

Hou,and, R. A. Agnosticism, Philosophy in Relation to it 
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Hontheim. Institution es Theodicaeae. 1893. 

Hugonin, Mon. Dieu est-il inconnaissable? Annal. de Phil. 
Chret., 1894, 129-145, 217-233; 1895, 409-439- ^ es At- 
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Humphrey. His Divine Majesty, or the Living God. Lon- 
don, 1897. 

IXungworTH. J. R. Personality Human and Divine. New 
York. 1892. 

KaThouk, Der. Die Lehre des hi. Thomas iiber Gott. v. 
29, 26-42, 167-180, 291-308; v. 30, 316-336. Die Krkenn- 
barkeit Gottes nach der Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin. 
v. 83, 242-257. 

Kernaeret de. La preuve de l'existence de Dieu par le 
mouvement. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1887, 64-75. 

Knight, W. Aspects of Theism. 1893. 

Ladd, G. T. Philosophy of Knowledge, c. 21, Knowledge 
and the Absolute. New York. 1897. 

LECL^RE. Examen critique des preuves classiques de l'ex- 
istence de Dieu. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1891, 26-48, 159- 
98, 257-77. 

LEighton, J. A. Typical Modern Conceptions of God. New- 
York. 1901. 

Lii<i,y, W. S. The Great Enigma. New York. 1892. 

Maisonneuve, L. La personnalite* humaine et les theories 
contemporaines. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1894, 65-88, 163- 
178. 

MarTineau, J. A Study of Religion. New York. 1888, 2 
vols. Essays, v. 1, cc. 3, 4, 5. 

Mii,i„ J. S. Three Essays on Religion. 

Month. Material Analogies in the Supernatural Order, v. 
53. 529~538. 

Ormond, A. T. Some Aspects of Theistic Logic. Christian 
Thought, 5th Series, 401-417. 

PEGUES. Theologie thomiste d'apres Capreolus. Revue 
Thomiste. v. 8. Pouvons-nous sur cette terre arriver a 
connaitre Dieu? 50-77. De la voie rationelle qui nous 
conduit a Dieu. 288-310. L'id6e de Dieu en nous. 505-531. 

PESCH, T. Die grossen Weltrathsel. Freiburg, 1884. 2 vols. 



— 194 — 

PiaT, C. Quid Divini Nostris Ideis Tribuat Divus Thomas. 

Paris. 1890. (In the same volume with I/Intellect Actif.) 
Ramey, P. De I/idde d'Innni. Annal. de Phil. Chret., 1886, 

615-623. 

Rashdau,. Personality, Human and Divine, c. VIII. in 

Personal Idealism. New York. 1902. 
Royce, J. The Conception of God. New York. 1898. 
Scheie, H. Der Gottesbegriff in Katholizismus and Pro- 

testantismus. Jahr. f. Phil. u. Spek. Theol., 1888, 241-299. 
Schneider, C. M. Das Wissen Gottes nach der Lehre des 

hi. Thomas von Aquin. Regensburg. 1884. 4 vols. Cfr. 

vols. 1,2. Natur, Vernunft, Gott ( Natural Knowledge 

of God according to St. Thomas.) 
Schurman. Agnosticism. Phil. Rev. v. 4. 
SEUNGER, J. Agnosticism. New Theology and old Theology 

on the Natural and Supernatural. Milwaukee, pp. 79. 

SerTii,i,anges. Preuve de l'existence de Dieu et l'eternite 

du monde. Ce monde preuve-t-ilDieu? Ibid. , Nov. and 

Dec. 1903. 
Seth, A. Two Lectures on Theism. New York, 1897. 
Shanahan, E. T. John Fiske on the Idea of God. Cath. 

Univ. Bull., Jan. 1897. 
Van Weddigen. Philosophic de S. Anselme. c. IV. 
Vaughan, J. S. Evolution as an Argument for Theism. 

Month, v. 53, 344-6i. 
Ward, W. G. Philosophy of the Theistic Controversy. Dub. 

Rev., v. 7, 3. S., 49-86. Philosophy of Theism. 



195 



INDEX OF NAMES. 



Albert the Great, 21, 26, 27 
Alexander of Hales, 21 
Angel of the Schools, cfr. St. 

Thomas 
Anselm, St., 21, 101, 102, 104 
Aquinas, passim 
Areopagite, 19 
Aristotle, 19, 25, 27, 38, 85 
Augustine, St., 7, 19 

Balfour, 161 
Berkeley, 70 
Bernard of Tours, 24 
Boedder, 138 
Boethius 19, 20, 176 
Bonaventure, St , 21 
Bowne, 151 
Bradley, 6, 1, 77 

Caldecott, 6, 90, 129, 149,164 
Capreolus, 7 
Carus, 8, 9 
Chrysostom, St., 178 

David of Dinant, 24 
Democritus, 38 
Descartes, 28, 69, 101 
Dewey, 27 
DeWulf, 21, 22 
Dionysius the Areopagite, 

19, 20 
Driscoll, no 

Epicurus, 39 
Erigena, 21, 24 
Eucken, 26, 29 

Farges, 66 
Fiske, 147, 159 



Flint. 133, 134, 184 
Froschammer, 31 

Gardair, 66 
Gioberti, 136 
Giinther, 31 

Hamilton, 79, 81 
Hanne. 114 
Harris, 23, 26 
Hegel, 101 
Hermes, 31 

Hontheim, 113, 114, 179 
Hume, 79, 85 
Huxley, 128, 129 

Janet et Seailles, 3, 23 
Jourdain, 16 

Kant, 28, 29, 72, 73, 76, 78, 

79, 85, roi, 105, it 9 , 133 
Kleutgen, 84 

Ladd, 2, 39, 59, 67, 80, 82, 

154, 183 
Leibniz, 101, 102, 103 
Leo, Pope, 28 
Lindsay, 22, 27, 39 
Locke, 101, 166 

Malebranche, 136 
Mansel, 153 
Martineau, 161 
Mill, J. S. ; 79, 82, 159 

Pace, 164 
Paulsen, 5, 29 
Pegues, 7 
Peillaube, 67 



196 



Piat, 78, 177 

Plato, 19, 43, 44, 45, 5i, 58, 

76 
Port man n, 16 
Prantl, 26 
Proclus, 45 

Raymond of Pennafort, St., 

12 
Reginald, 16 
Rosmini, 136 
Royce, 6, 27, 30, 98, 160, 164, 

165, 171, 172 

Scotus Erigena, 21 



Sertillanges, 128 
Seth, 68, 69, 132 
Spencer, 5, 79, 82, 130, 131, 

136, 146, 147, 151, 153, !54, 

162, 163 
Spinoza, 28, 101 
Straub, 81 

Turner, 4 

Ueberweg, 24 

Werner, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 20 
Windelband, 25, 26, 39 



197 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 



Absolute, how understood, 151-154. 

Abstraction in knowledge, 60 62. 

Agnosticism, 120, 129, 136, 147, 153, 178, 183. 

Analogy, 87-91; predication by, 149-150, 154-158. 

Anthropomorphism, 149, 161. 

Aristotelianism, 23, 25. 

Assimilation in knowledge, 34, 35, 36, 45. 

Attributes, how predicated of God, 149-150, 154-158; how they 
differ, 154; of God, how attained, 179; Infinite, 165-169; 
Omniscient, 169-173; Omnipotent, 173-175: Personal, 175- 
178; Unchangeable; 151- 152; Absolute, 153-154. 

Canons of Attribution, 148, 165. 

Cause, First, 108, 112; misapprehensions of, 125; nature of, 
125-127; two views of, 127; two factors in formation of 
concept of, 109; infinite series, 127-129. 

Causality, not treated especially by Aquinas, 83-85; how idea 
of, acquired, 84-85; division of, 85; efficient, 86, 116-117, 
125; similarity in, 86-89; known by effects, 81, 89-92; 
principle of, 119; exemplar cause, 121; its knowledge 
power, 124. 

Cognition, cfr. Knowledge. 

Commentary on the Lombard, outline of, 14. 

Compendium Theologiae, outline of, 16. 

Conception of God defined, 11 9-1 20. 

Conceptualism, 67. 

Demonstration, a priori, a posteriori, 106; God known by, 107. 

Dogmatism, 67, 

Dualism of Arabians, 24. 

Eclecticism, 21. 

Existence of God, 97; relation of conception or nature of God 
to, 97; not known per se, 99-101; not by Ontological 
Argument, 101; known by demonstration, 106; by mani- 
festations, 107; arguments for, 116; of motion, 116; of 
efficient cause, 116; of contingency, 117; of perfection, 
118; of order, 118. 



— 198 — 

God, problem of, its position in works of Aquinas, 16-19; in 
Middle Ages, 21; to-day, 1, 23, existence of, 16, 19, 95-119; 
as First Cause, 1 19-130; nature of, 130-165; knowable in 
se, 132-134; not comprehensively nor intuitively, 134; not 
by way of Ontologism, 1 36-141 ; known by way of 
remotion, causality, eminence, 143-150; a postulate, 120; 
Unchangeable, 151-152; Absolute, 153-154; Infinite, 165- 
169; Omniscient, 169-173; Omnipotent, 173-175; a Person, 
175-178; as qui est, 179-180; value of knowledge of, 17; 
conception of, defined, 119-120; Creator and End of man, 
17, 18. 

Idealism, Personal, 115-120. 

Ideas, as state of mind, 69; as representation, 69-73; qualities 
of, 76-79; divine, 73, 122. 

Immateriality of knowledge, 34, 36, 96, 134; defined, 46; basis 
of knowledge for both subject and object, 46-53; same as 
actuality, 49. 

Incarnation, 27. 

Infinite, idea of, how attained, 166; how understood, 166-168; 
matter and form, 167. 

Innatism, 67, 96, 97; of Aquinas, 109-116. 

Intellect, outline of intellectual knowledge, 54; being, proper 
object of, 55; essence of material things, 56-57; active, 
58> 77> 95> 96, 144; its function, 60-63; to abstract, 60-62; 
to illumine plantasma, 63; to make singular universal, 
62, 68; relation to passive, 59. 

Intuition, 96, 97, no. 

Knowable, how things are, 99-100. 

Knowledge, theory of, relation to knowableness of God, 2-3, 
95-96; elements of a theory of, 33-34; immateriality and 
actuality in, 34, 36, 46; assimilation in, 34, 35, 36, 45; 
intentio in, 35,40, same as verbuin mentale in intellectual, 
41; species in, 35-41; general outline of theory of, 34-35; 
three fundamental principles in, 36; relation of subject 
and object in, 36-37; verbum mentale in, 41, 65; validity 
of, 46, 65-73; two kinds of, 54; abstraction in, 60-63; idea 
in, 69; proportion in, 72-75, 91; relativity of, 79-83; two 
kinds of, 54. 

Matter, first, 24; materialism, 29; in knowledge, cfr. Imma- 
teriality. 

Method, employed,3-6, 18, 27; of remotion, causality, eminence, 
144, 148. 

Mysticism, 21. 



— 199 — 

Naturalism, 29. 

Nature of God, Spencer and Aquinas on, 130; infinitely know- 
able in se, 132; Flint's view of God in se, 133; not 
comprehended, 134; position of Aquinas on, 141; reduced 
to primum ens ; analysed, 142. 

Neo-Platonism, 25. 

Neo-Scholasticism, 28. 

Nominalism, 67, 76. 

Omnipotent, relation to will, 173; idea of, how attained, 174. 

Omniscient, idea of, how attained, 170; meaning of, 171; view 
of Royce, I7r, 172. 

Ontologism, defined, 136; of Malebranche, 137; of Gioberti, 
137; of Rosmini, 138; Aquinas' view of, 133-141; and the 
Infinite, 165. 

Ontological Argument, of Anselm, 102; Descartes, 102; Leib- 
niz, 102-103; nature of, 103-104; flaw of, 105; a petitio 
principii, 105. 

Pantheism, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25; of Arabrans, 24. 

Peripateticism, 67. 

Personality, 23, 24; of God, 175-178; how idea of, attained, 
175; meaning of, 176; Bradley's view of, 177. 

Philosopy, Arabian, 21, 23. 25; Jewish, 21, 25; in Middle Ages, 
22, 29; of Aquinas declared insufficient to-day, 29; regard- 
ing Theory of knowledge, 30; regarding God, 30-31. 

Platonism, 25. 

Quaestiones Disputatae, outline of, 15. 

Realism, 67, 89; moderate, 76, 85. 

Relation in knowledge, 147, 150; kinds of, 151; of creatures to 
God, 152. 

Relativity of Knowledge, 79-83. 

Religion, 21. 

Remotion, method of, 143; nature of, 144; application of prin- 
ciple of, 145, 149. 

Revelation, 184-185. 

Scholasticism, 21, 22, 26, 27, 27 ; faculty theory of, 59; 
phantasia in, 62. 

Sensism, 67. 

Similarity, definition of, 86; between cause and effect, 86-89; 
kinds of, 89; knowledge given by, 89-92, 149. 

Similitude, same as likeness or representation; twofold, 37; 
place of, in knowledge, 42-43; Plato's view of, 44. 



200 



Species, sensible, 35; intellectual, 35. 39, 64; synonymous with 
forma and similitudo, 38; impressa, 38; expressa, 38; 
meaning of, 39-41; equivalent to image, 37; no preexist- 
ing, 39; relation of, to object known, 40-41, 65, 68. 

Summa Theologica, outline of, 10-12; Contra Gentes, outline 
of, 12, 13; contrasted w T ith Summa Theol., 13-14. 

Theodicy, 21, 25. 

Thomas, St., relation to other thinkers on question of God, 19, 
25, 26; power of assimilation, 20, 22, 26; no mere imitator, 
22, 25, 27-28; as imitator, 26, 27. 

Trinity, 27. 

Truth, defined, 73; of faculties, 73-75; judgment in, 75. 

Unity, 95, 164. 

Universals, 21, 76. 

Validity of knowledge, taken for granted by Aquinas, 65; 
sensitive, 67; intellectual, 68-73. 



BIOGRAPHICAL. 



Matthew A. Schumacher was born March 8, 1879, 
in Chicago, Illinois. Pursued his primary studies 
at St. Mary's Parochial School, South Bend, Indiana. 
Entered the University of Notre Dame in 1892, 
where he received an A. B. in 1899. Entered Holy 
Cross College, in 1900, and at the same time took 
up studies at the Catholic University of America. 
These studies centred especially around Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Apologetics. — Thanks are due 
to Dr. E. A. Pace, for suggestion and stimulation, 
during the whole course of Philosophy ; also to 
Dr. Aiken, Professor of Apologetics. 



ERRATA. 



On p. 36, 1. 2, read fundamental for fundamenial. 

On p. 70, 1. 17, read ideas for idea. 

On p. 77, 1. 7 of notes, read complementum for eomplementum, 

On p. 80, 1. 11 of notes, read I call for is called. 

On p. 83, 1. 16, read perception for preception. 

On p. 87, 1. 16, supply to before the axiom. 

On p. 112, 1. 2 of notes, read quamdam for quandam. 

On p. 126, 1. 6 of notes, read universi for universale 

On p. 130, 1. 19, read First for Prst. 



LB D '06 



THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD 



ITS RELATION TO THE THEORY 
OF KNOWLEDGE IN ST. THOMAS 



DISSERTATION 




SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE 

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PART 

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR 

OF PHILOSOPHY 



BY 



MATTHEW SCHUMACHER, C. S. C. 

(A. B., S. T. B.) 



NOTRE DAME, INDIANA 

UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1905. 



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